Tuesday 27 February 2018

Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation - 24th December 1962 – 11th August 1966

Campaign Service Medal with ‘Borneo’ Clasp
24th December 1962 – 11th August 1966
Qualifying Period – Thirty days or more, service, not necessarily continuous in North Borneo
(now Sabah, Sarawak or Brunei).

Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation

The Indonesian–Malaysian confrontation (also known by its Indonesian/Malay name, Konfrontasi) was a violent conflict in 1963–66 that stemmed from Indonesia's opposition to the creation of Malaysia. The creation of Malaysia was the amalgamation of the Federation of Malaya (now West Malaysia), Singapore and the crown colony/British protectorates of North Borneo and Sarawak (collectively known as British Borneo, now East Malaysia) in September 1963.

The confrontation was an undeclared war with most of the action occurring in the border area between Indonesia and East Malaysia on the island of Borneo (known as Kalimantan in Indonesia). The conflict was characterised by restrained and isolated ground combat, set within tactics of low level brinkmanship. Combat was usually conducted by company or platoon sized operations on either side of the border. Indonesia's campaign of infiltrations into Borneo sought to exploit the ethnic and religious diversity in Sabah and Sarawak compared to that of Malaya and Singapore, with the intent of unravelling the proposed state of Malaysia.

The challenging jungle terrain of Borneo and lack of roads straddling the Malaysia/Indonesia border forced both Indonesian and Commonwealth forces to conduct long foot patrols. Both sides relied on light infantry operations and air transport, although Commonwealth forces enjoyed the advantage of better helicopter deployment and resupply to forward operating bases. Rivers were also used as a method of transport and infiltration. Although combat operations were primarily conducted by ground forces, aerial forces played a vital support role and naval forces ensured the security of the sea flanks. The British provided most of the defensive effort, although Malaysian forces steadily increased their contributions, and there were periodic contributions from Australian and New Zealander forces within the combined Far East Strategic Reserve stationed then in West Malaysia and Singapore
.
Initial Indonesian attacks into East Malaysia relied heavily on local volunteers trained by the Indonesian Army. With the passage of time infiltration forces became more organised with the inclusion of a larger component of Indonesian forces. To deter and disrupt Indonesia's growing campaign of infiltrations, the British responded in 1964 by launching their own covert operations into Indonesian Kalimantan under the code name Operation Claret. Coinciding with Sukarno announcing a 'year of dangerous living' and 1964 race riots in Singapore, Indonesia launched on 17 August 1964 an expanded campaign of operations into West Malaysia, albeit without military success. A build-up of Indonesian forces on the Kalimantan border in December 1964 saw the UK commit significant forces from the UK based Army Strategic Command and Australia and New Zealand deployed roulement combat forces from West Malaysia to Borneo in 1965-6. The intensity of the conflict began to subside following the events of the 30 September Movement and Suharto's rise to power. A new round of peace negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia began in May 1966 and a final peace agreement was signed on 11 August 1966 with Indonesia formally recognising Malaysia.

Important precursors to the conflict included Indonesia's policy of confrontation against Netherlands New Guinea from March–August 1962 and the Brunei Revolt in December 1962.

Background & Political situation

Before Indonesia's Confrontation of Malaysia, Sukarno had sought to develop an independent Indonesian foreign policy, focused on the acquisition of Netherlands New Guinea as a residual issue from the Indonesian National Revolution, and establishing Indonesia's credentials as a notable international power operating distinct interests from those of the West and East. Indonesia had relentlessly pursued its claim to Netherlands New Guinea during the period 1950–1962, despite facing multiple setbacks in the UN General Assembly to have its claim recognised by the international community. Indonesia was an important country in developing the Non-Alligned Movement, hosting the Bandung Conference in 1955.

Following the Indonesian crisis in 1958, which had included the Permesta rebellion in eastern Indonesia and the declaration of the PRRI, a rebel revolutionary government based in Sumatra; Indonesia had emerged as a notable and rising military power in Southeast Asia.[5] With the influx of Soviet arms aid, Indonesia was able to advance its diplomatic claims to Netherlands New Guinea more forcefully. The diplomatic dispute reached its climax in 1962 when Indonesia launched a substantial campaign of airborne and seaborne infiltrations upon Netherlands New Guinea. While the infiltration forces were soundly defeated by Dutch and indigenous forces, Indonesia was able to lend credence to the threat of an Indonesian invasion of Netherlands New Guinea. The Dutch, facing mounting diplomatic pressure from the Indonesians and the Americans, who were anxious to keep Indonesia from becoming Communist aligned, yielded and agreed to a diplomatic compromise, allowing the Indonesians to gain control of the territory in exchange for pledging to hold a self determination plebiscite (the Act of Free Choice) in the territory by 1969. Thus by the close of 1962 Indonesia had achieved a considerable diplomatic victory, which possibly emboldened its self perception as a notable regional power. It was in the context of Indonesia's recent diplomatic victory in the Netherlands New Guinea dispute, that Indonesia cast its attention to the British proposal for a unified Malaysian state.

Prior to the British Government announcing the East of Suez policy in 1968, the British Government had begun to re-evaluate in the late 1950s its force commitment in the Far East. As a part of its withdrawal from its Southeast Asian colonies, the UK moved to combine its colonies in North Borneo with the Federation of Malaya (which had become independent from Britain in 1957), and Singapore (which had become self-governing in 1959). In May 1961, the UK and Malayan governments proposed a larger federation called Malaysia, encompassing the states of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei, and Singapore. Initially, Indonesia was mildly supportive of the proposed Malaysia, although the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia — Indonesian Communist Party) was strongly opposed to it.

In Brunei, it was unclear whether the Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III would support Brunei joining the proposed Malaysian state because of the implied reduction of his political office, and Brunei's oil revenues ensured Brunei's financial viability were it to chose independence. Furthermore, a Brunei politician, Dr. AM Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud, while supporting a unified North Borneo, also opposed a wider Malaysian federation. In 1961, he had sounded out Indonesia about possible aid in training Borneo recruits; General Abdul Nasution hinted at moral support, and Soebandrio, the Indonesian foreign minister and head of intelligence, hinted at supplying more substantial aid. Azahari was a leftist who had fought in Indonesia in their war for independence. Following these meetings Indonesia began training in Kalimantan a small volunteer force, the North Kalimantan National Army (TNKU).

On 8 December 1962, the TNKU staged an insurrection—the Brunei Revolt. The insurrection was an abject failure, the poorly trained and equipped forces were unable to seize key objectives such as capturing the Sultan of Brunei, seize the Brunei oil fields, or take European hostages. Within hours of the insurrection being launched, British forces based in Singapore were being mobilised for a prompt response.

The failure of the insurrection was clear within 30 hours when Gurkha troops airlifted from Singapore secured Brunei town and ensured the Sultan's safety. On 16 December, the British Far East Command claimed that all major rebel centres had been occupied. Several UK and Gurkha infantry battalions were deployed to Brunei, with significant elements in Kuching and Tawau because the TNKU had the support of the Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO) in Sarawak. Some 4,000 Kelabits from the 5th Division were also mobilised to help prevent the TNKU's escape to Indonesia. Mopping up operations continued until 18 May 1963, when the last elements of the TNKU, including its commander, were captured.

The degree of Indonesian support for the TNKU remains a subject of debate. While Indonesia at the time denied direct involvement, it did sympathise with the TNKU's objectives to destabilise the proposed Malaysian state. Following the TNKU's military setback in Brunei, on 20 January 1963 Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio announced that Indonesia would pursue a policy of Konfrontasi with Malaysia, reversing Indonesia's previous policy of compliance with the British proposal. This was followed by the first recorded infiltration of Indonesian forces on 12 April 1963 when a police station in Tebedu, Sarawak, was attacked.

People and terrain
In 1961, the island of Borneo was divided into four separate states. Kalimantan, comprising four Indonesian provinces, was located in the south of the island. In the north, separated from Kalimantan by a border some 1000 miles long, were the Sultanate of Brunei (a British protectorate) and two colonies of the United Kingdom (UK)—British North Borneo (later renamed Sabah) and Sarawak.

The three UK territories totalled some 1.5 million people, about half of them Dayaks. Sarawak had a population of about 900,000, while Sabah's was 600,000 and Brunei's was around 80,000. Among Sarawak's non-Dayak population, 31% were Chinese, and 19% were Malay. Among non-Dayaks in Sabah, 21% were Chinese and 7% were Malay; Brunei's non-Dayak population was 28% Chinese and 54% Malay. There was a large Indonesian population in Tawau in southern Sabah and a large and economically active Chinese one in Sarawak. Despite their population size, Dayaks were spread through the country in village longhouses and were not politically organised. Sarawak was divided into five administrative Divisions. Sabah, whose capital city was Jesselton (Kota Kinabalu) on the north coast, was divided into several Residencies; those of the Interior and Tawau were on the border.

Apart from either end, the border generally followed a ridge line throughout its length, rising to almost 2,500 metres in the Fifth Division. In the First Division, there were some roads, including a continuous road from Kuching to Brunei and around to Sandakan on the east coast of Sabah. There were no roads in the Fourth and Fifth Divisions or the Interior Residency, and in Third Division, there was only the coast road, which was some 150 miles from the border. Mapping was generally poor, as British maps of the country showed very little topographic detail. Indonesian maps were worse; veterans recall “a single black and white sheet for all of Kalimantan torn from a school text book” in 1964.

