SABAH
SOCIETY JOURNAL VOL. 29 (2012)
The Rise and Fall of a North Bornean Kingdom
The Rise and Fall of a North Bornean Kingdom
Bianca M. Gerlich
INTRODUCTION
“Thus
has Marudu ceased to exist;
and Seriff Houseman’s power received a fall from which it will never recover”,
James Brooke wrote in his diary (1) on 20 August 1845 after a
successful campaign against Syarif Osman of Marudu, (2) which had its eventual tragic
climax in the destruction of Marudu by the British Navy.
Brooke had managed to convince Vice Admiral Thomas Cochrane to proceed with a great fleet against Marudu. The accusation of piracy, which Brooke used intentionally against Syarif Osman, served Brooke as a pretext for the attack. However, on closer examination, this accusation turns out to be false. Nevertheless, Cochrane and other commanders of the British ships, as well as colonial officials, relied on Brooke’s details because, in their opinion, he had insight into the situation in Borneo and because he presented authorities in Singapore, India and London with documents containing allegedly incriminatory evidence against Syarif Osman.
Brooke had managed to convince Vice Admiral Thomas Cochrane to proceed with a great fleet against Marudu. The accusation of piracy, which Brooke used intentionally against Syarif Osman, served Brooke as a pretext for the attack. However, on closer examination, this accusation turns out to be false. Nevertheless, Cochrane and other commanders of the British ships, as well as colonial officials, relied on Brooke’s details because, in their opinion, he had insight into the situation in Borneo and because he presented authorities in Singapore, India and London with documents containing allegedly incriminatory evidence against Syarif Osman.
 |
| James Brooke |
Brooke’s actions have had lasting
influences on historiography. The British commanders on site, Keppel and Mundy,
cited long passages from Brooke’s diaries (the Journals). Furthermore, in
direct contact with Brooke were John Templer, Spenser St. John, and Brooke’s
nephew, Charles Brooke, and in their books they repeated — like the British
commanders — Brooke’s portrayal of Marudu as a pirate’s nest. Horace St. John,
Gertrude Jacob, Sabine Baring-Gould and Charles Bampfylde, who wrote
biographies of Brooke, relied on the same information. As a result, the misrepresentation
of Marudu found its way into the twentieth century; for example, into the works
of Owen Rutter, Emily Hahn and Robert Payne. In books concerning the history of
Sabah and Sarawak it was customary to portray Syarif Osman as a pirate; for
example:
“A famous pirate leader of Borneo at that time was Sherif Osman”
(Mullen 1961: 50–51);
“One of the most famous pirate strongholds in the history of piracy in the East Indies was at Marudu … and their leader was the widely-known Serip Usman” (Whelan 1968: 1).
“One of the most famous pirate strongholds in the history of piracy in the East Indies was at Marudu … and their leader was the widely-known Serip Usman” (Whelan 1968: 1).
It was also included in more
general works that do not necessarily have historical content; for example, in
the travel reports of Cyril Alliston (1961), who portrayed Marudu as one of the
largest pirate places. David Leake (1989) called Syarif Osman a ‘pirate leader’. Such representation
can be found even in some more recent books which touch upon the topic. (3)
However, since the 1960s a more
differentiated discussion has appeared in the academic literature dealing with
the colonial history of northwest Borneo. In particular, Ingleson, Bassett and
Warren come to different conclusions from those previous authors who reflected
the events only from Brooke’s perspective. All three authors stressed that in
fact Brooke was the initiator in the destruction of Marudu because he had
defamed Syarif Osman as a pirate.
Malaysian authors considered Syarif Osman as a hero who was brought down by the British:
“Matilah seorang pahlawan keturunan darah Raja akibat pengkhianatan dan hasutan Inggeris” (Buyong 1981: 15).
Malaysian authors considered Syarif Osman as a hero who was brought down by the British:
“Matilah seorang pahlawan keturunan darah Raja akibat pengkhianatan dan hasutan Inggeris” (Buyong 1981: 15).
In the book Commemorative History of
Sabah 1881–1981, edited by Anwar Sullivan and Cecilia Leong, which was
published by the Sabah State Government on the occasion of the 100th
anniversary of Sabah, Marudu was described as an independent chiefdom whose
interference in the politics of Brunei led to Vice Admiral Cochrane declaring
Marudu as a pirate stronghold and destroying it. Nevertheless, nineteenth century
colonial officials were already in doubt as to the representation of Osman as a
pirate.
Thus Bulwer wrote:
“Yet it is
very doubtful if he [Osman] was guilty of the charge brought against him by the
Brunei Government. He was of Arab descent and a man of character and energy,
and he was acquiring a power and influence which were disagreeable to the
Pangerans of Brunei.” (4)
Even Captain Belcher, who sailed
with Brooke to Brunei in 1844 and who in his letters to the Admiralty supported
Brooke’s defamation of Syarif Osman, came to a different assessment in his book
after having learnt in Manila of the real behaviour and motivation of Syarif
Osman:
“At Maludu Bay, in particular,
the destruction of Seriff Housman has deprived the people of that region, of
the only energetic ruler who could have afforded protection to European
traders” (Belcher 1848: II, 124).
Before Syarif Osman was defamed by Brooke
he was recognised as ‘Rajah of Maloodoo’
by Governor Butterworth of Singapore (Belcher 1848: I, 170), and even Pascoe,
who took part in the Battle of Marudu as an officer, described him as Rajah
(Pascoe 1886:49).
It is difficult to find reliable
contemporary information about Syarif Osman and Marudu. Generally history is
written by the winners — and this certainly applies to Marudu. There are few
neutral statements from that period. Those statements which have emerged in
connection with Brooke’s campaign are biased. One can try to reinterpret them;
for example, from Brooke’s statement that Syarif Osman was a known pirate
leader one can at least deduce that he was a prominent leader.
The source literature on Syarif
Osman consists of official archival letters (the correspondence of the officers
involved in Southeast Asia with the ministries — the Foreign and Colonial
Offices and the Admiralty — in London, as well as interministerial exchanges),
periodicals (Journal of the Indian Archipelago, Singapore Free Press, Straits
Times, Illustrated London News and British North Borneo Herald), private
correspondence (letters between persons involved are also to be found in
archives in London as well as in the Philippine National Archives in Manila;
the correspondence and journals by James Brooke are to be found in the books of
Keppel (1846), Mundy (1848) and Templer (1853)), and travel literature written
by persons involved such as Keppel (1846, 1853), Belcher (1848), Mundy (1848),
Marryat (1848), Cree (Levien 1981) and S. St. John (1862).
If these written sources
are evaluated impartially, the relevant oral traditions reviewed carefully and the
historical situation of northern Borneo before and after Syarif Osman (as well
as the position of his descendants) fully considered, then the importance of
Marudu at the time of Syarif Osman can be ascertained, even though perhaps not
completely understood. This article, based on my extensive study, (5) represents an
attempt to do so.
MARUDU
The
Claims of Brunei and Sulu to Marudu.
The sixty-kilometre-long Bay of Marudu is
located between the Sulu Sea and the South China Sea. The land adjacent to the
large bay is crossed by many rivers where settlements were established. The bay
and the nearby islands formed the core area of Syarif Osman’s territory. To the
south, mountains framed the bay. (6) The name Marudu already appeared on very
rudimentary fifteenth-century Portuguese maps, (7)
on which not many local names were shown.
Marudu lay midway between the
spheres of influence of Brunei to the west and Sulu to the east. Both had laid
claim to Marudu throughout history because they wanted to control its many
economic resources. (8) Though Borneo’s soil may not have been as fertile
as that of the Malay Peninsula, Marudu is represented in the early nineteenth century
as the most fertile region in northern Borneo.(9)
Marudu had been conquered by Sultan
Bolkiah of Brunei (reigned 1485–1524) who extended his power over most of
Borneo as well as Sulu and, most likely, Luzon. (10) Brunei became the most powerful
sultanate of that region. Later, Marudu became part of the inheritance of
family members of Sultan Hassan of Brunei. In the eighteenth century there were
internal problems in Brunei which led to a civil war, after which the areas
north of Kimanis were ceded by the Sultan of Brunei to Sulu in gratitude for its
successful intervention in the civil war. Sulu gained importance in the
eighteenth century through its extremely lucrative middleman role with the
British/Indian– Chinese tea trade.
Thus with Brunei’s civil war the
situation regarding suzerainty in northern Borneo had changed. In 1761 Alexander
Dalrymple had to deal with Sulu, not with Brunei, when he planned to obtain the
island of Balambangan, where he wanted to establish a British trading post. He
listed the Bornean coastal regions that belonged to Sulu as Tirun, Magindora,
Marudu, and Kinabalu/Papar. (11) Brunei still laid claim to them and
quarrelled with Sulu over the issue. In the 1780s Iranun people settled on the
coast between Tempasuk and Marudu and established local markets, which quickly
became trading centres. The stronger the Iranun were, the weaker was Brunei’s
influence in the more northern lands. Brunei’s de facto influence ended where
the Iranun districts began. Marudu formed at that time a kind of border
territory between the spheres of influence of Sulu and Brunei.This is supported
by the observation of Hunt (Keppel 1846: I, Appendix II: lx, lxi) that in the
early nineteenth century the Bay of Marudu was divided into two spheres of
influence: the river district Songy Bessar (Sungei Besar) was ruled by Syarif
Mahomed and sent its products to Sulu, while Benkaka (Bengkoka) was ruled by an
orang kaya who traded with Brunei. However, according to Dalrymple, the leaders
of northern Borneo were virtually independent from the sultanates of Brunei and
Sulu because of the eighteenth-century conflict between the sultanates. (12)
Both sultanates were weakened
further due to succession disputes in the 1820s. Moreover, Sulu was weakened by
the centuries-long Moro Wars with the Spanish, (13) and a war of succession after 1823
contributed to the waning of Sulu’s de facto control, especially in the
northern Borneo territories. Likewise, Brunei had to struggle in the 1820s with
internal succession problems, and had to deal with the British and Brooke less
than twenty years later. So both sultanates had lost even more power after 1820,
paving the way for the rise of a new government structure which was able to
fill the power vacuum that had emerged in northern Borneo through the elimination
of de facto control by the two sultanates.
Marudu
as an Independent Polity
At least since the 1820s, a
tri-partition of spheres of influence could be observed in Sabah: Brunei, Sulu,
and de facto independent territories between the two sultanates. (14) These independent polities were designated as
no-man’s-land (Short 1969: 136) or as pirate states (Wright 1979–1980: 209).
Since the designating of Marudu as a pirate state is an invention of James
Brooke, the label ‘state’ still needs to be considered. According to political
theory studies the de facto control is crucial:
“A state will therefore be considered as independent if its
independence is de facto” (Claessen & Skalnik 1978: 19).