Kalimantan was divided into four provinces, of which East Kalimantan and West Kalimantan face the border. The capital of the West is Pontianak on the west coast, about 100 miles (160 km) from the border, and the capital of the East is Samarinda on the south coast, some 220 miles (350 km) from the border. There were no roads in the border area other than some in the west, and no road existed linking West and East Kalimantan.

The lack, on both sides of the border, of roads and tracks suitable for vehicles meant that movement was limited to foot tracks mostly unmarked on any map, as well as water and air movement. There were many large rivers on both sides of the border, and these were the main means of movement, including hovercraft by the UK. There were also quite a few small grass airstrips suitable for light aircraft, as dropping zones for parachuted supplies, and for helicopters.

The equator lies about 100 miles south of Kuching, and most of northern Borneo receives over 3000 mm of rain each year. Borneo is naturally covered by tropical rainforest. This covers the mountainous areas cut by many rivers with very steep sided hills and hilltop ridges often only a few metres wide. The high rainfall means large rivers; these provide a main means of transport and are formidable tactical obstacles. Dense mangrove forest covering vast tidal flats intersected with numerous creeks is a feature of many coastal areas, including Brunei and either end of the border. There are cultivated areas in valleys and around villages. The vicinity of abandoned and current settlements are areas of dense secondary regrowth.

Sarawakian Opposition

The end of the Second World War had brought an end to the Brooke Dynasty rule in Sarawak. Believing it to be in the best interest of the people of Sarawak, Charles Vyner Brooke ceded the state to the British Crown.[10] Sarawak became a Crown Colony, ruled from the Colonial Office in London, which in turn dispatched a Governor for Sarawak. The predominantly Malay anti-cession movement, which rejected the British takeover of Sarawak in 1946 and had assassinated Duncan Stewart, the first British High Commissioner of Sarawak, may have been the forerunner of the subsequent anti- Malaysia movement in Sarawak, headed by Ahmad Zaidi Adruce.

According to Vernon L. Porritt and Hong-Kah Fong, Left-wing and communist cell groups had been present among Sarawak's urban Chinese communities since the 1930s and 1940s. Some of the earliest Communist groups in Sabah included the Anti-Fascist League, which later became the Races Liberation Army, and the Borneo Anti-Japanese League, which was made up of the North Borneo Anti-Japanese League and the West Borneo Anti-Japanese League. The latter was led by Wu Chan, who was deported by the Sarawak colonial government to China in 1952. Other Communist groups in Sarawak included the Overseas Chinese Youth Association, which was formed in 1946, and the Liberation League along with its youth wing, the Advanced Youth Association, which emerged during the 1950s. These organisations became the nuclei for two Communist guerilla movements: the anti- Malaysia North Kalimantan People's Army (PARAKU) and the Sarawak People's Guerrillas (PGRS). These various Communist groups were designated by various British and other Western sources as the Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO) or the Sarawak Communist Organisation (SCO).[11]

The Sarawak Communist Organisation, was predominantly dominated by ethnic Chinese but also included Dayak supporters. However, the Sarawak Communist Organisation had little support from ethnic Malays and the indigenous Sarawak races. At its height, the SCO had 24,000 members.[12] During the 1940s and 1950s, Maoism had spread among Chinese vernacular schools in Sarawak. Following the Second World War, Communist influence also penetrated the labour movement and the predominantly-Chinese Sarawak United People's Party, the state's first political party which was founded in June 1959. The Sarawak Insurgency began after the Brunei Revolt in 1962 and SCO would fight alongside the Bruneian rebels and Indonesian forces during the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation (1963–1966).

The Sarawak Communist Organisation and the Bruneian rebels supported and propagated the unification of all British Borneo territories to form an independent leftist North Kalimantan state. This idea was idea originally proposed by A. M. Azahari, leader of the Parti Rakyat Brunei (Brunei People's Party), who had forged links with Sukarno's nationalist movement, together with Ahmad Zaidi, in Java in the 1940s. However, the Brunei People's Party was in favour of joining Malaysia on the condition it was as the unified three territories of northern Borneo with their own sultan, and hence was strong enough to resist domination by Malaya, Singapore, Malay administrators or Chinese merchants.

The North Kalimantan (or Kalimantan Utara) proposal was seen as a post-decolonisation alternative by local opposition against the Malaysia plan. Local opposition throughout the Borneo territories was primarily based on economic, political, historical and cultural differences between the Borneo states and Malaya, as well as the refusal to be subjected under peninsular political domination. Both Azahari and Zaidi went into exile in Indonesia during the confrontation. While the latter returned to Sarawak and had his political status rehabilitated, Azahari remained in Indonesia until his death on 3 September 2002.

In the aftermath of the Brunei Revolt, the remnants of the TNKU reached Indonesia. Possibly fearing British reprisals (which never eventuated), many Chinese communists, possibly several thousand, also fled Sarawak. Their compatriots remaining in Sarawak were known as the CCO by the UK but called the PGRS—Pasukan Gelilya Rakyat Sarawak (Sarawak People's Guerilla Force) by Indonesia. Soebandrio met with a group of their potential leaders in Bogor, and Nasution sent three trainers from Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (RPKAD) Battalion 2 to Nangabadan near the Sarawak border, where there were about 300 trainees. Some 3 months later two lieutenants were sent there. The PGRS numbered about 800, based in West Kalimantan at Batu Hitam, with a contingent of 120 from the Indonesian intelligence agency and a small cadre trained in China. The PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) was strongly in evidence and led by an ethnic Arab revolutionary, Sofyan. The PGRS ran some raids into Sarawak but spent more time developing their supporters in Sarawak. The Indonesian military did not approve of the leftist nature of the PGRS and generally avoided them.

Beginning of Conflict 1963

Sukarno's motives for beginning Confrontation are contested. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung argued years later that Sukarno intentionally muted Indonesia's opposition to the proposed Malaysian state while Indonesia was preoccupied with advancing its claim to West New Guinea. Following Indonesia's diplomatic victory in the West New Guinea dispute, Sukarno may have been emboldened to extend Indonesia's dominance over its weaker neighbours. Conversely, Sukarno may have felt compelled by the ongoing pressure of the PKI and the general instability of Indonesian politics to divert attention towards a new foreign conflict. Sukarno argued that Malaysia was a British puppet state, a neo-colonial experiment, and that any expansion of Malaysia would increase British control over the region, with implications for Indonesia's national security. Similarly, the Philippines made a claim to eastern North Borneo, arguing that the Borneo colony had historic links with the Philippines through the Sulu archipelago.

President Sukarno had stated in at least four public speeches in 1963–64 that Indonesia had no territorial ambitions over North Kalimantan, and that Indonesia's territorial pursuit was completed with the "return" of West Irian in January 1963. Nevertheless the Indonesian name for the territory "Kalimantan Utara" had the same form as the names of Indonesia's Kalimantan provinces. Furthermore, later events in East Timor demonstrated that influential elements in Indonesia did aspire to other territory when the colonial powers left. However, while Sukarno made no direct claims to incorporate northern Borneo into Indonesian Kalimantan, he saw the formation of Malaysia as an obstacle to the Maphilindo, a non-political, irredentist union spanning Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia.[16] President of the Philippines Diosdado Macapagal initially did not oppose the concept and even initiated the Manila Accord, but while the Philippines did not engage in hostilities, Malaysia severed diplomatic ties after the former deferred recognising it as the successor state of Malaya.

In April 1963, the first recorded infiltration and attack occurred in Borneo. An infiltration force training at Nangabadan was split in two and prepared for its first operation. On 12 April 1963, one infiltration force attacked and seized the police station at Tebedu in the 1st Division of Sarawak, about 40 miles from Kuching and 2 miles from the border with Kalimantan. The other group attacked the village of Gumbang, South West of Kuching, later in the month. Only about half returned. Confrontation could be said to have started from a military perspective with the Tebedu attack.

Manila peace talks, 30 July - 5 August 1963

Prior to Indonesia's declaration of Confrontation against the proposed Malaysian state on 20 January 1963, the Cobbold Commission in 1962 had reported on the viability of a Malaysian state, finding that there was sufficient support in the Borneo colonies for the creation of a larger Malaysian state. However, due to firming Indonesian and Philippine opposition to the Malaysia proposal, a new round of negotiations was proposed to hear the Indonesian and Philippine points of opposition. To resolve the dispute the would-be member states of Malaysia met representatives of Indonesia and the Philippines in Manila for several days, starting on 30 July 1963. Just days prior to the summit, on 27 July 1963 President Sukarno had continued his inflammatory rhetoric, declaring that he was going to "crush Malaysia" (Indonesian: Ganyang Malaysia). At the Manilla meeting, the Philippines and Indonesia formally agreed to accept the formation of Malaysia if a majority in North Borneo and Sarawak voted for it in a referendum organised by the United Nations. While the fact-finding mission by the UN was expected to begin on 22 August, Indonesian delaying tactics forced the mission to start on 26 August. Nevertheless, the UN expected the referendum report to be published by 14 September 1963.

Prior to the Manilla meeting the Malayan Government had set 31 August as the date on which Malaysia would come into existence, (coinciding with Malaya's independence day celebrations of 31 August) but during the Manilla negotiations it was persuaded by the Indonesian and Philippine Governments to postpone Malaysia's inauguration until 15 September 1963 by which time a UN mission was expected to report on whether the two Borneo colonies supported the Malaysia proposal.

However, following the conclusion of the Manilla talks, the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman announced that the proposed Malaysian state would come into existence on 16 September 1963, apparently irrespective of the latest UN report.

North Borneo and Sarawak, anticipating a pro-Malaysian UN report, declared their independence as part of Malaysia on the sixth anniversary of Merdeka Day, 31 August 1963, even before the UN report had been published. On 14 September the UN report was published, once again providing general endorsement of the proposed Malaysian state.

Malaysia was formally established on 16 September 1963. Indonesia immediately reacted by expelling the Malaysian Ambassador from Jakarta. Two days later, rioters burned the British embassy in Jakarta. Several hundred rioters ransacked the Singapore embassy in Jakarta and the homes of Singaporean diplomats. In Malaysia, Indonesian agents were captured, and crowds attacked the Indonesian embassy in Kuala Lumpur.

Ongoing Campaign of Infiltrations

Even as peace talks progressed and stalled, Indonesia maintained its campaign of infiltrations. On 15 August, a headman reported an incursion in the 3rd Division and follow up indicated they were about 50 strong. A series of contacts ensued as 2/6 Gurkhas deployed patrols and ambushes, and after a month, 15 had been killed and 3 captured. The Gurkhas reported that they were well trained and professionally led, but their ammunition expenditure was high and their fire discipline broke down. The prisoners reported 300 more invaders within a week and 600 in a fortnight.

Battle of Long Jawai

The Battle of Long Jawai was the first major incursion for the centre of the 3rd Division, directed by an RPKAD Lieutenant Mulyono Soerjowardojo, who had been sent to Nanga Badan earlier in the year.

1964

The deliberate attack by Indonesian forces on Malaysian troops did not enhance Sukarno's "anti imperialist" credentials, although the Indonesian government tried blaming the KKO as enthusiastic idealists acting independently. They also produced Azahari, who claimed that Indonesian forces were playing no part in active operations. Sukarno next launched a peace offensive and, in late January, declared he was ready for a ceasefire (despite having denied direct Indonesia involvement). Talks started in Bangkok, but border violations continued, and the talks soon failed. They resumed midyear in Tokyo and failed within days but allowed time for a Thai mission to visit Sarawak and witness smart, well-equipped Indonesian soldiers withdrawing across the border, which they had crossed a short distance away earlier in the day.

Expansion of the conflict to the Malaysian Peninsula, August 1964

Coordinated to coincide with Sukarno announcing a 'Year of Dangerous Living' during Indonesian Independence Day celebrations, Indonesian forces began a campaign of airborne and seaborne infiltrations of the Malaysian Peninsula on 17 August 1964. On 17 August 1964 a seaborne force of about 100, composed of airforce Pasukan Gerat Tjepat (PGT — Quick Reaction Force) paratroopers, KKO and about a dozen Malaysian communists, crossed the Malacca Straits by boat. They landed southwest of Johore. Instead of being greeted as liberators, they were contained by various Commonwealth forces and most of the infiltrators were killed or captured within a few days.

On 2 September, three C-130 set off from Jakarta for Peninsula Malaysia, flying low to avoid detection by radar. The following night, two of the C-130 managed to reach their objective with their onboard PGT paratroopers, who jumped off and landed around Labis in Johore (about 100 miles north of Singapore). The remaining C-130 crashed into the Malacca traits while trying to evade interception by an RAF Javelin FAW 9 launched from RAF Tengah. Due to a lightning storm, the drop of 96 paratroopers was widely dispersed. This resulted in them landing close to 1/10 Gurkhas, who were joined by 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (1 RNZIR) stationed near Malacca with 28 (Commonwealth) Brigade. Operations were commanded by 4 Malaysian Brigade, but it took a month to round up or kill the 96 invaders and a New Zealand officer was killed during the action.

Indonesia's expansion of the conflict to the Malaysian Peninsula sparked the Sunda Straits Crisis, involving the anticipated transit of the Sunda Strait by the British aircraft carrier Victorious and two destroyer escorts. Commonwealth forces were readied for airstrikes against Indonesian infiltration staging areas in Sumatra if further Indonesian infiltrations of the Malaysian Peninsula were attempted. A tense three week standoff occurred before the crisis was peacefully resolved.

By the concluding months of 1964 the conflict once again appeared to have reached stalemate, with Commonwealth forces having placed in check for the moment Indonesia's campaign of infiltrations into Borneo, and more recently, the Malaysian Peninsula. However, the fragile equilibrium looked likely to change once again in December 1964 when Commonwealth intelligence began reporting a build-up of Indonesian infiltration forces in Kalimantan.

1965

Due to Indonesia's troop build-up in Kalimantan, Australia and New Zealand agreed to begin deploying combat forces to Borneo in early 1965.

Expulsion of Singapore from the Malaysian Federation

During the height of Konfrontasi, Singapore, much to the embarrassment of British officials, was expelled from the Malaysian Federation on 9 August 1965 due to ongoing political deadlock between the warring political parties of the Malaysian government with its respective power bases in Malaya and Singapore. Although Indonesia's Konfrontasi tactics of covert infiltrations had no direct effect on Malaysia's internal stability, the expulsion of Singapore was seized upon by Indonesia as evidence that the Malaysian state was an artificial British construct as Indonesia had consistently claimed.

30 September 1965 events and the easing of conflict

On the night of 30 September 1965 an attempted coup took place in Jakarta. Six senior Indonesian military leaders were killed, while General Nasution narrowly escaped from his would be captors. In the ensuing confusion Sukarno agreed to allow Suharto to assume emergency command and control of Jakarta and the armed forces stationed there. Blame for the failed coup was attributed to the

Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and in the following weeks and months a campaign of imprisonment and lynching of PKI members and sympathisers broke out across Jakarta and Indonesia. With Suharto's grip on power in Jakarta and Indonesia delicately poised, the scale and intensity of Indonesia's campaign of infiltrations into Borneo began to ease. The train of events set off by the failed coup led to Suharto's gradual consolidation of power and marginalisation of Sukarno. At the same time, the anti-communist purge spread throughout Indonesia. Suharto's steady consolidation of power after 30 September events allowed him to form a new government and in March 1967 Suharto was able to form a new Cabinet that excluded Sukarno.

1966 Peace Treaty

On 28 May 1966, at a conference in Bangkok, the Malaysian and Indonesian governments declared the conflict was over. However, it was unclear if Suharto was in full control of Indonesia (rather than Sukarno), and vigilance in Borneo could not be relaxed. With Suharto's co-operation a peace treaty was signed on 11 August and ratified two days later.

During Suharto's rise to power Claret operations continued and, in March 1966, a Gurkha battalion was involved in some of the fiercest fighting of the campaign during two raids into Kalimantan.[29] Minor action by Indonesian forces continued in the border area, including an attempt at counterbattery fire against a 105 mm gun position in Central Brigade (reports from locals said the British return fire had turned over the Indonesian gun, thought to be 76 mm).

At the beginning of 1966, with Indonesia's political hiatus beginning to stabilise (it had stopped a major RPKAD operation to capture a British prisoner), the RPKAD linked up with PGRS to establish guerrilla forces in Sabah and Sarawak. The Sabah effort never crossed the border; however, two groups entered Sarawak in February and May and obtained support from local sympathisers. The first group, despite losses in several contacts, lasted until June and exfiltrated on hearing about the end of Konfrontasi. Survivors of the second, after a contact with Australian troops, also made it back to Indonesia.[30] However, the final Indonesian incursion was in May and June. Signs of a substantial force were found crossing into Central Brigade. This was some 80 strong, mostly volunteers, led by Lt Sombi (or Sumbi) and a team from 600 Raider Company. They moved fast towards Brunei with 1/7 Gurkhas pursuing and ambushing them; almost all were accounted for. In response to this, a final Claret operation was launched, which was an artillery ambush by 38 Light Battery.

End

Origin                    Killed     Wounded
UK                          19           43
Gurkha                    44           83
AUS Army                16            9
NZ Army                   7            7
Rest                        29           38
Total                      114         181

The conflict lasted nearly four years; however, following General Suharto's replacement of Sukarno, Indonesian interest in pursuing the war with Malaysia declined, and combat eased. Peace negotiations were initiated during May 1966 before a final peace agreement was ratified on 11 August 1966.

Although the Indonesians had conducted a few amphibious raids and an airborne operation against Malaya, the war remained limited throughout its duration and remained largely a land conflict. For either side to have escalated to large scale air or naval attacks "would have incurred disadvantages greatly outweighing the marginal military effect that they might have produced". The UK Secretary of State for Defence at the time, Denis Healey, described the campaign as "one of the most efficient uses of military forces in the history of the world". British Commonwealth forces peaked at 17,000 deployed in Borneo, with another 10,000 more available in Malaya and Singapore. Total British Commonwealth military casualties were 114 killed and 181 wounded, most of them Gurkhas. The losses included Gurkha casualties of 43 killed and 83 wounded, other British armed  forces were a further 19 killed and 44 wounded, Australian casualties of 16 killed and 9 wounded (although only 7 were killed in action) and New Zealand casualties of 7 killed and another 7 wounded or injured.[33][34] The remaining casualties were that of the Malaysian military, police, and Border Scouts. A significant number of British casualties occurred during helicopter accidents, including a Belvedere crash that killed several SAS commanders and a Foreign Office official, possibly a member of MI6. A Wessex collision also killed several men from 2nd Parachute Battalion, and a Westland Scout crash, on 16 July 1964, near Kluang airfield, killed the two crewmen from 656 Sqn AAC. Finally, in August 1966, there remained two British and two Australian soldiers missing and presumed dead, with the Australians (both from the SASR) probably drowned while crossing a swollen river.[35] The remains of a Royal Marine were recovered some 20 years later. Altogether, 36 cilivians were killed, 53 wounded and 4 captured, with most being local inhabitants.