Syarif Osman cannot be represented
as a subject of Brunei and Sulu since the two sultanates no longer ruled over
the north of Borneo, which had become de facto independent. Singh lists Marudu
as the main example of the independent chiefdoms and points to their autonomous
status:
“They were a law unto themselves
and recognised no superior suzerain” (Sullivan & Leong 1981: 94).
Syarif Osman was of course
independent, but to mark him only as a chief does not accord with the political
structure that he had created in Marudu. According to writings on types of
government, the difference between a chiefdom and a kingdom consists of the
ability of the king to delegate his power, which is then exercised on his behalf.
(15) Syarif Osman delegated his power to
other syarif who resided on the many rivers of the bay and who were subordinate
to him. If Syarif Osman had restricted himself to only one river district, then
one could describe him as a chief. However, since he had united both sides of
the large bay and other areas and islands were also under his government, he
can be described as an independent ruler who was ambitious to build up his own
polity.
The creation of a polity in Marudu
was not an automatic or natural process, as a comparison between Marudu and the
island of Cagayan in the Sulu Sea shows. On Cagayan also, Sulu’s control was no
longer effective in the nineteenth century. Here, however, no one took
advantage of the opportunity to establish himself as a ruler. As in Marudu,
there was a foreign coastal population with syarif and datu who, together with
the traditional aristocratic leaders of the indigenous people, occupied the
position of heads. They divided the government into four main districts which
Casiño (1976: 29) describes as semi-independent although the island was still
officially under the control of Sulu. In this context, he points to the problem
that there was no resident authority in Cagayan who could unite these districts
into a single coordinated political unit.
Therefore, no leader in Cagayan
succeeded in doing what Syarif Osman achieved in Marudu by virtue of his
charismatic personality. The more successful a leader was — whether a sultan,
datu or syarif — the more his political structure stood out from the mass of
petty principalities. Syarif Osman was able to use the power vacuum to create
Marudu as an independent and organised political entity and to break loose from
Sulu’s weakening control.
Both before and after Syarif Osman,
no one managed to forge Marudu Bay into a single unit. Although Syarif Osman
built a dynasty, it was weakened by the defeat in 1845, so that it could not
continue to hold the polity together. Three years after the Battle of Marudu, a
son of Syarif Osman complained to the Briton Keppel about the unstable
situation in Marudu: ...
he [i.e. the son of Syarif Osman]
and the chiefs with him admitted that nothing could be worse than the
unprotected state and want of government, under which they lived; that each
petty chief quarrelled with and attacked his weaker neighbours, while they, in
turn, lived in constant dread of an attack from the more formidable Bajow, or
Soloo pirates (Keppel 1853: I, 45).
Members of Syarif Osman’s family
ruled even after the defeat in areas of Marudu, but none of them managed to
unite the communities around the bay. His son Syarif Hassan resided in the south
of Marudu Bay but had conflicts with other leaders and was even expelled
temporarily.(16)
Another son, Syarif
Yassin, fought in the Battle of Marudu and fled temporarily to Sugut. (17)
He was perceived as Raja when residing in Benggaya in
1851, (18) and — as ‘Sheriff Yassin of Malludu’ —
even as principal chief of the Bay of Marudu in 1879 by the British.(19) Syarif Yassin and, after Yassin’s
death, his son Syarif Hussin resided on the eastern side of Marudu Bay, and
Yassin’s sister Syarifa Loya was chief of Kalimo village on the Bongon River.
There were also other relatives not mentioned by name, such as the cousin who
resided in southern Palawan. Thus the claim of the family still existed, albeit
in competition with others such as Datu Badrudin and the family of Syarif Shee
who ruled the areas on the western side of the bay (which had previously paid
tribute to Syarif Osman). (20) In 1845 Syarif Shee’s family had
also fought under Syarif Osman and did not doubt his claim to leadership — as
Syarif Shee even told the British North Borneo administrator W.H. Treacher (CO
874/72, 8 May 1879).
So after 1845, the Bay of Marudu was
again divided into various spheres of influence which resembled not just a
disorganised, but already a lawless, state — as the British observed when
establishing the British North Borneo Company in the late 1870s:
“The
destruction of the region’s ‘only
energetic ruler’ … produced a descent into the near complete anarchy
Pretyman discovered in 1878” (Black 1968: 178). (21)
It was typical for Malay
thalassocratic (maritime) polities that when their organisation was broken,
they were stagnant or in decline. Marudu under Syarif Osman shows the characteristics
of a Malay thalassocracy. It had developed out of Sulu, as Sulu had itself
developed out of Brunei in the eighteenth century, and Brunei’s basic polities were
based on Johore Lama and Malacca. (22) They all had their precursors in
Srivijaya and were trade-oriented coastal states — that is, thalassocracies —
which had mainly in common the Malay language, similar characteristics of
political organisation and, most importantly, trade orientation.
The Malay-maritime coastal states
were created by a group of immigrants who settled on a particular coast and
then dominated the river mouths. (23) The previous resident population
became subordinated to the immigrants and, over time, also took on the values,
customs (24) and religion of the immigrants or
retreated into the interior, where possibly other groups also had to withdraw.
In northwestern Borneo the Malays occupied the coast but did not advance
inland. They settled near the river mouths and were therefore able to control
the trade which flowed upstream and downstream. The inland village communities
were considered a basic political unit,(25)
with several settlements
on a river forming a river district. Syarif Osman united many river districts under
his leadership.
According to Singh (1990: 237–239),
three different zones of economic use can be identified for Brunei and Sabah.
The first zone was the mountainous jungle areas, the primary source of jungle
products. This zone was inhabited by the Dusun/Murut.
After 1845 several
leaders of the Bay of Marudu admit that “that there were many tribes among the
mountains with whom they had little intercourse” (S. St. John 1862: I, 390).
Such statements confirm that the mountainous tribal population did not consider
themselves as subordinates of a particular coastal polity after the decline of
Marudu, whereas, prior to the Battle of Marudu, Syarif Osman seems to have
exercised control over the neighbouring interior tribes (Keppel 1846: II, 192).
The second zone was the coastal lowland zone, which extended about 20 to 40
miles inland, and where wet rice was grown.
The Dusun also lived there, but
this area was dominated by the later immigrants. This zone is considered by
Gullick (1969: 168) as a contact zone between foreigners (outside influence)
and natives (interior people) in Sabah. Third was the sea zone, which was used
mainly for fishing by immigrants from Sulu. In Marudu, the immigrant Bajau,
Iranun and Tausug were the coastal population and were also perceived as Malay
authorities (Belcher 1848: II, 120), while the Dusun (26) were the earlier inhabitants.
SYARIF
OSMAN
Syarif
Osman’s Claim to Leadership
Syarif Osman belonged to the Malay
immigrant society and was considered a foreigner. Because of his title Syarif, (27) he could easily find acceptance as a prestigious, idol-like
leader:
“sereibs or seriffs, descendants of the Prophet, have always been held in
high consideration. They are always addressed by the title of tuan-ku, or ‘your
highness’, and on state days and festivals occupy a position more eminent than
that of the highest hereditary nobles” (Low 1968 [1848]: 123).
Syarif
were thus equivalent to the members of royal lineages (28) and were able to marry into noble families. They also founded
sultanates, as in Sulu and Pontianak.(29) The origin myths of maritime
coastal states in Sabah as well as in the Philippines often go back to the
immigration of one or more syarif. (30) Thus syarif were predestined to
assume leadership, which was not limited to religion but affected the whole
society and politics.
A further strengthening of Syarif
Osman’s leadership resulted from his marriage alliances. One of his many wives
was the daughter of Sultan Pulalun of Sulu. This princess appears in the Sulu
genealogies, but not — as usual — by name. According to oral tradition she was
called Dayang Sahaya and was highly venerated in Marudu. Even Rutter (1991 [1930]:
205), who worked for the North Borneo Chartered Company from 1910 to 1915,
learned at Marudu that the princess was reputed to have had supernatural powers
and that her grave was very honoured.
Her brother was Raja Muda Datu Mohammed
Buyo, the successor to the throne and a friend of Syarif Osman. Spenser St.
John (1862: II, 207–8) reports how much Datu Buyo grieved for his dead sister
after the Battle of Marudu and was thereafter hostile to the British because
they were responsible for the defeat and death of his sister and brother-inlaw.
Also, Syarif Osman’s son Yassin and grandson Hussein married princesses of the
Sulu ruling family.
“Clearly, dynastic relations with older Muslim ruling houses of
neighbouring countries was an added item reinforcing legitimacy” (Majul
1977a: 653).
The marriage with Dayang Sahaya
meant that Syarif Osman and his direct descendants were able to protect their
primus inter pares claim against the other syarif and leaders in Marudu Bay.
The marriage was of mutual benefit for both Syarif Osman and the Sultan’s
family. Sulu was at the time under external political pressure, which is reflected
in the Treaty of 1836 with the Spanish. In Syarif Osman, Sulu won a reliable ally
and trade partner. Moreover, Syarif Osman married other daughters of Marudu Bay
leaders for political reasons. Thus these leaders felt bound to him because in
the traditions of northern Borneo and the southern Philippines the side into
which the women married was considered the stronger. (31)
In oral traditions the number of women who
married Syarif Osman is very high — forty or forty-four. The more women a
leader managed to acquire, the higher his prestige.(32) Moreover, the fecundity of the
leader was of great importance and was applied to the situation of the whole
country: the more fertile the leader, the more fertile the land. Syarif Osman
legitimised his position as the Raja of Marudu by his tactical polygamy, his
potency, his title, and his connection to an old Muslim dynasty.
The role of the raja is considered
prominent and central in the Malay world. Loyalty was an essential element
between ruler and subordinates who understood their position in relation to the
raja, (33) who was legitimised by a sacred
aura. (34) The person — not the office — was
important. The authority of the ruler was based on the willingness of his
supporters to remain loyal. He had to be able to bind the supporters to him. According
to Kiefer (1972: 93), the power of the leader was crucial to his supporters and
was largely derived from his wisdom and his justness, his prosperity, his
title, and the cannons that he possessed, as well as the number of loyal
followers.
Syarif
Osman as a Charismatic Leader
Even in the cultural sphere of Sulu,
to which Marudu belonged through their common waters, (35) a ruler not only obtained his
position through inheritance or because of his office, but also by virtue of
his own personality. This style of leadership may be designated as charismatic
authority. A charismatic leader is regarded as superhuman because of his
character, his strength and his ability to help his followers. (36) For the emergence of a charismatic leadership certain
conditions also had to be met; for example, the leader had to be a foreigner.
Syarif Osman was perceived as a foreigner simply because of his Arab title. (37) Furthermore, he also knew how to gather many
followers. He ruled by Islam and adat, and he was known for his strict style of
leadership, especially when seeing that the local customary law, the adat, was respected.
With Marudu expanding as a stable trading centre, more and more people came to
settle there because it offered prosperity and protection from pirates and from
the exactions of the colonial powers. Syarif Osman was described as strong, courageous,
ambitious, assertive and self-confident — so he must have seemed charismatic to
his supporters.
Syarif Osman also owned many
cannons. According to Casiño (1976: 29), Muslim coastal rulers had a monopoly
on these weapons, which symbolised wealth, power and the political office
itself. The British discovered eleven large guns in the fortress in Marudu,
together with numerous small brass cannons. In oral tradition the cannons
played an important role in the defeat. According to many accounts, the main
cannons were given particular names: Penamal, Mandi Dara(h), Bujang Si Dandam/Puasdandan,
Gentaralan. Appell, who recorded in the 1960s a legend of the Rungus Dusun
relating to the death of Syarif Osman, reported that there were three cannons
named Sorio, Puasdandan and Putut Karabau which had been endowed with supernatural
abilities by river spirits. It was Syarif Osman’s brother-in-law Pompugan who
fired the guns in the wrong order and was thus responsible for the defeat. (38) In this Rungus tradition, magic plays an important
role.
Supernatural qualities are essential
for a charismatic ruler. Syarif Osman was said to be generally in the
possession of supernatural properties (39) and invulnerable:
“as
he [Syarif Osman], being one of those whom they deem invulnerable, exposed
himself to every fire, and fought to the last” (S. St. John 1862: II,
207).
Spenser St. John (1862: II, 208) describes in this context the method of
creation of invulnerability (namely, through the “rubbing of their whole bodies
with some preparation of mercury”) which, according to him, differs
from the method in Sarawak. Magical powers were invested in Syarif Osman
himself or in persons near him, such as his wife Dayang Sahaya, or items such
as his guns.
In addition to his title and his
alliances through marriage, it was the charismatic qualities which legitimised
Syarif Osman as a leader and strengthened his claim to power. Typically, the
role of the raja in a Malay thalassocracy was so exalted that there were really
no — or only very rudimentary — other recognisable concrete administrative
structures.
“The Raja is not only the ‘key institution’ but the only institution,
and the role he plays in the lives of his subjects is as much moral and religious
as political” (Milner 1982: 113).
Syarif Osman had the typical key
position held by a raja: he was the political and religious leader, and
everything focused on him.
“The Malay conceptualisation of authority
was directly linked to the presence of a Raja; territory was unimportant, hence
the term kerajaan (the state of having a Raja), which is, more appropriately,
the Malay equivalent of the Western concept of a ‘kingdom’” (Khoo 1991:
20).
For Malay independent constructs the expression kerajaan can be considered
as an adequate designation, if there is a raja at the top. (40)
Marudu
as a Trade-oriented Thalassocracy
As a Malay thalassocracy, the Marudu
kerajaan was first of all trade-oriented. Trade can be understood as the
essential foundation of a Malay maritime coastal state.
It is described by Trocki
(1979: 52) as “the only source of political power that Malays had ever known”.
A successful thalassocracy was based on economic activities. The Malay maritime
states exerted primarily political influence if they were able to control the trade
with their peripheral areas. The trade was necessary for the ruler to gain
wealth, which in turn was important to guarantee a large following.
Therefore,
Milner (1982: 16, 17) states that “The kingdom was, in the final analysis, a
commercial venture, and Malay rulers were the greatest merchants in their
state.”
Syarif Osman concentrated on
acquiring the products that were important for trade with China, especially
birds’ nests. Similarly, marine products were obtained — fish, trepang (sea
cucumber or beche-de-mer), turtle eggs, pearls, mother-of-pearl, shells,
agar-agar and tortoise shell. Except for the first three, these products were mainly
used for trade. Trepang was an important domestic food item, but it was also an
important source of revenue in the markets of China and Sulu, as were pearls and
tortoise shell. The goods were stored in Marudu before sale. Other products in Marudu
were rattan, wax, wood, sweet-scented wood (kayu laka), and camphor. Tobacco
and rice were also cultivated and traded. The trade was important for the rise of
Marudu as a kerajaan. Syarif Osman knew how to organise and protect the trade. The
inland population did not come into contact with the merchants. According to
the structures of a Malay coastal state, it was the immigrant society who
organised trade and profited by it. By trading, Syarif Osman gained control
over the local population. He also needed to trade in order to pay his numerous
retinue, through which he became a recognised and respected leader.
In order to attract foreign traders
in the port, Syarif Osman not only built storehouses, warehouses and shipyards
in his harbour, but also took defence measures. His strong fortress, built to
secure trade, was two square miles in size, consisting of several forts and
batteries. The complex was protected on three sides by palisades. Protected within
the fortress stood — besides houses — warehouses and armouries, a village and
fields. (41) To be safe from pirate attacks, it
was situated a few miles upriver and secured by a wooden barrier with iron
chains which was stretched across the river and could not be destroyed by the
British forces. The fortress was one of the strongest in the whole region.
Furthermore, Syarif Osman had
entered into alliances with the Bajau and Iranun, so that they would no longer
be dangerous to him at sea. Likewise, Srivijaya had bound the Orang Laut
contractually. These nomadic sea-faring nations no longer committed piracy
against Srivijaya and Marudu, but rather protected the waters from pirate
attacks. According to Trocki (1979: 208), the rise of the Malay maritime
coastal states was dependent on the ability to control the sea off their
coasts. From the report of Earl, who travelled in Borneo in the early 1830s,
the conclusion can be drawn that in Marudu good, safe trading conditions had
been created:
The north-east end of Borneo has
not, I believe, been visited by a British vessel since the abandonment of
Balambangan, but, according to the accounts of the Bugis traders who sometimes
touch there, a very interesting change has lately taken place. They assert that
large bodies of Cochin Chinese are now established on the shores of Malludo Bay
and the adjacent parts; and as the Cochin Chinese are known to be settled in
considerable numbers on the neighbouring island of Palawan, there appears to be
no reason for doubting the correctness of their information (Earl 1971 [1837]:
322–323).
The settling of the Chinese in
Marudu suggests that Syarif Osman had already built a safe harbour with good
trading conditions. The goods which were handled in Marudu were indeed
primarily destined for the China market. Based on this reference and on oral
tradition (Gerlich 2003: 233) and, of course, on the development of the two neighbouring
sultanates, it can be assumed that Syarif Osman had established himself in
Marudu no later than the early 1830s.
Marudu’s
Spheres of Influence
Syarif Osman succeeded in increasing
the number of his followers by a functioning, organised trading system.This
enabled him to enter into more alliance partnerships and to bind more distant
river districts. He could demand tribute from communities that he in turn was
able to protect by his naval power. He had built a strong centre, which is
typical of a Malay thalassocracy, being defined by its centre and not by a delineated
territory.
Basically, there is an imbalance of power between the centre and
periphery areas. There are several terms to describe this phenomenon of Malay coastal
states which all emphasise the discrepancy between centre and periphery; for example,
the negara concept (Geertz 1980),(42)
the galactic polity
concept (Tambiah 1976), and the segmentary state model (Kiefer 1971). In the
segmentary state model, the authority outside the centre should not have been
exerted politically, but only ritually and symbolically, so these peripheral
districts could have been perceived as independent.
The same applies to
Wolters’ mandala concept (1982). According to him, the “mandala is an unstable ‘circle of kings’ in a territory without fixed
borders, in which each subjugated unit of the state remained a complete,
potentially independent polity with its own centre and court” (Christie
1985: 9).
These centre-periphery theories are
applicable to Marudu. As Sulu had become weaker it lost effective control over
peripheral areas, including Marudu. That was the prerequisite for the
independence of Marudu, which then itself formed a polity that resembled the
segmentary state model, similar to a mandala. Marudu had a strong centre and
effective control over neighbouring rivers. The farther away Marudu’s areas of
influence were, the weaker the influence and the more independent these areas
may have been; nevertheless, Marudu still had some influence there. Figure 1
illustrates Marudu’s spheres of influence. The dark grey field is the area in which
Syarif Osman’s influence was the strongest (the centre). The lighter the grey, the
weaker his influence.
The centre consisted of the fortress
lying on the Marudu River (later called the Langkon River). According to an
1851 list by Syarif Osman’s son Syarif Hassan, the people of the adjacent river
systems had paid tribute to his father, as had the people of the offshore
islands of Banggi and Balabac. Through this list, Syarif Hassan wanted to give
evidence to Spenser St. John (1862: I, 389 ff.) of the areas which had been
once subject to his father. Other leaders in the bay (Datu Bedrudin and Syarifs
Musahor, Abdullah and Houssein) confirmed his statements. Syarif Hassan’s list
cites the following locations (from north to south):
Udat, Milau, Lotong, Anduan, Metunggong,
Bira’an, Tigaman, Taminusan, Bintasan, Bingkungan, Panchur, Bungun and Tandek.
Therefore, Syarif Osman exerted influence from Kudat to Tandik. St. John also
mentioned the Bengkoka district, but the name does not appear directly in the
list.
However, the family of Syarif
Osman’s son Syarif Yassin built one of their main residences there. (43) According to S. St. John (1862: I, 391), Syarif Osman
had also tried to establish a settlement in Mobang (Melabong), which lies near
Bengkoka to the north. In the oral traditions, other places are mentioned as
being under Syarif Osman’s rule; for example, the village of Parapat near
Limau-Limawan, and the island of Tambun in front of the Bandau River mouth.
Kampar, where he lived and died, is mentioned as his home village.
The islands in the north of Marudu
Bay were also viewed by Syarif Osman as his direct sphere of influence. He had
recovered items from a wrecked and abandoned ship near Banggi, which confirms
that he regarded the area as his own. According to Belcher (1848: I, 194),
Syarif Osman had made an excursion with his ships from Banggi to Palawan. The
residents of Banggi paid tribute to the Malay authorities of Marudu Bay in
1846, even after the downfall of Syarif Osman (Belcher 1848: II, 120). The
Spanish clergyman Cuarteron, who was a resident of Labuan in 1857, reported that
fifteen years previously Syarif Osman had made a rather cruel expedition
against the people of Balabac as they had refused to pay tribute.(44) It is not surprising that Syarif
Osman wished to directly control the entrance to Marudu Bay.