Indonesian casualties were estimated at 590 killed, 222 wounded and 771 captured.

Forces Command arrangements

In early January 1963, the military forces in northern Borneo, having arrived in December 1962 in response to the Brunei Revolt, were under the command of Commander British Forces Borneo (COMBRITBOR), Major General Walter Walker, who was Director of Borneo Operations (DOBOPS) based on Labuan Island and reported directly to the Commander in Chief Far East Forces Admiral Sir David Luce. Luce was routinely replaced by Admiral Sir Varyl Begg in early 1963.

Politico-military authority lay with the Emergency Committees in Sarawak and North Borneo, including their Governors, who were the Commanders in Chief for their colonies. In Brunei, there was a State Advisory Council answerable to the Sultan.

After independence, supreme authority changed to the Malaysian National Defence Council in Kuala Lumpur with State Executive Committees in Sabah and Sarawak. Military direction was from the Malaysian National Operations Committee jointly chaired by the Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff, General Tunku Osman, and the Inspector General of Police, Sir Claude Fenner. The British Commander in Chief Far East Forces was a member. DOBOPS regularly attended its meetings.

British forces in Borneo included Headquarters (HQ) 3 Commando Brigade in Kuching with responsibility for the western part of Sarawak, 1st–4th Divisions, and HQ 99 Gurkha Infantry Brigade in Brunei responsible for the East, 5th Division, Brunei and Sabah. These HQs had deployed from Singapore in late 1962 in response to the Brunei Revolt. The ground forces were composed of five UK and Gurkha infantry battalions normally based in Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong and rotated with others and an armoured car squadron. In the middle of 1963, Brigadier Pat Glennie, normally the Brigadier General Staff in Singapore, arrived as Deputy DOBOPS.

The naval effort, under DOBOPS command, was primarily provided by minesweepers used to patrol  coastal waters and larger inland waterways. A guardship – a frigate or destroyer- was stationed off Tawau.

The initial air component based in Borneo consisted of detachments from squadrons stationed in Malaya and Singapore. These included Twin Pioneer and Single Pioneer transport aircraft, probably two or three Blackburn Beverley and Handley Page Hastings transports, and about 12 helicopters of various types. One of Walker's first "challenges" was curtailing the RAF's centralised command and control arrangements and insisting that aircraft tasking for operations in Borneo was by his HQ, not by the RAF Air Command Far East HQ in Singapore.[36] Other aircraft of many types stationed in Malaya and Singapore provided sorties as necessary, including routine transport support into Kuching and Labuan.

The police deployed a number of paramilitary Police Field Force companies. At this stage, Indonesian forces were under command of Lieutenant General Zulkipli in Pontianak, on the coast of West Kalimantan about 200 km (120 mi) from the border. The Indonesian irregulars, led by Indonesian officers, were thought to number about 1500, with an unknown number or regular troops and local defence irregulars. They were deployed the entire length of the border in eight operational units, mostly facing the 1st and 2nd Divisions. The units had names such as "Thunderbolts", "Night Ghosts" and "World Sweepers".

British Tactics

Soon after assuming command in Borneo, General Walker issued a directive listing the ingredients for success, based on his experience in the Malayan Emergency:

• Unified operations (army, navy and air force operating fully together)
• Timely and accurate information (the need for continuous reconnaissance and intelligence
collection)
• Speed, mobility and flexibility
• Security of bases
• Domination of the jungle
• Winning the hearts and minds of the people (this was added several months later).

Walker recognised the difficulties of limited forces and a long border and, in early 1963, was reinforced with an SAS squadron from the UK, which rotated with another mid-year. When the SAS temporarily adopted 3-man instead of 4-man patrols, they could not closely monitor the border. Increasing the capability of the infantry to create a surveillance network was also considered important.

Walker raised the Border Scouts, building on Harrison's force of Kelabits, who had mobilised to helpintercept the fleeing TNKU forces from the Brunei Revolt. He also utilised the experience of the Royal Marines as well as knowledge of the skill and usefulness of the Sarawak Rangers in the Malayan Emergency. This was approved by the Sarawak government in May as "auxiliary police". Walker selected Lieutenant Colonel John Cross, a Gurkha officer with immense jungle experience, for the task. A training centre was established in a remote area at Mt. Murat in the 5th Division and staffed mainly by SAS. Border Scouts were attached to infantry battalions and evolved into an intelligence gathering force by using their local knowledge and extended families.[39] In addition, the Police Special Branch, which had proved so effective during the Malayan Emergency in recruiting sources in the communist organisation, was expanded.

British jungle tactics were developed and honed during the Malayan Emergency against a clever and elusive enemy. They emphasised travelling lightly, being undetectable and going for many days without resupplying. Being undetectable meant being silent (hand signals, no rattling equipment) and 'odour free'—perfumed toiletries were forbidden (they could be detected a kilometre away by good jungle fighters), and sometimes eating food cold to prevent cooking smells.
In about 1962, at the end of National Service, British infantry battalions had reorganised into three rifle companies, a support company and an HQ company with logistic responsibilities. Battalion HQ included an intelligence section. Each rifle company was composed of 3 platoons of 32 men each, equipped with light machine guns and self-loading rifles. The support company had a mortar platoon with 6 medium mortars (3-inch mortar until replaced by 81-mm mortar around the end of 1965) organised into 3 sections, enabling a section to be attached to a rifle company if required. Similarly organised was an anti-tank platoon; there was also an assault pioneer platoon. The machine gun platoon was abolished, but the impending delivery of the 7.62 mm GPMG, with sustained fire kits held by each company, was to provide a medium machine gun capability. In the meantime, the Vickers machine gun remained available. The innovation in the new organisation was the formation of the battalion reconnaissance platoon,[41] in many battalions a platoon of "chosen men". In Borneo, mortars were usually distributed to rifle companies, and some battalions operated the rest of their support company as another rifle company.

The basic activity was platoon patrolling; this continued throughout the campaign, with patrols being deployed by helicopter, roping in and out as necessary. Movement was usually single file; the leading section rotated but was organised with two lead scouts, followed by its commander and then the remainder in a fire support group. Battle drills for "contact front" (or rear), or "ambush left" (or right) were highly developed. Poor maps meant navigation was important; however, the local knowledge of the Border Scouts in Borneo compensated for the poor maps. So tracks were sometimes used unless ambush was considered possible, or there was the possibility of mines. Crossing obstacles such as rivers was also handled as a battle drill. At night, a platoon harboured in a tight position with all-round defence.

A contact while moving was always possible. However, offensive action usually took two forms: either an attack on a camp, or an ambush. The tactic for dealing with a camp was to get a party behind it then charge the front. However, ambushes were probably the most effective tactic and could be sustained for many days. They targeted tracks and, particularly in parts of Borneo, waterways. Track ambushes were close range, 10 to 20 m (11 to 22 yd), with a killing zone typically 20 to 50 m (22 to 55 yd) long, depending on the expected strength of the target. The trick was to remain undetected when the target entered the ambush area and then open fire all together at the right moment.

Fire support was limited for the first half of the campaign. A commando light battery with 105 mm Pack Howitzers had deployed to Brunei at the beginning of 1963 but returned to Singapore after a few months when the mopping-up of the Brunei Revolt ended. Despite the escalation in Indonesian attacks after the formation of Malaysia, little need was seen for fire support: the limited range of the guns (10 km (6.2 mi)), the limited availability of helicopters and the size of the country meant that having artillery in the right place at the right time was a challenge. However, a battery from one of the two regiments stationed in Malaysia returned to Borneo in early to mid-1964. These batteries rotated until the end of the confrontation. In early 1965, a complete UK-based regiment arrived. The short range and substantial weight of the 3-inch mortars meant they were of very limited use.

Artillery had to adopt new tactics. Almost all guns deployed in single gun sections within a company or platoon base. The sections were commanded by one of the battery's junior officers, warrant officers or sergeants. Sections had about 10 men and did their own technical fire control. They were moved underslung by Wessex or Belvedere helicopters as necessary to deal with incursions or support operations. Forward observers were in short supply, but it seems that they always accompanied normal infantry Claret operations and occasionally special forces ones. However, artillery observers rarely accompanied patrols inside Sabah and Sarawak unless they were in pursuit of a known incursion and guns were in range. Observation parties were almost always led by an officer but only two or three men strong.

Communications were a problem; radios were not used within platoons, only rearwards. Ranges were invariably beyond the capability of manpack VHF radios (A41 and A42, copies of AN/PRC 9 and 10), although use of relay or rebroadcast stations helped where they were tactically possible. Patrol bases could use the World War II vintage HF No 62 Set (distinguished by having its control panel labelled in English and Russian). Until the manpack A13 arrived in 1966, the only lightweight HF set was the Australian A510, which did not provide voice, only Morse code.

Special Forces

One squadron (up to 64 men in total in its four patrol troops) from the UK-based 22 Special Air Service deployed to Borneo in early 1963 in the aftermath of the Brunei Revolt to gather information in the border area about Indonesian infiltration. There was a special forces presence until the end of the campaign. Faced with a border of 971 miles, they could not be everywhere, and, at this time, 22 SAS had only three squadrons, although there was also the Special Boat Service (SBS) that had two sections based in Singapore. Tactical HQ of 22 SAS deployed to Kuching in 1964 to take control of all special forces. The special forces shortage was exacerbated by the need for them in South Arabia, in many ways a far more demanding task in challenging conditions against a cunning and aggressive opponent.