In the medium grey region of Fig. 1
one can see the more remote river systems which also had to pay tribute but
could not be controlled as closely as the districts in the bay. Syarif Osman’s
influence extended east to approximately Labuk, and west of Marudu Bay to at
least Ambong, if not to the border of Brunei, which was then very probably Kimanis.
The island of Labuan, which is located opposite Brunei Bay and therefore still
further south than Kimanis, was also mentioned in contemporary sources in connection
with Syarif Osman. (45)
Three facts allow us to draw
conclusions about the reign of Syarif Osman over the Labuk/Sugut area. First,
his direct descendants Syarif Yassin (his son) and Syarif Hussin (his grandson)
also ruled there. Yassin fled to the area after the Battle of Marudu and
settled there. He was considered to be the supreme leader and had married a
daughter of a local chieftain named Datu Israel; this suggests he pursued a
marriage policy like his father. Second, the area was known as a particularly
good source of camphor, one of Syarif Osman’s main exports. (46) Third, this area lies in the direct eastern
neighbourhood of Marudu Bay and had already formed in Dalrymple’s time (47) a unit combined with the bay (under the name Malloodoo
and later Alcock Province) when the British North Borneo Company ruled there. (48)
Contemporary sources point to the
influence of Syarif Osman on the southwest coast of Marudu Bay. The population
of Ambong told Captain Belcher (1848: I, 194) in 1844 that Syarif Osman
exercised power on the coast between Brunei and Marudu. He demanded from them
support in the form of a ship and crew in order to help collect tribute in
Palawan, Banggi and Balabac. Syarif Osman and his fleet had made an
intermediate stop in Ambong in 1841, as mentioned by Haji Hassan, who claimed
to have seen a European woman during his stay there.(49) In all correspondence regarding
that European woman, Ambong is regarded as belonging to Marudu, which is
represented by Belcher as a large district reaching from Kinabalu to Marudu
Bay. The Governor of Singapore’s letter (Belcher 1848: I, 170) asking for clarification
concerning the woman was directed only to Syarif Osman of Marudu and not to
anyone in Ambong, where the woman was seen, or in Tempasuk, which lies in
Ambong’s direct neighbourhood. Most likely Syarif Osman’s influence on the northwest
coast of what is today Sabah would not have been everywhere in that area, but
major communities would have paid him respect and tribute.
To the north, Syarif Osman’s
influence extended at least to southern Palawan, where he demanded tribute in
the form of birds’ nests. After the Battle of Marudu, his followers established
a settlement in southwest Palawan in which they lived under a cousin of Syarif
Osman.(50) It was only after Syarif Osman’s downfall
that the Tausug managed to regain control over Balabac and southern Palawan.(51)
Syarif Osman also had relations with
the residents of Tempasuk, which he visited in 1844. Relatively independent
Iranun settled there in the eighteenth century and even referred to their
leaders as ‘sultans’. Brooke used as
argument against Syarif Osman that the Iranun were in league with him.
Certainly both Tempasuk/Pindusan and Ambong had their own leaders who, however
they may have been entitled, had regarded Syarif Osman, due to his position, as
superior to them.
According to Wright (1979–1980: 213), Syarif Osman would have
been connected through kinship to the Iranun leaders and he received tribute
from them. Pascoe (1886: 49, 51) mentioned a relative of Syarif Osman called
Sheriff Mahomed who served as parlementaire (i.e. an intermediary) and who
fought bravely but was killed:
“a fine intelligent young man about twenty
four years of age, an Illanun native (as I understood), from Mindanao in rich
attire, and head adorned with feathers”.
Even in the British reports of
1844/45 (52) it is pointed out that Syarif Osman
had been recognised by the relatively independent population of Tempasuk and
Pindusan. After all, this area was also in the coastal strip which was regarded
as belonging to Marudu. Their leaders were not as influential as Syarif Osman
since none of them managed to fill the gap left behind by Marudu’s decline in
1845.
Perhaps Marudu’s relationship with Pindusan and Tempasuk was more of an
alliance based on an institutionalised or informal friendship between the leaders,
but with Syarif Osman being considered the stronger partner in the alliance.(53)
Similarly, Syarif Osman may have had
such an alliance with Sandokong of Melapi, a leader on the Kinabatangan River.
Sandokong was in possession of the huge birds’- nest caves in the Kinabatangan
area.(54) Since Syarif Osman planned to
control the entire birds’-nest trade of the northern Borneo coast, (55) it can be assumed that he wanted to have Sandokong
under his control. Kinabatangan district is in the immediate vicinity of Labuk
district, and the existence of a good road was already reported in 1812 by Hunt
(Moor 1837: 54) to have connected Bengkoka in Marudu Bay with Sandakan which is
near the birds’-nest caves in the Kinabatangan River area.
According to oral
traditions in Marudu Bay Syarif Osman and Sandokong were comrades, and Sandokong
is said to have fought in the Battle of Marudu. He was likely to have been one
of the most influential leaders of his time.
These alliances can be compared with
the peripheral areas of the mandala concept. A supreme ruler is recognised, but
the leaders still remain autonomous in their respective areas. This alliance
area is marked on Fig. 1 as a light grey area.
The numerous alliances would
certainly have increased Syarif Osman’s reputation and power. Rutter (1922:
100) and Wright (1979–1980: 213) conclude that Syarif Osman’s de facto region
of power must have extended from Tuaran to Tungku, which lies still further away
to the east of Kinabatangan. Wright even mentions the distant island of
Tawi-Tawi. (56) However, it is difficult to prove
Syarif Osman’s sphere of influence in detail, especially regarding locations
far east of Marudu. Contemporary information indicates that he exercised direct
control over the islands and river districts of Marudu Bay and demanded tribute
even from more distant areas. His sphere of influence was likely to have been
almost exactly the area between the two ancient sultanates of Sulu and Brunei,
whose rulers looked at him not as a competitor but as connected by friendship
and kinship.
Foreign
Political Relations
As Raja of Marudu, Syarif Osman had
created his own kerajaan. He was recognised by European government officials
such as General Claveria of Manila and Governor Butterworth of Singapore, as
well as by local neighbours. Syarif Osman cultivated very good relations with
the two directly neighbouring sultanates. As already mentioned, he was married
to a daughter of the reigning Sultan of Sulu and was a friend of her brother,
the heir to the throne. Sulu had not only acknowledged Marudu, but found it a
reliable partner in troubled times. Syarif Osman was also accepted at the court
of Brunei. He was a friend of Pengiran Usop, who exercised effective control in
Brunei in his position as bendahara (that is, the chief advisor to the sultan).
Usop’s daughter was married to the Sultan’s son, the Crown Prince Pengiran Anak
Hashim. Syarif Osman also had relations with him as well as with other nobles in
Brunei. (57)
Pengiran Muda Hassim, who had been
living in Sarawak from approximately 1837/38 to 1844, (58) and his half-brother Pengiran Bedrudin travelled back
with Brooke in 1844 from Sarawak to Brunei, where they were placed by Brooke in
opposition to Pengiran Usop, because Brooke labelled the supporters of Pengiran
Muda Hassim and Pengiran Bedrudin as being pro-British, and those of Pengiran
Usop and his allies as anti-British. (59) Therefore in the British literature
of that time the alliance between Syarif Osman and Pengiran Usop is considered
as Syarif Osman’s real crime, as he thus necessarily became, in Brooke’s
opinion, an opponent of Muda Hassim and even of Brooke himself. (60) Brooke went so far as to drive out
Pengiran Usop from the post of bendahara by gunboat diplomacy (61) and to re-install Muda Hassim.
By doing this, Brooke offended the nobles of
Brunei, so they in turn finally fought against Muda Hassim and Bedrudin (both
committed suicide to avoid capture in late 1845/early 1846). Syarif Osman was well
known by those Brunei nobles who represented the real power in the sultanate (until,
that is, the situation was drastically changed by James Brooke’s intervention).
Thus, Syarif Osman had maintained good foreign relations with both sultanates, as
well as with neighbouring independent communities and with the main trading centres
in the region. In addition to Sulu and Brunei, he traded with the Iranun from the
west coast of Sabah, the Balangingi from the Sulu Archipelago, the Bugis and,
of course, the Chinese. He was invited by Butterworth to trade in Singapore
(Belcher 1848: I, 170).
He was in good contact with regional leaders; many may
have been actually present in Marudu, as indicated by the fact that after the
Battle of Marudu the British discovered many influential persons among the dead
(“persons of considerable influence”:
Talbot, in Keppel (1846: II, Appendix V, xciv)).
In the early 1840s Syarif Osman’s
authority in northern Borneo was more far-reaching than that of other leaders.
He was regarded as an ambitious and strong leader who could offer protection
and whose government was considered to be effective and successful.
THE
SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF MARUDU BY JAMES BROOKE
“Usman’s
career was cut short by a man of similar temperament and talent” (Warren 1981:
79).
From 1840 James Brooke established
himself in Sarawak. To consolidate his position there he gradually eliminated
potential opponents, beginning with the leaders of the adjacent river
populations. (62)
With the move to
forcibly restore his protégé Muda Hassim to the powerful position of bendahara
in Brunei, Brooke extended his influence and intervened actively in the
politics of Brunei. Brooke had basically disposed of Pengiran Usop after
October 1844, and the Sultan was supposedly under Brooke’s control (through
Muda Hassim and Bedrudin).
Syarif
Osman as a Potential Rival to James Brooke
Around this time Brooke may have
heard of Syarif Osman’s influence in Brunei and Sulu because before 1844 he had
not written anything negative about Syarif Osman. Now he was afraid that Syarif
Osman could possibly intervene in Brunei (63) and that this could affect his
plans to bring the whole of north western Borneo under his influence.(64) Thus, Brooke began his campaign against Syarif Osman
with the reinstallation of Muda Hassim in Brunei. He was especially afraid of
the unpredictability of Syarif Osman’s reach of power. Brooke was able to
control the situation in Brunei in favour of his own interests, yet he could
not control Syarif Osman by means of Muda Hassim.(65) Marudu was a kerajaan, independent
of Brunei, and thus dangerous in Brooke’s view because Syarif Osman possessed
precisely the connections which Brooke wanted for himself. Syarif Osman had
extended his sphere of influence to the borders of Brunei and was free from the
influence of colonial powers and from control by the sultanates. The
sultanates, on the other hand, had to deal with the Europeans themselves: Sulu
with the Spaniards, and Brunei with the British. To the east of Borneo, the
Dutch were extending their influence.
Syarif Osman’s alliances with
members of the ruling families — especially Pengiran Usop and Datu Mohammed
Buyo, who were critical of European interference in their affairs (66) — might even have contributed to his reputation of
resisting European influence. Marudu’s destruction represented a preventive
measure by Brooke: the elimination of a potential opponent of the imperial
policy of expansion which Brooke wanted to enforce in Borneo. (67) With the destruction of Marudu he ensured that his own
personal leadership in Brunei and, of course, in the whole of northwestern Borneo
would not be interfered with by Marudu.