The solution was to create new units for Borneo. The first to be employed in Borneo was the Guards Independent Parachute Company, which already existed as the pathfinder force of 16th Parachute Brigade. Next, the Gurkha Independent Parachute Company was raised. Sections of the Special Boat Service were also used, but it seems mostly for amphibious tasks. Finally, Parachute Regiment battalions formed patrol companies (C in the 2nd and D in the 3rd). The situation eased in 1965 when the Australian and New Zealand governments agreed that their forces could be used in Borneo, enabling Australian SAS and New Zealand Ranger squadrons to rotate through Borneo.

Special forces activities were probably mostly covert reconnaissance and surveillance by 4 man patrols. However, some larger scale raiding missions took place, including amphibious ones by the SBS. Once Claret operations were authorised, most special forces missions were inside Kalimantan, although they conducted operations over the border before Claret from about early 1964.

The role of Intelligence in operations and the events of 30 September

A useful factor in the containment of the Indonesian forces was the use of intelligence. The Royal Signals were able to intercept the Indonesian military communications. The ciphers were decrypted by the Intelligence Corps based at Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) listening stations in Singapore, one of which was RAF Chia Keng which was linked directly to the RAF Far East Air Force headquarters at RAF Changi. Intelligence from this may have been used in planning some aspects of Claret cross-border operations.

British Psychological Operations

The role of the United Kingdom's Foreign Office and Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) during the confrontation was brought to light in a series of exposés by Paul Lashmar and Oliver James in The Independent newspaper beginning in 1997, and has also been covered in journals on military and intelligence history.
The revelations included an anonymous Foreign Office source stating that the decision to unseat President Sukarno was made by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and then executed under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. According to the exposés, the UK had already become alarmed with the announcement of the "Konfrontasi" policy. It has been claimed that a Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of 1962 indicated that Macmillan and US President John F. Kennedy were increasingly alarmed by the possibility of the Confrontation with Malaysia spreading, and agreed to "liquidate President Sukarno, depending on the situation and available opportunities". To weaken the regime, the UK Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD) coordinated psychological operations (psyops) in concert with the British military, to spread black propaganda casting the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), Chinese Indonesians, and Sukarno in a bad light. These efforts were to duplicate the successes of the British psyop campaign in the Malayan Emergency.

These efforts were coordinated from the British High Commission in Singapore, where the BBC, Associated Press, and The New York Times filed their reports on the Crisis in Indonesia. According to Roland Challis, the BBC correspondent who was in Singapore at the time, journalists were open to manipulation by IRD due to Sukarno's stubborn refusal to allow them into the country: "In a curious way, by keeping correspondents out of the country Sukarno made them the victims of official channels, because almost the only information you could get was from the British ambassador in Jakarta."

These manipulations included the BBC reporting that communists were planning to slaughter the citizens of Jakarta. The accusation was based on a forgery planted by Norman Reddaway, a propaganda expert with the IRD. He later bragged in a letter to the British ambassador in Jakarta, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, that it "went all over the world and back again", and was "put almost instantly back into Indonesia via the BBC". Gilchrist himself informed the Foreign Office on 5 October 1965: "I have never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change."

In April 2000 Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence at the time of the war, confirmed that the IRD was active during this time. He officially denied any role by MI6, and denied "personal knowledge" of the British arming the right-wing faction of the Army, though he did comment that if there were such a plan, he "would certainly have supported it".

Although the British MI6 is strongly implicated in this scheme by the use of the Information Research Department (seen as an MI6 office), any role by MI6 itself is officially denied by the UK government, and papers relating to it have yet to be declassified by the Cabinet Office.

Commonwealth Order of Battle


In addition to the ground and air force units, between 1963 and 1966 there were up to 80 ships from the Royal Navy, Royal Australian Navy, Royal Malay Navy and Royal New Zealand Navy. Most of these were patrol craft, minesweepers, frigates and destroyers patrolling the coast-line to intercept Indonesian insurgents. One of the two Commando Carriers, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, was also committed throughout the period of Confrontation usually in their transport role for troops, helicopters and army aircraft between Singapore and Borneo.

Monday 26 February 2018

13 Mei 1969 :Sejarah Hitam Negara

13 Mei 1969 :Sejarah Hitam Negara

PERISTIWA BERDARAH 13 MEI 1969 

DI KAMPUNG BARU DAN SEKITAR KL

Friday, 4 July 2014

Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969

APA ITU PERISTIWA 13 MEI ???

Tidak ramai yang mahu memperkatakannya secara terbuka. Kalau ada hanya bisik-bisik sahaja. Masih lagi dianggap taboo di Negara yang sebegitu majmuk ini. Yang masih terasa perit bisanya hanya orang-orang tua sahaja. Golongan muda , yang membaca tahulah tapi yang terkinja-kinja berotak tiada ramai belaka. Baca dengan tenang dan ambil pengajaran. Tak guna terpekik terlolong kisah-kisah dahulu jika pengajarannya tak diambil.

Peristiwa ini merupakan satu rusuhan kaum yang berlaku pada tahun 1969 adalah kemuncak masalah perpaduan di Malaysia. Ia lebih dikenali sebagai Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969. Peristiwa ini telah mengakibatkan kehilangan nyawa dan harta benda dan mempunyai kaitan yang rapat dengan Pilihan Raya 1969. Tragedi yang berlaku pada 13 Mei 1969 ini merupakan satu titik hitam dalam sejarah negara Malaysia.

LATAR BELAKANG PERISTIWA

SOROTAN PERISTIWA

Sebelum Mei 1969

Semuanya bermula sejak dari penjajahan British lagi. Bagi menjamin cengkaman British ke atas tanah Melayu , penjajah telah menjalankan dasar “Divide and Rule” (pecah dan perintah) dengan membawa orang-orang Cina dari Tanah Besar China dan orang-orang India dari British Raj bekerja di Tanah Melayu dibawah sector ekonomi berbeza. System pendidikan bercorak perkauman juga menyumbang kepada kewujudan ketidakseimbangan sosio-ekonomi antara kaum di Malaysia. Kemudiannya penjajahan Jepun menyebabkan hubungan kaum semakin meruncing. Orang Melayu mendapat layanan tidak seteruk Orang Cina. Kemudiannya kebanyakan orang Cina menganggotai PKM dalam cubaan menggulingkan Jepun dan menubuhkan republic Komunis di Malaya.

Pertelingkahan antara kaum terutama Melayu dengan Cina telah berlaku di Georgetown(1957), Pangkor(1959), Bukit Mertajam (1964) dan beberapa tempat lagi yang menyebabkan kematian dan kerugian di kedua-dua belah pihak. Situasi menjadi semakin buruk apabila berlaku Rusuhan Kaum di Singapura pada 21 Julai 1964 yang membawa kepada pemisahan Singapura dari Persekutuan Malaysia pada 9 Ogos 1965 apabila Lee Kuan Yew melalui PAP yang mempertikaikan keistimewaan orang Melayu dalam kempen pilihanraya pada tahun 1964. Perjuangan PAP dengan slogan “Malaysian Malaysia” diteruskan DAP.

Pada bulan April 1969, seorang petugas pilihanraya UMNO, Encik Kassim Bin Omar telah dibunuh dengan kejam oleh pemuda-pemuda Parti Buruh. Mayatnya diconteng dengan cat merah dan ditulis ‘Jangan Mengundi Dalam Pihanraya’. Hal ini menunjukkan pengaruh komunis dan sikap mengagung-agungkan Mao Tze Tung. Namun disebabkan takutkan tindak balas orang Melayu, gangguan PRU dan rusuhan kaum berlaku, berita pembunuhan yang kejam ini telah ditutup selepas kerajaan telah meminta pihak keluarga dan pemimpin Melayu bersabar.

9 Mei 1969 “Perarakan Mayat/Keranda”

Pengaruh PKM dan Parti Buruh dalam melaungkan sokongan terhadap fahaman Komunis dan Mao telah memboikot pilihanraya umum 1969. Pada 4 Mei 1969 3 peronda Polis terpaksa melepaskan tembakan terhadap sekumpulan pemuda Parti Buruh yang bertindak menyerang anggota polis dengan batang besi. Seorang daripadanya mati. Mayatnya disimpan oleh pihak parti buruh dalam peti sejuk untuk diarak semasa hari pengundian untuk mengganggu pilhanraya. Pemohonan utk mengadakan perarakan pada 10hb ditolak dan digantikan pada 9hb. Perarakan yg dibenarkan polis itu bersyarat iaitu tidak melebihi beberapa ratus orang dan jalannya tidak menghala ke kuala lumpur. Arahan tersebut diingkari, 10,000 org terlibat dalam perarakan yg diadakan di tengah Bandar KL sambil mengibarkan bendera komunis  dan gambar Mao serta menghina org Melayu dengan kata-kata “Malai- Si (Matilah Melayu). Disebabkan esoknya merupakan pilihanraya , polis diarahkan untuk berhati-hati.

Perarakan mayat Lim Soon Seng oleh Parti Buruh. Kelihatan sepanduk yang melaungkan ajaran komunis Mao

10 Mei 1969 “Keputusan Pilihan Raya Umum Semenanjung 1969”

Keputusan pilhanraya menyaksikan PERIKATAN dinafikan majority mudah di parlimen oleh Pembangkang. GERAKAN menguasai Pulau Pinang, PAS di Kelantan dan DAP-PPP-GERAKAN hampir menumbangkan PERIKATAN di Selangor dan Perak. (Di Selangor PERIKATAN=14 DAP=9 GERAKAN=4 manakala di Perak PERIKATAN=19 PPP=12 DAP=6 GERAKAN=2 PAS=1). Walaubagaimanapun GERAKAN tidak berhasrat untuk bergabung dengan mana-mana pembangkang membolehkan PERIKATAN dapat membentuk kerajaan negeri di Selangor dan Perak.

Keputusan pilihanraya umum 1969. Perikatan hilang majority mudah 2/3 di Parlimen apabila hanya memperoleh 66 kerusi dari 104 yang dipertandingkan di semenanjung.

11 Mei 1969 “Perarakan Kemenangan DAP”

DAP membuat perarakan kemenangan yg tidak mendapat kebenaran polis. 5 petang, 5 kereta dan 15 motosikal dari jalan Brickfields ke Jalan Lornie. Sampai di Balai Polis Brickfield, peserta yg kebanyakannya org cina melaungkan “apa polis boleh buat- kita raja” dan “buang semua polis melayu”. Goh Hock Guan ada dalam perarakan tersebut. 8.30 mlm, satu lagi perarakan DAP di jalan Bukit Bintang. 10 mlm, perarakan kemenangan menghala ke kuala Lumpur. Di hadapan Balai Polis Jalan Travers mereka melaungkan “Mati Melayu- Sakai pergi masuk hutan”. Manakala 40 ahli GERAKAN berarak di Jalan Changkat Dollah berhampiran Penjara Pudu dengan kereta dan skuter sambil berteriak “Kuala Lumpur sekarang Cina punya”. Tengah malam, perarakan bersama DAP-GERAKAN juga melalui dihadapan Balai Polis Brickfields dan melakukan perkara sama.

12 Mei 1969 “Perarakan Kemenangan GERAKAN”

GERAKAN telah diberi kebenaran untuk berarak dari jalan Ipoh ke Jalan TAR, jalan Gombak, Jalan Raja Laut dan kembali ke Jalan Ipoh. Mereka yang diketuai Dr Tan Chee Khoon melolong kepada tiap-tiap orang Melayu dengan kata-kata menghina seperti “Melayu balik kampong” dan “melayu sekarang tak ada kuasa lagi”. Perarakan mengandungi 500 skuter. Apabila sampai di Kampung Baru kata-kata seperti “Melayu keluar-apa lagi duduk sini” dan “kita hentam  lu, sekarang kita besar” telah dihemburkan. 4.00 petang Balai Polis Pudu dihujani teriakan “Kasi halau semua polis”. 7.30 mlm, 5 pemuda cina sambil berteriak ‘semua melayu kasi habis” cuba memukul seorang anggota polis sebelum lari apabila polis mengeluarkan pistolnya. 8.30 mlm di Balai Polis Bukit Bintang perarakan bersama DAP-GERAKAN telah memekik “Apa ini melayu kita negeri dia sudah perintah. Ini negeri bukan melayu punya” dan “Mata-mata(polis) lanchau”. 9.30 malam perarakan oleh GERAKAN di hadapan Kolej MARA Petaling Jaya memukul tin besi dan memekik ‘MARA butoh, MARA tundun, kapal layar (symbol PERIKATAN) bocor” “MARA 5 tahun lagi akan jahanam, sekarang kita perintah apa boleh buat, Melayu boleh balik kampong.” Saksi terlihat V David berdiri dalam kereta terbuka dengan sekalung bunga di lehernya.

Perarakan kemanangan pihak pembangkang iaitu Gerakan & DAP di Kuala Lumpur. Jelas kelihatan penyapu besar yang turut diarak bersama mengundang maksud tertentu

13 Mei 1969 “Tragedi”

Subuh, 60 penyokong GERAKAN melalui Jalan Hale dan mencela penduduk Kampung Baru supaya “keluar dari kampong dan balik ke hutan”.  7.30 mlm perarakan kemenangan Perikatan Selangor diketuai UMNO pula diadakan setelah mendapat kebenaran polis. Perarakan ini juga dihadiri penuntut Kolej MARA. Semua orang melayu berkumpul di rumah MB Selangor di Kampung Baru. Sbelum itu pada 6.15 ptg berlaku rusuhan di Setapak dimana orang melayu dari Gombak telah diserang ketika perjalanan ke Kampung Baru. Rusuhan ini dan kemudiannya merebak ke Cheras, Kerinchi, Kampung Pandan dan Kampung Datuk Keramat. 6.30 petang lebih kurang 500 orang berhimpun di rumah Dato Harun Idris. Sesetengahnya bertombak dan berkeris. Dato Harun berdiri diatas bas merayu supaya bertenang tetapi mereka menjerit “tidak boleh tahan lagi tok.” Hampir 300 org melayu keluar menuju ke Jalan TAR manakala yang lain sempat ditahan Pasukan Pencegah Rusuhan. Pertempuran bersenjata antara orang melayu dan bukan melayu berlaku. Perusuh Cina telah mengepung dan menyerang orang melayu di Panggung Rex, Federal dan Capitol. Pasukan Regimen Renjer yang kemudiannya digantikan polis dan tentera mengawal keadaan dan mengisytiharkan perintah berkurung. Keluarga-keluarga yang ketakutan mendapatkan perlindungan di kawasan yang dipatrol oleh pihak tentera. Operasi mengawal ketenteraman oleh pihak tentera semasa 13 Mei 1969 diberi gelaran Ops Gerhana manakala pihak polis menggunakan gelaran Ops Tenteram.

Banyak kenderaan ditepi jalan diterbalikkan dan dibakar tanpa mengetahui apakah nasib pemandu dan penunggangnya. Mayat-mayat bergelimpang serta banyak kedai dan rumah dibakar. Angka rasmi menunjukkan 196 mati, 439 cedera, 39 hilang dan 9,143 ditahan. 211 kenderaan musnah. Tapi ramai menganggar ramai lagi dibunuh.

14 Mei 1969 “Darurat”

Yang Dipertuan Agong Malaysia telah mengisytiharkan darurat. Perlembagaan dan parlimen digantung. Pilihanraya Malaysia Timur ditangguhkan.

16 Mei 1969 “MAGERAN”

Tunku telah menubuhkan MAGERAN yang diketuai Tun Abdul Razak mentadbir Negara dalam pengisytiharan darurat. Tun Abdul Razak telah dibantu oleh anggota-anggota majlis yang terdiri daripada pemimpin-pemimpin politik, pegawai-pegawai kanan kerajaan dan pegawai-pegawai tinggi Polis dan Tentera.
Di atas merupakan antara terbitan yang menceritakan peristiwa tragedy 13 Mei. Dari kiri “May 13: Declassified documents on the Malaysian Riots of 1969” karangan Kua Kia Soong bekas ahli DAP, “Peristiwa 13 Mei: Sejarah Perhubungan Melayu-Cina” karangan seorang pegawai British Leon Comber., Laporan Tragedi 13 Mei oleh MAGERAN dan juga “13 Mei Sebelum dan selepas” oleh Tunku Abdul Rahman. Aku galakkan korang baca kisah 13 Mei dari pelbagai sumber. Kua Kia Soong didalam bukunya mengatakan bahawa Tragedi 13 Mei sebenarnya ialah rancangan Tun Razak, Dato Harun dan Tun Mahathir dalam menjatuhkan Tunku. Tunku pula didalam bukunya menyatakan bahawa punca tragedy ini ialah peranan yang dimainkan pihak Komunis dalam mengapi-apikan semangat perkauman. Laporan MAGERAN pula menulis bahawa ucapan oleh pemidato semasa kempen pilihanraya yang meniup semangat perkauman dan mempersoalkan keistimewaan bumiputera mendorong berlakunya peristiwa ini. Tunku dan Laporan MAGERAN juga turut menyatakan penglibatan kongsi gelap memburukkan lagi keadaan.

Isu perkauman dalam pilihan raya 1969

Isu-isu perkauman yang menyentuh emosi dan sentimen menjadi tema utama sepanjang kempen pilihanraya yang telah menaikkan semangat kaum-kaum di Malaysia. Semasa kempen Pilihan Raya 1969, calon-calon pilihan raya serta ahli-ahli politik terutamanya daripada parti pembangkang, telah membangkitkan soal-soal sensitif berkaitan dengan Bahasa Kebangsaan (Bahasa Melayu), kedudukan istimewa orang Melayu sebagai (Bumiputera) dan hak kerakyatan orang bukan Melayu. Hal ini telah menimbulkan perasaan perkauman dan syak wasangka.

Parti Perikatan yang dianggotai oleh (UMNO-MCA-MIC) telah mengalami kekalahan yang teruk dalam Pilihan Raya 1969. Jumlah kerusi yang dimenanginya dalam Dewan Rakyat (Parlimen) telah menurun daripada 89 kerusi pada tahun 1964 kepada 66 kerusi pada tahun 1969. Parti Perikatan telah kehilangan majoriti dua-pertiga dalam Dewan Rakyat.

Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), Parti Tindakan Demokratik (DAP) dan Parti Progresif Rakyat (PPP) menang 25 buah kerusi dalam Dewan Rakyat manakala PAS menang 12 kerusi.