Whether Syarif Osman would ever have
turned against Brooke is questionable. He had taken no direct action against
the British when they had deposed Pengiran Usop as bendahara even though he
certainly must have been alarmed by it. Syarif Osman took only increased
defensive measures — and only after the British fleet was already in the Bay of
Marudu. Most likely, Syarif Osman did not know what was brewing against him
after October 1844, because until then he had been recognised by domestic and
foreign governments.
Because Brooke could not exert any
influence on Marudu through his good contacts in Brunei and because an
independent state could not be attacked easily, Brooke again used the ploy he
had already used successfully against the leaders of the river districts in
Sarawak. He portrayed Syarif Osman as a pirate in order to gain the support of
the British Navy, which was only allowed to intervene when the East Indian
trade routes were considered to be no longer safe. Brooke was aware of this and
was also aware that while the British and the Indian governments insisted on a
policy of non-involvement in the native states of Borneo, they would sanction activities
for the suppression of piracy. It was this issue of piracy which enabled Brooke
to obtain the naval support which was essential for the success of his wider
aims (Ingleson 1970: 38).
James
Brooke’s Campaign against Syarif Osman
Thus, Brooke started a campaign
against Syarif Osman. First, he succeeded in convincing Captain Belcher (with
whom he was travelling along the coast of northwestern Borneo after the
restoration of Muda Hassim as bendahara in October 1844) not to deliver the
letter to Syarif Osman from Governor Butterworth in Singapore, in which Syarif
Osman was referred to as “Rajah of Maloodoo” (Belcher 1848: I, 170). Brooke
persuaded Belcher to allege that Syarif Osman was a pirate. Belcher reported
(following Brooke) that Syarif Osman was planning a piratical expedition
against Palawan. Belcher’s letter of 5 December 1844, addressed to the Admiralty
— which was responsible for the security of the sea routes — is, however, in
contrast to reports in his book (1848), in which he gave a detailed chronology
of his journey. In his letter he indicates that the expedition was made by
Syarif Osman to demand tribute. After Belcher and Brooke had separated, Belcher
went on to Manila where he was informed by General Claveria that this was also
untrue, but that Syarif Osman went to a stranded ship near the island of Banggi
and took everything still usable. In his book, Belcher wrote less accusingly
and even described Syarif Osman as “the only energetic ruler” in
northern Borneo who could protect European traders.
Perhaps this discrepancy may be
traced to the temporal and spatial distance between Belcher’s writing of his
letter and of his book. When he wrote the letter dated 5 December 1844 he was
still under the influence of James Brooke’s statements. On his part, Brooke
wrote at that time about the piracy of Syarif Osman in letters to Wise (CO
144/1, 31 October/5 November 1844). It was imperative for him that other persons
represented Syarif Osman as a pirate — so Belcher’s letter to the Admiralty was
of great significance to Brooke. A start on the systematic defamation of Syarif
Osman had been made.
In February 1845 Brooke went on the
offensive, after having received — through Captain Bethune — his official
appointment as ‘Agent near the person of
the Sultan of Brunei’.
Since the beginning of his operations in Sarawak,
Brooke had hoped to be officially recognised by the government in London. Now
Aberdeen (that is, the Foreign Office) had granted him this unpaid office and
also informed the Sultan of Brunei in a letter that Brooke was now officially
allowed to conduct negotiations for the United Kingdom. Brooke was to ensure
Brunei’s cooperation in the protection of trade.
Bethune was instructed to send the
Foreign Office letter to the Sultan and to look for a suitable site for a naval
station in north western Borneo. Labuan was under discussion since it was
halfway between Singapore and Hong Kong and it promised to have coal resources.
Brooke supported the idea of having a British colony on the island of Labuan,
partly because it could serve to control Brunei. So Brooke and Bethune travelled
to Brunei, where they arrived on 24 February 1845 and immediately met with the
Sultan and other nobles. Brooke prepared a memorandum for the British government
in which he outlined the advantages of Labuan and the need to eradicate piracy,
in particular the elimination of Syarif Osman. Only one day after his arrival in
Brunei, he persuaded the nobles to sign a letter requesting that action be
taken against Syarif Osman because official procedure required that notice of
this concern be conveyed by the Brunei Government to Brooke. (68) In Brooke’s diary, the following statement is dated 25
February 1845:
“The
rajahs of Borneo have addressed to me the following letter, in my public
capacity, which I conceive will be sufficient to gain protection for Borneo, if
it does not enable the authorities to act in the offensive, and at once to
crush Malludu and its pirate gang” (Mundy 1848: II, 15).
Strangely, this letter from the
Sultan and Muda Hassim to the Admiralty was dated 6 March 1845. The reason for
post-dating it to 6 March can be explained by another event. On 5 March Brooke
wrote:
Received intelligence from Malludu:
Sheriff Osman has fortified himself, and is prepared to resist the threatened
attack of the English; and report further states, that if the British squadron
do not attack him, he will, at all events, assault Brunè for having entered
into a treaty with us. Throwing aside all speculative points, our first
endeavour must be to crush the Sheriff, or at any rate to protect the capital
(Mundy 1848: II, 29).
The exact message received by Brooke
is an open question. Certainly it was not as dramatic as he described it.
Marudu was already known as a strong fortress. If Syarif Osman had threatened
Brunei then he was most likely referring to Brooke’s protégés Muda Hassim and
Bedrudin and not to the Sultan or Brunei itself. Brooke took this message as
the reason to newly date the letter from the Sultan and Muda Hassim, which he
had actually received 13 days earlier, to make it more obvious why the Brunei
authorities would seemingly ask at this point in time for the protection of the
British against Marudu. As Marudu and Brunei were previously allied by flourishing
trade and friendly bonds, it is questionable whether the Sultan had signed this
letter voluntarily.
In February/March 1845, Captain
Bethune’s ship was at anchor in Brunei and thus potentially threatened the
Sultan and the nobles. This letter was very important for Brooke’s plan to win
the Navy’s support for an offensive against Marudu. So he handed the letter and
Bethune’s and Belcher’s statements against Syarif Osman to Vice Admiral
Cochrane in Singapore, where he had gone together with Bethune after his stay
in Brunei. The Navy officials relied on Brooke’s information since they
believed he had insight into the local situation, and because he could also provide
them with local complaints about Syarif Osman. Thus Brooke managed to win the
Vice Admiral’s support for his projects in Brunei and Marudu.
Vice Admiral Cochrane also addressed
a detailed letter to the Admiralty. He presented letters from Captains Belcher
and Bethune as well as the Sultan’s letter dated 6 March 1845. Brooke,
recognised as an Agent by the Foreign Office, sent in turn a copy of the same
letter from the Sultan, as well as his two memoranda to the Foreign Office
(Memorandum on the Suppression of Piracy and Memorandum on the Royal Family of
Borneo, both dated 31 March 1845, FO 572/1, No. 7). He also sent copies of the
Sultan’s letter and of the first-mentioned memorandum (on piracy) to Governor
Butterworth of Singapore. This letter campaign was based on Brooke’s misrepresentation
of Syarif Osman as a pirate and a danger to the security of Brunei and, more
specifically, to British interests in Brunei.
The
Charge of Piracy
In these letters, Brooke tried to
provide evidence of the offence of piracy. In his documents of 1845 he
mentioned three ships in particular: the Sultana, the Lord [Viscount] Melbourne
and the Wilhelm Ludwig. In mentioning these ships, Brooke was attempting to
associate them with acts of piracy. In fact, they were shipwrecked.
The Sultana was shipwrecked on 4
January 1841 in the vicinity of Dumaran Island, which lies northeast of
Palawan. Most survivors were able to make it to Brunei, where they were robbed
of their possessions, taken prisoner and treated as slaves.
However, nineteen
people landed in Marudu. One of them, Haji Hassan, said:
“When at Maloodoo, I lived in
the house of a Syed, and was treated very well” (Belcher 1848: I, 165).
He only stayed there a few days before he travelled to the south with a crew
from Marudu and stopped in Ambong, where he saw a European woman who lived
there (Singapore Free Press, 30 September 1841). In October 1844 Governor Butterworth
asked in a letter — which by Brooke’s instigation was not delivered — for
Syarif Osman’s assistance to resolve the case with regard to the European woman
in Ambong.
Butterworth makes no mention of
possible Sultana crew members enslaved. He could have asked Syarif Osman for
their release if it was assumed that they were still staying in Marudu.
However, in June 1845 in Singapore, Brooke had Church, the Resident Councillor,
prepare two testimonies of former Sultana crew members in which they reported:
We are there seized and detained by
Shireef Osman, the chief of the place, who treated us in every respect as
slaves. After a time, myself and Mahomed, here present, were handed over to
Dattoo Bureedeen, of Marudu. We remained there about two years, when the Dattoo
conveyed us and Jose the drummer to Borneo, and handed us over to Pangeran Usuf
(PP LXI, 1852–53, Cochrane to Admiralty, 21 July 1845, Sub-Enclosure 2,
Statement of Bastian Martinez).
These statements were sent to the
Admiralty in London to provide evidence against Syarif Osman and, of course,
also Pengiran Usop. However, first, it is quite strange that Brooke obtained these
statements exactly at that point when he desperately needed to persuade the
Vice Admiral to fight against Pengiran Usop and Syarif Osman; and, secondly, even if things were as the two
sailors testified, the fact of slavery was still no proof of piracy. The
British, and also Brooke, knew that shipwrecked persons automatically became by
law the property of the finder. (69)
The same weakness of a claim of
piracy applies to the shipwreck of the Lord Viscount, which ran aground on the
Luconia Shoal off the coast of Brunei on 5 January 1842. Here, Captain
Bethune’s only accusation is that Syarif Osman had sold the sailors into
slavery. (70) In 1842 twenty crew members were
held in Brunei, but eventually they were handed over to Brooke, who did not
connect their fate with Syarif Osman, but with Usop. With the case of the Lord
Viscount, as with the Sultana, neither Brooke nor Bethune went so far as to
construct a possible pirate attack by Syarif Osman.
The third ship, the Wilhelm Ludwig
from Bremen, became stranded — unlike the other two ships — in the waters of
Marudu itself, on a small island called Mangsi, probably in October/November
1844. According to Brooke, the alleged looting and burning of this European
ship was the answer of Syarif Osman to Muda Hassim’s demand that he must not
come to Brunei any longer and was a deliberate continuation of his pirate
deeds. (71)
However, General Claveria explained
to Captain Belcher in Manila at the end of 1844 that Syarif Osman had gone
there to take the salvage left behind by the crew. In fact, it was unwritten
law in Southeast Asia that the salvage belonged to the ruler on the spot. (72) After the Battle of Marudu, a ship’s
bell, furniture and anchor chains from the Wilhelm Ludwig were found, but these
came not from a pirate attack — as Brooke had claimed in August 1845 (73) — but as salvage of an already abandoned ship in
Marudu. In none of the cases — not the Sultana, the Lord Melbourne nor the
Wilhelm Ludwig — can acts of piracy by Syarif Osman be proved.
Brooke and the British Navy officers
influenced by him had no evidence, a fact which Belcher also noted:
“Serif Osman ... never engaging himself in
any active Piracy he encouraged the real actors in every possible way supplying
arms and food, and assisting in the disposal of the plunder” (CO 144/1,
Report on Balambangan, p. 64/ archive numbering).
However, Belcher claimed — as did
Brooke — that Syarif Osman had practised indirect piracy. But if they adopted
this stance, then they logically should also have charged with piracy all those
persons involved in this type of trading system, including the majority of
Malay and Borneo nobles! Syarif Osman participated in the trading system and,
of course, in slavery in a similar manner to other nobles of Sulu, Brunei and
other places. When it suited his purpose, Brooke, on the one hand, tolerated
this kind of cooperation with alleged pirates, while, on the other hand, he
readily used it as evidence against someone who was standing in his way. He had
no real evidence of active piracy by Syarif Osman, so he tried to create a
picture of Syarif Osman as a pirate by citing the cases of the three ships.
Brooke seemed to have a very
thorough knowledge of what constituted piracy but he was unwilling to accept
the legal results attributed to the definition. Hence, he redefined the concept
of piracy in order to rationalize some of his illegal activities. They [Brooke
and the British Navy] distorted the legal term to fit the forces of the Borneo
states and thus to justify attacking them. To suggest that James Brooke did not
know the legal definition of piracy in international law is to insult his
intelligence (Hamzah 1991: 15, 18).
In April 1845 Cochrane had promised
to support Brooke, who now urgently awaited his support as he feared that the
situation could escalate in Brunei. Muda Hassim was not nearly as popular as
Brooke tried to make out to the authorities. He was afraid that Pengiran Usop
might seize power with support from Syarif Osman.(74)
In May 1845 he
again went with Bethune to Brunei, where they learned that in the meantime the
American ship the Constitution had anchored in Brunei waters and the Americans
had tried to enter into trade relations with Brunei but had failed to do so due
to translation difficulties.
This provided a further argument for
Brooke to urge the authorities to intervene. In the official correspondence
with Aberdeen (the Foreign Office), Brooke stressed that the visit of the
Constitution had weakened the pro-British side. In addition, he pointed to
possible interference by the French who showed interest in Basilan Island in
the Sulu archipelago. When he corresponded with the Foreign Office, Brooke did
not use the charge of piracy as his main argument because the Foreign Office
did not have jurisdiction over piracy matters, so he instead emphasised concern
about the security of the British sphere of influence in Borneo, which could be
threatened by the Americans or the French.
Bethune and Brooke travelled
immediately from Brunei to Singapore to promote their cause. Here they asked
Church, the Resident Councillor, to record the testimonies of two former slaves
from the Sultana who had travelled with them to Singapore. He could have
recorded the statements previously when they were all in Brunei where Brooke
had obviously ransomed them,(75)
but it looked more
official if Church recorded them. Brooke used these statements for another
letter campaign in June/July 1845. Again he wrote to the Foreign Office, while
Cochrane sent to the Admiralty a letter with many enclosures which he had
received from Brooke. However, when Cochrane wrote his letter on 21 July 1845
he must have known that it would reach London only after he would have
intervened in Brunei and Marudu. Thus, their letters were only directed to
obtain ex post facto approval of their operations.(76)
The
Offensive against Pengiran Usop
Cochrane set out for the northwest of
Borneo with eight heavily armed ships. Such a fleet brought fear and terror to
the Siamese: upon departure of the fleet from Malaya, the Siamese immediately
took preventive defensive measures because they assumed they would be attacked.(77) Cochrane and Brooke arrived in
Brunei on 8 August 1845 in order to proceed against Pengiran Usop. Officially,
he was accused of having held British subjects in slavery. The Sultan and other
nobles could also be similarly accused of slavery, but Brooke did not want to
eliminate them at that time. The later secretary and biographer of Brooke,
Spenser St. John (1879: 101), saw it as fortunate that two British subjects
were held as slaves by Pengiran Usop because that provided a pretext for
Cochrane to proceed against Usop.
The Vice Admiral again got the
Sultan’s written approval for his planned action and he persuaded the Sultan to
declare that Usop was rebellious and would probably attack the pro-British
party after the British had departed. There is no doubt that the ships in
Brunei’s waterways intimidated the Sultan so much that he had no choice but to
sign the document.
Following Brooke’s statement, it was
demanded that Pengiran Usop should appear before the Sultan unarmed and in the
presence of British soldiers, otherwise the British would attack his residence.
He had one day to comply. According to the statement of Edward H. Cree, the
surgeon of the Vixen who was present in the negotiations, Usop took part in the
first meeting but refused to sign a British contract to suppress the piracy,
whereupon they gave him one day to sign, otherwise they would fire upon his
house (Levien 1981: 156). Usop then barricaded himself in. Expecting a violent confrontation,
the people fled. Cree describes how a shot was fired through Usop’s roof, which
the British considered a warning.
The Pengiran defended himself and
then shot back in turn. The British, however, claimed that he had started the
fight because their first shot was only a warning. Thus, they were able to
justify the destruction of the house. The first shot was a heavy hit and, of
course, the British had opened the attack with it, but later authors followed
the opinion of the Vice Admiral that Usop had attacked first.(78) Usop was put to flight and his
influence destroyed in Brunei. He returned after the British had departed and
tried to fight Muda Hassim and Pengiran Bedrudin, but they put him to flight
again. Usop escaped to Kimanis, which belonged to him as Sungai Tulin
(inheritance). Brooke later urged the Sultan to impose the death sentence on
Usop, which was enforced in October 1845.
The
Battle of Marudu
Cochrane’s fleet left Brunei and
reached Marudu on 17 August 1845. The Vixen, Pluto, Nemesis, Wolverine and
Cruiser sailed deep into the bay. Cochrane gave the command to Captain Talbot.
With 24 boats loaded with guns, he went to Syarif Osman’s position. Talbot was
to fall back if victory was endangered. The British did not know Syarif Osman’s
exact position, but were led to him by two Brunei natives who — according to
Cree (Levien 1981: 161) — acted under duress. Early in the morning of 19 August
1845 Talbot entered the river leading to the fortress. The pilot failed to
inform the Captain of the full situation as he overlooked the fact that one
sideof the fort was accessible by land; here Talbot could have sent soldiers.
Syarif Osman’s position consisted of
two forts, one equipped with three cannons,the other with one (see Fig. 2). The
forts, separated by a creek, were decorated with colourful flags, a sign of the
presence of many distinguished leaders and personalities.Syarif Osman’s own
banner — a red flag with a tiger’s head — flew over the fort.(79) He had placed a barrier made of tree
trunks and iron across the river about 200 metres ahead of his fortress so that
enemy ships could not proceed, but the gunners of the fort could fire on the
attackers.
Before the battle commenced, Syarif
Osman had sent Syarif Mohammed with a flag of truce and asked for negotiations,
but the British did not agree. The British began to work on the barrier with
axes, whereupon Syarif Osman opened fire. The battle took about an hour and
claimed nearly ten dead and twenty wounded on the British side. Cree describes
how a squad of soldiers landed on the right-hand river bank and successfully
targeted the fortress with rocket projectiles (Levien 1981: 161). These weapons
might have been superior to those of Syarif Osman and caused havoc in the fortress.
The only chance of the Marudu defenders lay in the persistent bombardment of
the barrier to avert an assault. However, after firing they had problems in
bringing the guns back into position (according to Pascoe).(80) When the British broke through after
an hour, most of the defenders fled. There was some hand combat, but the battle
had already been decided. Probably the loss of skilled combatants by the rocket
fire.
A. Enemy’s stockade.
1. Eight-gun battery.
2. Eight gingalls (large, often mounted, muskets).
3. Burial ground.
4. Serip Usman’s house.
B. Three-gun battery.
C. Floating battery.
D. Double boom made of two tree trunks, one 7 feet and the other 5 feet in circumference, fastened to each launch by an iron chain.
E. Jungle that had been cut down and undergrowth about breast high.
F. Gardens.
G. Malay town.
H. High jungle.
1. English force.
2. One Rocket battery.
K. Boats — 21 in number, eight of
them with guns.
1. Agincourt’s launch.
2. Vixen’s pinnace.
3. Daedalus’ launch.
4. Vestal’s launch.
5. Agincourt’s barge.
L. Small ditch which before the
action was supposed to be a deep branch of the river. (Levien 1981: 158)
Ground plan of the attack on Marudu was
too high for a more effective defence. A report in the Straits Times in October
1845 (Vol. 1, no. 1, p 2) states that 240 fighters from Marudu were killed and
wounded:
“The slaughter has been very severe ....”
The Britons found many prominent
leaders among those killed, but Syarif Osman was not found. Cochrane suspected
that he had fled to his small house in the countryside. The British assumed
that he had been wounded. He did not show up again in the history of Borneo.
Therefore Cochrane and Brooke assumed that he had died when they controlled the
location a year later. (81)
After the flight of the defenders,
the British fell upon the location, sacked, killed, and set fire to the fort,
burning down (to their own anger) some camphor warehouses. The British even ran
the risk of being trapped by the fire. They made the guns unusable or took them
on board their ships.
The sailors and marines chased after
them [the Marudu-defenders] in such an unruly manner that one of the officers,
Lieutenant Pascoe of the Vestal, was disgusted: ‘all was helter-skelter as if
going to a fair’, he said later. The navy had done a great deal of damage with
gunfire and there were many dead and wounded, but some of the sailors and
marines treated the whole affair as a great lark (Evans 1978). Finally, the
British caught some animals and ended their operation with a picnic.(82) People who searched for possible
survivors a day later in the ruined fortress were expelled as looters with a
few shots. Brooke and Cochrane tried again to justify the destruction of Marudu
as a pirate hideout through physical evidence. They took the ship’s bell of the
Wilhelm Ludwig, which they had found in Marudu, as evidence of piracy, although
it was made clear by Belcher that the bell had come to Marudu as salvage.