Sebab terjadinya Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 adalah perarakan kemenangan pihak pembangkang. Penyokong-penyokong Parti DAP telah mengutuk dan menghina orang-orang Melayu semasa mengadakan perarakan di jalan-jalan raya di sekitar Kuala Lumpur.

Pembangkang meraikan kemenangan

Peristiwa ini berlaku berikutan pengumuman keputusan Pilihanraya Umum pada 10 Mei 1969.

Dr. Tan Chee Khoon dari parti Gerakan telah menang besar di kawasan Batu, Selangor. Beliau minta kebenaran polis untuk berarak meraikan kemenangan parti tersebut di Selangor yang menyaksikan 50:50 di Selangor. Perarakan tersebut menyebabkan kesesakan jalan raya di sekitar Kuala Lumpur. Perarakan hingga ke Jalan Campbell dan Jalan Hale dan menuju ke Kampung Baru. Sedangkan di Kampung Baru, diduduki lebih 30,000 orang Melayu yang menjadi kubu UMNO, berasa terancam dengan kemenangan pihak pembangkang. Di sini letaknya rumah Menteri Besar Selangor ketika itu, Dato' Harun Idris.

Dikatakan kaum Cina yang menang telah berarak dengan mengikat penyapu kepada kenderaan mereka sebagai lambang kemenangan mereka menyapu bersih kerusi sambil melaungkan slogan. Ada pula pendapat yang mengatakan penyapu tersebut sebagai lambang mereka akan menyapu ('menyingkir') orang-orang Melayu ke laut. Dalam masyarakat Melayu, penyapu mempunyai konotasi yang negatif (sial). Ada yang mencaci dan meludah dari atas lori ke arah orang Melayu di tepi-tepi jalan.

Perarakan kematian Cina

Akibat daripada rusuhan maut tersebut, kesesakan jalanraya turut berlaku.

Di Jinjang, Kepong, kematian seorang Cina akibat sakit tua diarak sepanjang jalan dengan kebenaran polis. Namun perarakan kematian bertukar menjadi perarakan kemenangan pilihan raya dengan menghina Melayu.

Pada hari Selasa 13 Mei, Yeoh Tech Chye selaku Presiden Gerakan memohon maaf di atas ketelanjuran ahli-ahlinya melakukan kebiadapan semasa perarakan. Yeoh menang besar di kawasan Bukit Bintang, Kuala Lumpur. Tapi permohonan maaf sudah terlambat.

Rumah Menteri Besar Selangor

UMNO telah mengadakan perarakan balas pada pagi 13 Mei 1969 yang mengakibatkan terjadinya peristiwa ini. Hal ini adalah kerana perasaan emosi yang tinggi dan kurangnya kawalan dari kedua-dua pihak. Perarakan ini tidak dirancang.

Orang Melayu berkumpul di rumah Menteri Besar Selangor di Jalan Raja Muda Abdul Aziz di Kampung Baru, Kuala Lumpur. Dato' Harun Idris selaku Menteri Besar Selangor ketika itu cuba mententeramkan keadaan. Rupa-rupanya, mereka yang berkumpul telah membawa senjata pedang dan parang panjang dan hanya menunggu arahan daripada Dato' Harun Idris untuk mengamuk. 

Ketika berkumpul, cerita-cerita tentang kebiadapan ahli parti Gerakan tersebar dan meluap-luap. Jam 3.00 petang datang berita kejadian pembunuhan orang Melayu di Setapak, hanya dua kilometer dari rumah Menteri Besar Selangor. Terdapat cerita-cerita lain mengenai seorang wanita mengandung dibunuh dan kandungannya dikeluarkan dari perut dengan menggunakan besi penggantung daging babi.Sebelum menghembuskan nafas terakhir wanita tersebut sempat memasukkan semula janin yang terkeluar itu ke dalam perutnya.

4.00 petang dua penunggang motosikal Cina yang melalui Jalan Kampung Baru telah dipancung. Sebuah van membawa rokok dibakar dan pemandunya dibunuh. Pemuda-pemuda Cina yang dikatakan dari PKM dan kongsi-kongsi gelap telah bertindak balas. Mereka membunuh orang-orang Melayu di sekitar Kuala Lumpur. Rupa-rupanya orang Cina dan pemuda Cina ini lengkap dengan pelbagai senjata besi, tombak dan lembing berparang di hujung seperti dalam filem lama Cina.

Cerita-cerita seperti ini yang tidak diketahui sama ada benar atau tidak telah menyemarakkan lagi api permusuhan di antara Melayu dan Cina. Rusuhan besar terjadi. Perintah darurat dikeluarkan, semua orang tidak dibenarkan keluar dari rumah. Pasukan polis berkawal di sekitar Kuala Lumpur. Tentera dari Rejimen Renjer lebih awal dikerahkan menjaga keselamatan sekitar Kuala Lumpur.

Rejimen Renjer

Anggota FRU semasa rusuhan 13 Mei berlaku.

Pasukan FRU di keluarkan dari Kampung Baru dan askar dari Rejimen Renjer ambil alih. Malangnya pasukan ini terdiri dari orang-orang Melayu, Iban, Cina, India, Sikh, Gurkha dan lain-lain turut menembak orang-orang Melayu dan ini menyebabkan kemarahan orang Melayu semakin meluap-luap. Menurut laporan, ketua pasukan Rejimen Renjer dikatakan berbangsa Cina.

Pemuda-pemuda Melayu yang mempertahankan Kampung Baru dan yang lain-lain mengamuk merasakan diri mereka terkepung antara orang Cina dengan askar Rejimen Renjer. Beberapa das turut ditujukan ke arah rumah Menteri Besar Selangor.

Askar Melayu

Akhirnya Regimen Renjer dikeluarkan dan digantikan dengan Askar Melayu. Beberapa bangunan rumah kedai di sekitar Kampung Baru, Jalan Tuanku Abdul Rahman masih terus terbakar. Pentadbiran diambil-alih oleh Askar Melayu. Malangnya beberapa askar Askar Melayu turut masuk ke kedai-kedai emas Cina dan mengambil harta benda di sana. Malah ada askar melayu yang menembak ke atas rumah kedai orang Cina kerana kononnya mereka telah membaling botol ke arah askar melayu tersebut. Ada yang berkata askar tersebut berpakaian preman.

Ramai orang Cina dibunuh dan dicampakkan ke dalam lombong bijih timah di Sungai Klang berhampiran lorong Tiong Nam, Chow Kit. Konon ada rakaman televisyen oleh pemberita dari BBC dan Australia, beberapa pemuda Cina ditangkap, dibariskan di tepi lombong dan dibunuh. Bagaimanapun, sehingga sekarang, tiada bukti yang diedarkan mengenai rakaman ini.

Panggung Odeon

Pemuda-pemuda Cina dari kongsi-kongsi gelap telah bertindak mengepung Panggung Odeon, di Jalan Tuanku Abdul Rahman, Kuala Lumpur. Beberapa iklan disiarkan dalam bahasa Cina di skrin pawagam menyuruh penonton dari kalangan Cina keluar dari panggung. Penonton Melayu di panggung tersebut ramai yang mati. Ini termasuklah dua orang Askar Melayu yang tinggal di Sungai Ramal, Kajang. Manakala di pasar pula askar melayu telah menembak orang cina dengan kereta perisai mereka kononnya melanggar perintah berkurung. Di lebuh raya persekutuan pula, penduduk melayu Kampung Kerinchi telah membuang pasu di atas lebuhraya tersebut dan mengakibatkan kesesakan lalulintas dan kemalangan. Pemilik kereta berbangsa cina ditetak dan dibunuh. Seluruh keluarga peniaga cina yang menjual bunga berdekatan habis dibunuh. Di lapangan terbang Sungai Besi waktu itu yang merupakan lapangan terbang antarabangsa, askar melayu telah menembak orang Cina yang baru balik dari luar negeri kononnya melanggar perintah berkurung.

Seorang polis bernama Rahim yang tinggal di Kuala Lumpur yang turut menonton wayang di Odeon terkena tetakan di kepala dan berpura-pura mati. Beliau masih hidup hingga sekarang. Akibat daripada tindakan sebegini, orang-orang Melayu mulai bertindak balas, dan dikatakan kepala orang Cina yang dibunuh diletakkan di atas pagar.

Abdul Rafai Alias bersama rakan-rakannya dari Semenyih yang datang ke Kuala Lumpur turut terperangkap dan terkejut dengan rusuhan kaum yang tidak disangka-sangka pada 13 Mei itu. Beliau turut melangkah-langkah mayat mereka yang telah terbunuh di atas jalan.

Khabar angin mengatakan Tentera Sabil dari Sungai Manik hendak datang ke Kampung Baru tetapi tersekat. Begitu juga dengan Tentera Selempang Merah dari Muar dan Batu Pahat tersekat dan disekat oleh polis di Balai Polis Kajang dan Cheras.

Ada 4 kiai di sekitar Kampung Baru mengedarkan air jampi dan tangkal penebat, iaitu ilmu kebal dengan harga yang agak mahal. Sesiapa yang memakainya menjadi kebal dan boleh terbang. Apa yang pasti, Askar Melayu juga telah menyelamatkan orang Melayu di Kampung Baru ketika itu. Mungkin juga ramai yang pernah mendengar kisah parang terbang yang terbang di Kampung Cheras Baru dan penggal kepala orang Cina.