As a result of Brooke’s defamation
of Syarif Osman, Marudu was destroyed on Cochrane’s command. Based on
constructed evidence, Cochrane and Brooke won approval for the destruction of a
flourishing trade centre in northern Borneo. Marudu had fallen victim to the
preventive measure of Brooke, namely, the destruction of a potential opponent
of imperial expansionism and of his own claim to leadership in north western
Borneo.
However, the charge of piracy was so
massively driven by Brooke that it has repercussions to this day. On 19 August
1845 he not only caused hundreds of people to lose their lives and destroyed
their settlement, but he also destroyed the memory of the real Marudu. Clearly
it was not a pirate hideout and Syarif Osman was not the powerful leader of
Borneo pirates, but a raja who was about to build up Marudu as a kerajaan
(kingdom), independent of Sulu, Brunei and other regional powers. The significance
of what Syarif Osman achieved in Marudu is in large part lost or has been
ignored.
“Thus has Marudu
ceased to exist.”
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Keppel (1846: II, 152).
(2) Besides the spelling Osman, the
spellings Usman and Uthman are also found in the literature, as well as
Houseman/Housemann/Hausman in the British literature of the nineteenth century.
In the oral information on Sabah the name variations Syarif Osman Indal Lana,
Syarif Suman, and Syarif Rom/Rum bin Syarif Osman were mentioned (Gerlich 2003:
250).
(3) Accordingly, the British
literary scholar Ann Lawson Lucas writes in her introduction to the novel Le
Tigri di Mompracem (Salgari 2009: 36), which is set in Borneo: “Wir wissen,
dass in den vierziger Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts das historisch bekannteste
undgefürchtetste Piratennest in der Bucht von Marudu (oder Malludu) im
äußersten NordenBorneos lag.” (We know that in the eighteen forties, the
historically well-known and most feared pirates’ nest was in the Bay of Marudu
(or Malludu) in the far north of Borneo.) (English translation by the author of
this article.)
(4) FO 12/38, Bulwer to Kimberly, 28
May 1872. Here the origin of the charge is blamed on Brunei. Brooke and
Cochrane enforced in August 1845 a letter from the Sultan of Brunei requesting
the destruction of Marudu. This letter was used by Brooke as evidence when communicating
with the British authorities.
(5) Gerlich (2003). On many matters
which will only be touched upon in this article, please refer to the book for
more extensive discussion: it contains the records of oral traditions that I
collected in Marudu as well as those collected by other authors.
(6) Refer to Casiño (1977: 310),
with reference to Fox: water unites while mountain ranges divide. Refer also to
Brown (1969: 7).
(7) Refer to various maps in Nicholl
(1976).
(8) Warren (1981: 77, 79).
(9) Leyden (1837), Hunt (Moor 1837:
53) and Wilkes (Blair & Robertson 1903–1909: 1717). Based on information
provided by a local navigator, Dalrymple wrote (c. 1792): “Malloodoo is, in
many respects, one of the most valuable districts on Borneo. Few places equal
it in the abundance of provisions, nor is it destitute of valuable articles of
commerce” (Belcher 1848: II, 128–129).
(10) Refer to Low (1880: 3, 7, 24);
Hughes-Hallett (1940: 27).
(11) Belcher (1848: 277).
(12) Tarling (1978: 14).
(13) In 1836 and 1851 Sulu was
forced to enter into treaties with Spain. Wilkes stated during his visit in
1837 that Sulu had become weak compared to the past when it had controlled much
trade (Blair & Robertson 1903–1909, vol. 43: 180).
(14) Brown (1969: 160); Black (1971:
64); Sullivan and Leong (1981: 85).
(15) Sagan (1987: 3
(16) PP LXI, 1852–53, Austen to
Parker, 16 March 1852, Enclosure 3, Massie to Austen; S. St. John (1862: II,
224).
(17) CO 144/36, Bulwer to Kimberly,
28 May 1872.
(18) PP LXI, 1852–53, Papers
relating to the murder of Mr Robert Burns, testimony of Karnoor, 2 December
1851.
(19) FO 12/47, Treacher to Colonial
Office, 30 June 1879.
(20) For a detailed comparison of
the areas of influence of Syarif Osman with those of his descendants and Syarif
Shee, refer to the map in Gerlich (2003: 100).
(21) Black refers to Belcher’s
statement that Syarif Osman was the only energetic ruler (Belcher 1848: II,
124).
(22) Gallop (1993: 4); Brown (1969:
176); Majul (1977b: 677); Milner (1992: 46). Of course, certain regional
differences between Borneo and Malaya should have been taken into account.
(23) Refer to Bronson’s model of the
trade exchange (1977: 42), which clarifies this political system. The situation
in Borneo is comparable to the situation in Sumatra, to which the model refers,
since there are similar geographic conditions.
(24) In Brunei, for example, the
Kedayan converted to Islam (Casiño 1976: 37). Refer also to Brown (1976: 184);
for the term ‘Malayness’ see Ali (1975: 60); Milner (1982: 10/11); Kiefer
(1971: 50). The ethnic groups of Borneo who converted to the Islam represented
the main part of the later Malay population (King 1993: 125). Refer also to
Dalton (1837: 2/3). Syarif Osman was a member of a Malay-Muslim society, which
regarded itself as elite in comparison to the other ethnic groups.
(25) Refer to King (1993: 197);
Appell (1978: 163).
(26) S. St. John (1862: I, 390)
referred to the Dusun as Ida’an in his list of people from Marudu. In the
nineteenth century, the term Ida’an was often used synonymously for the Dusun.
(27) “The word ‘Sharif’ is Arabic
and means ‘noble’. It is a title which is universally given to the descendants
of the Prophet Mohammed. The full title is ‘Sayid Sharif’, the ‘master and noble’.
The Arabians generally use the first word, Sayid, alone, but the Moros have
adopted the second” (Saleeby 1905: 53). In the Arab world, mainly the Sunnis
used the title Sharif for the descendants of Hasan ibn Ali and Sayyid for the
descendants of Husayn ibn Ali, both grandchildren of the Prophet Muhammad.
(28) Refer to Gullick (1965: 67).
(29) Refer to Majul (1969) (Sulu),
Leyden (1837: 101) (Pontianak).
(30) Saleeby (1905: 52 f., 1908: 3);
Sopher (1965: 312/313); Majul (1973: 87).
(31 Refer to Ileto (1971: 2/3).
According to Reber (1966: 98), followers were obliged traditionally to supply
their masters with women for marriage.
(32 This statement, applicable to
every man, is also reflected in the Darangen, the most popular epic tale in the
Philippines. Before the Qur’an it was the main source of wisdom and normative
behaviour. It is still respected (Francisco 1977: 655/656).
(33) Refer to Milner (1982: 104).
(34) “This area of sanctity or, one
might call it the ideology of legitimacy, is better known as ‘daulat’” (Khoo
1991: 18).
(35) Casiño (1977: 313); see also
Philippines Bureau of Printing 1964: 21.
(36) Sinha (1995).
(37) Even Syarif Osman’s grandson,
who represents at least the third generation in Marudu, is still referred to as
a young Arab (CO 855/1–55, British North Borneo Herald, 1 September 1883: 4).
(38) Appell (1965: 228–229).
(39) The terms for Syarif Osman’s
supernatural abilities which can be found in oral traditions and in S. St. John
(1862) and Appell (1965) are: pandai ilmu, ilmu batin, kitab and ilmu kebatinan.
(40) Kerajaan is associated with the
term state: “Satu lagi konsep yang ada hubungan dengan kerajaan ialah negeri
atau ‘state’. Sebagai institusi, pengertian dan peranan ‘negeri’ hampir sama
dengan ‘kerajaan’” (Daud 1987: 10).
(41) On Cree’s map (Levien 1981:
158) of the Battle of Marudu, one can recognise the facilities and dimensions
very well. See Fig. 2.
(42) Negara is equated with the
capital, the state is defined by negara, which originally meant ‘town’, and is
used in Malay simultaneously as palace, capital, state, realm, and again town (Geertz
1980: 4). Refer also to Anderson (1972: 28).
(43) It seems that Syarif Hassan had
not dealt much with his brother Syarif Yassin who settled at Bengkoka. Probably
Yassin was a child from the marriage between Dayang Sahaya and Syarif Osman,
while Hassan is likely to have had a different mother. When presenting the list
to S. St. John, it was Syarif Hassan’s intention to declare that the government
rightfully belonged to him (1862: II, 224), so he saw himself as heir to his
father’s claim, but he made no hereditary claim to the places in the east of
Marudu Bay; perhaps this is why Bengkoka is not explicitly mentioned in the
list.
(44) PNA, Isla de Borneo, Tomo II,
Folder 3, Exp 1, 1–11, Cuarteron to Don Fernando, 28 October 1857. The
neighbouring island of Balambangan was not inhabited in Syarif Osman’s time.
(45) FO 572/1: 7 (1): Memorandum of
31 May 1845; refer also to Tarling (1971: 47).
(46) Camphor was discovered in large
quantities by the British after the Battle of Marudu.
(47) Refer to Dalrymple’s detailed
description of “Malloodo” (Belcher 1848: II, 128–131). Dalrymple wrote also that
“the limits of each [district] are not very definite” (Belcher 1848: I, 278).
Moor (1837: 53) mentioned the following: “Second, Maludu, or Kini Balu, which includes
the provinces of Paitan, and Labuk, and extends from cape Simpanmanjio to the west
end of Sondakan harbour.”
(48) CO 855/1–55: British North
Borneo Herald, 1 October 1886: 215.
(49) Belcher (1848: I, 165). Belcher
was ordered to make inquiries regarding an European woman in Ambong and in his
book the correspondence in this regard (pp. 163–170) includes the testimony of
the seaman Haji Hassan which appe,
(50) Levien (1981: 166); Buyong
(1981); Scott (1988: 175/6); Rutter (1922: 105); Rutter (1991 [1930]: 204).
(51) PNA, Isla de Borneo, Tomo II,
Folder 3, Exp. 1, 1–11, Cuarteron to Don Fernando, 28 October 1857; Warren
(1981: 79).
(52) Refer for example to FO 572/1,
No. 7, Brooke to Aberdeen, 31 March 1845, Enclosure 1; Mundy (1848: I, 18).
Refer also to Rutter (1922: 98); Tarling (1963: 124); Buyong (1981:13).
(53) Kiefer (1971: 47) points out
that these institutionalised as well as informal friendships frequently formed
the basis of alliances. On the importance of alliance networks, refer to Junker
(1999: 76).
(54) For Sandokong
[Sandukung/Sandukur] as grandfather of the famous Pengiran Digadong Samah and
in connection with the Gomantong caves, refer to Harrisson (1966: 134); Bampfylde
(CO 874/233, 22 Feb. 1883), Bhar (1980: 129 ff). Refer also to Gerlich (1998).
(55) Brooke writes: “his [Osman’s]
great object, I hear, is to possess himself by force of all the birds-nests’
caves in that part of the coast, and on Palawan” (Mundy 1848: II, 17).ared in
the Singapore Free Press, 30 September 1841.
(56) The island of Tawi-Tawi was the
centre of Balangnini (Ileto 1971: 26), who Brooke claimed cooperated with
Syarif Osman (Mundy 1848: II, 18).
(57) Mundy (1848: II, 11, 15).
(58) When Tradescant Lay (1839: 178)
was in Brunei in 1837, he was told by Pengiran Muda Hassim (the then bendahara)
that he “was meditating a visit to all the neighbouring places upon the coast
which acknowledge the supremacy of Brunei, in order to bind them to that state
by leagues of confederacy and exchanges of mutual confidence”. When Brooke visited
Sarawak (a vassal state of Brunei) in 1839 for the first time, he met Pengiran
Muda Hassim who told him of problems with the local population who had rebelled
against Brunei. When Brooke returned in 1840 after a year’s absence, Muda
Hassim asked him to help end the rebellion and promised him — according to
Brooke — the position of governor of Sarawak. However, after Brooke had helped
quell the rebellion neither Muda Hassim nor Pengiran Indera Mahkota, Governor
of Sarawak since 1827, wanted to pass over the government to Brooke. Instead,
Muda Hassim allowed him only to stay in Sarawak and to trade. Bassett (1980:
43) explained the confusion in the transfer of Sarawak as follows: “It is
difficult to believe, on Brooke’s evidence alone that Hassim offered the
government ... of Sarawak to Brooke in November 1840 simply because he needed
his help to deal with the rebellion, when none of the Malays viewed the
rebellion at all seriously.” After 10 months of stalemate, however, Pengiran
Muda Hassim was compelled by a threat of force by Brooke to give the post of
governor to him in September 1840, and this appointment was confirmed by the
Sultan of Brunei in 1842.
(59) Between Pengiran Usop and
Pengiran Muda Hassim old family rivalries existed. Besides, Pengiran Muda
Hassim was appointed Bendahara in the 1830s, and when he was away in Sarawak,
it was Pengiran Usop who became Bendahara after a palace coup in Brunei.
(60) Bassett (1980: 48), Mundy
(1848: I, 382; II, 12/13), Ingleson (1970: 53).
(61) Saunders (1969) details the
events that led to the re-installation of Muda Hassim as Bendahara. Based on
several eyewitness accounts, Saunders points out that the gunboat diplomacy of
the British forced the Brunei Malays to depose Pengiran Usop. The British ships,
which towered above the wooden houses in Brunei, posed threateningly in front
of the audience hall of the Sultan’s palace, which was open to the water, and a
gunner was ready with a burning torch.
(62) Refer to Tarling (1971: 46).
(63) Memorandum on Bruné, 3 July
1845, in: PP LXI, 1852–1853, Cochrane to Admiralty, 21 July 1845, Enclosure 1.
(64) Before James Brooke could gain
a foothold in Sarawak, he had planned to go first to Marudu, inspired by
Raffles’ views and by the deeds of Dalrymple in North Borneo. He described his
plan in a report for the Royal Geographical Society: refer to Keppel (1846: II,
Appendix I: vii ff.). (‘Proposed Exploring Expedition to the Asiatic
Archipelago, by James Brooke, Esq., 1838’). Refer also to Tarling (1978: 66);
Keppel (1846: I, 14); S. St. John (1897: 270). When Mundy operated on the
Borneo coast in September 1846, he stated Brooke’s goals in Borneo as achieved
and described him as the current “de facto sovereign of the whole coast of
Borneo Proper, from point Api to Malludu, 700 miles in extent!” (1846: II,
266).
(65) Thus, according to Brooke, Muda
Hassim’s attempt to command Syarif Osman not to come to Brunei as long as he
practised piracy was unsuccessful. Refer to FO 572/1, No. 7, Brooke to
Aberdeen, 31 March 1845.
(66) Pengiran Usop was not generally
hostile against the Europeans. Indeed, he often sought contact; for example,
with the Dutch in the 1830s (Tarling 1971: 50). Even against Brooke, he was not
hostile in 1842 (Keppel (1846: I, 324–325); Tarling (1971: 53); Bassett (1980: 44)).
Conflicts arose only because of Brooke’s direct intervention in Brunei’s
policy, especially because Brooke had forcibly removed Usop from his office by
for no apparent reason.
(67) “The foundation of the British
position in the north-east was helped enormously by the British Navy’s decisive
defeat of pirates in the Marudu Bay region in 1845” (King 1993:145).
(68) Brooke had done the same in
1843 during his campaign against the Saribas and Sekarang communities. At that
time he had asked Pengiran Muda Hassim in Sarawak for a letter requesting the
destruction of these communities, which was to be handed to Captain Belcher.
Here, too, an oral request would have been sufficient, as Belcher was on the
spot. Yet, for the purposes of the British authorities, Brooke required written
proof from local people that these two communities were committing piracy.
(69) Brooke wrote in his diary in
1842: “I had some scruples about three Kleeses of the Sultana, who had been
sold at Malludu Bay, bought there by an Arab Seriff, and brought here. By all their
laws and customs they were his slaves, purchased at a distance, and, as I had
no right to claim them …, I paid a fair price for them …” (Keppel 1846: I,
326). In 1883 the British stated: “A few years ago these shipwrecked
unfortunates would have been naturally looked upon as the undisputed private
property of the finder and no one would have dreamed of arguing that point” (CO
855/1–55: British North Borneo Herald, 1 May 1883: 4).
(70) Letter of Bethune to Cochrane,
1 April 1845, in: PP LXI, 1852–1853, Cochrane to Admiralty, 10 April 1845,
Enclosure 1.
(71) FO 572/1, No. 7, Brooke to
Aberdeen, 31 March 1845.
(72) Refer to Manguin (1991: 45, n.
14); Andaya (1993: 95).
(73) Refer to Keppel (1846: II,
151–152).
(74) Refer to Brooke’s Memorandum on
Bruné, 3 July 1845, in: PP LXI, 1852–1853, Cochrane to Admiralty, 21 July 1845,
Enclosure 1.
(75) Refer to the statement of Bastian
Martinez, 20 June 1845, in: PP LXI, 1852–1853, Cochrane to Admiralty, 21 July
1845, Enclosure 1, Sub-Enclosure 2, Enclosure.
(76) This was a common practice at
that time because the post to London took three months on average. The Battle
of Marudu was actually approved afterwards; refer to Aberdeen to Brooke, 18
October 1845, FO 572/1, No. 11. Brooke owed the Navy’s help to the engagement
and the decisiveness of the officers in Southeast Asia who often decided on their
own initiative, but certainly also tried to seek the opinion of other Britons
on the spot.
(77) Singapore Free Press, 49/10, 4
December 1845.
(78) For example, Hahn (1953: 114);
Irwin (1955: 91); S. St. John (1879: 102); Evans (1978: 15); Baring-Gould and
Bampfylde (1989 [1909]: 115). Rutter (1991 [1930]: 189/190) noted that the
first shot by the British was fired over the house.
(79) Pascoe (1886: 50). Lieutenant
Pascoe of the Vestal admired a defender of Marudu who, in a bold action,
re-erected the flag after it had been shot down.
(80) Pascoe (1886: 49); Evans
(1978).
(81) Brooke called Dayang Sahaya a
widow (CO 144/1, Brooke to Foreign Office, 25 May 1846).
(82) Refer to Rutter’s report (1922:
104).
Bibliography
Official Records
Public
Records Office, London
·
Admiralty
Records
- · Adm 1/5548: China and Mediterranean
·
Colonial
Office Records
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- · CO 855/1–55: The British North Borneo Herald & Gazette (1883–1940)
- · CO 874: British North Borneo Papers, 1878–1915
·
Foreign
Office Records
- · FO 12: Borneo, 1842–1875
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- · FO 572 (Confidential Prints): Papers respecting Borneo, 1844–1847 and ‘Brunei, Sarawak and British North Borneo’
·
Parliamentary
Papers
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Philippine
National Archives, Manila
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Isla
de Borneo
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Tomo
II:
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Folder
1: Exp. 1, 1–3b, 17.11.1882
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Exp.
2, 4–9, 12.11.1848/6.5.1846
·
Folder
2: Exp. 1, 1–1b, 27.3.1845
·
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·
Exp.
2, 12–13b, 10.3.1858
·
Exp.
4, 16–20, 16.5.1858
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Exp.
5, 21–21b, 20.8.1858
·
Exp.
6, 22–24b, 22.9.1858
·
Exp.
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·
Exp.
16, 112–113b, 3.3.1877
·
Folder
7: Exp. 1, 1–22b
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University of Singapore
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The
Singapore Free Press, 1845–1847
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Straits
Times and Singapore Journal of Commerce (July–December 1845)
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The Author : Bianca Maria Gerlich
Pictures : Google Images
.....a most enlightening read....I was captivated....this broadens my view about Rajah Brooke's role in the evolution of the politics of Borneo....it confirms my view that history is written by the victor...and its interesting that each side has their own version of events....or perception of events...never the less, as history always proves, the man with the biggest guns..and the best strategies (eg. political diplomatic connections)always comes on top....Thank you for your research.
ReplyDeleteHello Admin., I am Maharani Mimi, thank you for writing this. My great great grandmother Dayang Victoria " Oya." Cabailo Manlavi, grand daughter of the Chief / King of the Kerajaan " Kingdom of Taytay,Palawan...King Cabailo, was one of the wives of Shariff Usman... My ancestors own the caves of Birdsnest in Northern Palawan,
ReplyDeleteespecially the Northeastern part . So, Shariff / Rajah Usman could possdibly, buy/ collect all the birdsnest,since my Great great grandmother was a crown princess. Beside through marriages he had the right to collect also tribute, in return he was to depend the kingdom from the conqueror... When Brooked defeated him, he stayed a few months in the southern part of Palawan, our cousins the Cursod's and Joya's of today.. Soon he joined my grandmother in protecting Taytay, with the Masikampo of Aborlan.. Attacked the Spaniards.... To reclaimed our lands, not of an act of piracy... His wife was the Chief, and he only became Agwasil " Alquazir ",as designated / recognuzed by the Spanish authorities,he changed his identity.. Called himself Semion Daquer...as was told to my grandpatents... My great grandmother, Asunciana Daquer I,became the Chief of Taytay.... riding her horse in inspecting the Birdsnest caves, and the herds of cow...