Namun rusuhan kaum tidak terjadi di Kelantan, Terengganu dan Pahang. Di Perak, Kedah, Pulau Pinang serta Perlis tiada sebarang pergaduhan. Negeri Johor dan Negeri Sembilan juga tidak terjadi apa-apa kerana telah diberi amaran oleh PKM. Cuma ada sedikit kekecohan di Melaka. Di Betong ada tembakan dilepaskan oleh PKM dan mereka memberi amaran jika askar melayu menembak orang cina, mereka akan memberi senjata api kepada orang cina.

Ada yang menyifatkan pergaduhan ini sebenarnya adalah pergaduhan "politik" Datuk Harun dengan sokongan Tun Razak yang tidak berpuas hati dengan Tunku Abdul Rahman bukannya perkauman kerana pemimpin cina Parti Perikatan seperti, Tan Siew Sin, Ong Yoke Lin telah "lari" bersama dengan Tunku Abdul Rahman ke Cameron Highlands. Sebelum peristiwa itu masyarakat Melayu dan Cina boleh hidup dalam keadaan yang harmoni. Seperti dinyatakan pergaduhan tidak belaku di negeri Melayu seperti Kelantan, Pahang dan Kedah. Jika ia merupakan isu perkauman, pastinya pada hari itu orang cina dan melayu akan berbunuhan sesama sendiri di negeri tersebut seperti di selatan thai.

Kesimpulannya, pergaduhan ini bukanlah rusuhan perkauman, kerana ia hanya terjadi selepas pilihanraya (perbezaan politik) dan hanya melibatkan orang-orang Melayu dan Cina di Kuala Lumpur menjadi mangsa agenda Datuk harun dan Tun Abdul Razak. Akhirnya selepas Tun Abdul Razak meniggal dunia dan Tun Hussein Onn dilantik sebagai Perdana Menteri, beliau telah mengarahkan Datuk Harun ditangkap kerana pecah amanah duit bank rakyat. Datuk Harun telah menaja Muhammad Ali kononnya juga beragama Islam untuk datang ke Malaysia berlawan tinju dengan Joe Bugner untuk menunjuk-nunjuk bahawa orang Islam mampu menandingi barat. Perlawanan tersebut mengalami kerugian kerana diboikot akibat kecelakaan Datuk Harun semasa peristiwa Mei 13. Datuk Harun juga berhasrat untuk mencabar tempat Tun Hussein Onn .

Persepsi negatif masyarat Melayu terhadap kaum Cina juga berlaku kerana orang Cina merupakan majoriti menganggotai pasukan Bintang Tiga yang ingin menjadikan negara ini sebagai negara komunis. Selain itu, selepas kekalahan Jepun, MPAJA bermaharaja lela selama dua minggu dengan memerintah secara kuku besi dan ramai orang melayu dan cina yang menjadi tali barut Jepun telah dikenakan hukuman bunuh.

Angka korban

Polis dan tentera sedang mengawal Panggung Odeon yang menjadi sasaran rusuhan.

Angka rasmi menunjukkan 196 mati, 439 cedera, 39 hilang dan 9,143 ditahan. 211 kenderaan musnah. Tapi ramai telah menganggar ramai lagi dibunuh. Sebuah thesis PhD. daripada Universiti California, Berkeley menganggar seramai 20,000 orang hilang nyawa dalam peristiwa 13 Mei. <1>

Statistik tidak rasmi jumlah kematian:

Melayu  : 86 orang
Cina  : 342 orang
Lain-lain  : 3 orang

Statistik tersebut tidak begitu tepat kerana daripada kacamata orang ramai yang menjadi saksi, mereka melihat berderet-deret lori membawa mayat yang tidak sempurna ke balai polis Jalan Travers waktu itu.

Lokasi Tunku Abdul Rahman semasa peristiwa 13 Mei

Ketika itu (13 Mei 1969), Tunku Abdul Rahman baru pulang dari Alor Star meraikan kemenangan beliau di sana.

6.45 petang Encik Mansor selaku Ketua Polis Trafik Kuala Lumpur memaklumkan kejadian pembunuhan kepada Tunku Abdul Rahman. Darurat diisytiharkan pada jam 7.00 malam 13 Mei 1969. Ada khabar angin mengatakan Tunku sedang bermain mahjung dan ada khabar menyatakan Tunku sedang menikmati hidangan arak. Dalam tulisannya, Tunku menafikan hal tersebut. Pada malam peristiwa itu di televisyen, Tunku berkata "Marilah kita tentukan sekarang bahawa sama ada kita hidup atau mati".

> Mageran

Negara diisytiharkan darurat pada malam 16 Mei 1969 di seluruh negara dan Mageran dibentuk di bawah pentadbiran Tun Abdul Razak. Parlimen dibubarkan.
Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 menyebabkan Tunku Abdul Rahman dipersalahkan oleh orang Melayu dan Malaysia secara keseluruhannya. Berikutan itu Tunku meletakkan jawatan pada tahun 1970. Buku "Dilema Melayu" ("Malay Dilemma") oleh Tun Dr Mahathir telah diharamkan. Dikatakan Tun Dr Mahathir memburuk-burukkan Tunku Abdul Rahman sebagai kerabat raja Kedah yang kaki joli.

Keadaan akhirnya dapat dikawal dan beberapa keputusan telah diambil bagi mencari jalan penyelesaian termasuklah penubuhan beberapa badan seperti Majlis Perundingan Negara, Dasar Ekonomi Baru dan Rukun Negara telah diciptakan.

Ternyata langkah Tunku Abdul Rahman penyingkiran Singapura dari Malaysia tidak menyelesaikan masalah perkauman. Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 merupakan kemuncak kemarahan lama orang Melayu kerana kemiskinan.

Tahun 1969 pilihan raya diadakan semula dan memberi kemenangan 2/3 semula kepada kerajaan yang memerintah. Barisan Nasional dibentuk. Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur dibentuk bagi mengurangkan pengundi Cina dalam Dewan Undangan Negeri Selangor. Beberapa ahli politik yang dianggap berbahaya telah ditahan melalui Akta Keselamatan Dalam Negeri (ISA). Persempadanan pilihan raya yang lebih bijaksana dan seimbang telah dilaksanakan. Sistem demokrasi, pilihan raya dan agihan kek ekonomi (hak-hak keistimewaan bumiputera) mendapat tafsiran semula. Peniaga cina terpaksa mencari rakan niaga bumiputra dan berkongsi 30% dari saham mereka di KLSE.

KESAN PERISTIWA 13 MEI PADA NEGARA

Peristiwa 13 Mei memberi kesan kepada banyak perkara di negara kita. Antaranya ialah politik, ekonomi, pendidikan dan sosial kaum.

Kesan politik zaman Inggeris ini telah menyebabkan sistem masyarakat Negara ini yang asalnya sangat  taat dan hidup di bawah pemerintahan raja dan sultan telah mengalami satu perubahan yang drastik. Kuasaan raja serta sultan Melayu telah dihadkan kepada hanya menjadi lambang kepada sesebuah negeri atau negara. Kemudian penjajah Inggeris ini telah menerapkan sistem residen di Negeri-Negeri Melayu Bersekutu dan kemudiannya diikuti pula dengan sistem penasihat British di Negeri-Negeri Melayu Tidak Bersekutu. Dengan adanya sistem yang berbeza antara negeri, pemerintah percaya bahawa setiap negeri tidak akan bersatu untuk menentang mereka kerana tiada persefahaman. Inilah
antara kesan yang telah terpendam lam dalam diri masyarakat hingga tercetusnya peristiwa hitam 13 Mei.

Sistem yang diperkenalkan penjajah Inggeris ini mengurangkan kuasa pemerintahan raja-raja Melayu dan pembesarnya Perkara ini telah menyebabkan satu perubahan besar dalam pentadbiran. Fungsi residen dan penasihat British yang diperkenalkan telah mengambil alih peranan yang dahulunya dimainkan oleh pembesar-pembesar Melayu terutamanya dalam soal menasihati Sultan dan mendapatkan hasil untuk negeri melalui cukai 

Kesan terhadap penjajahan Inggeris di Tanah Melayu telah mengakibatkan perubahan dalam sistem ekonomi tradisional yang telah sekian lama diamalkan di Tanah Melayu. Sistem ekonomi tradisional yang dimaksudkan adalah seperti sistem yang berasaskan sara diri, penanaman padi, penangkapan ikan, dan penternakan ladang. Sistem ini mengalami perubahan disebabkan penjajah Inggeris telah menjalankan dasar ekonomi kolonialismenya dengan menjadikan sistem ekonomi yang wujud bermatlamatkan keuntungan semata-mata.

Dalam perlaksanaan dasar ekonomi, British secara langsung dan tidak langsung telah mengasingkan kaum-kaum utama di Tanah Melayu iaitu orang-orang Cina, India dan Melayu mengikut kegiatan ekonomi masing-masing. Perkara ini telah menyebabkan kaum-kaum Melayu, Cina dan India tidak dapat mempelajari untuk memahami satu sama lain. Mereka juga tidak dapat berinteraksi dengan baik dan menyebabkan kesukaran untuk mewujudkan perpaduan kaum.

Perbezaan jurang ekonomi yang ketara akibat daripada dasar pecah dan perintah colonial telah menimbulkan perasaan tidak puas hati sehingga mencetuskan konflik seperti 13 Mei. Di mana masyarakat telah dikelaskan berdasarkan kepada pekerjaan dan penempatan menjadi faktor penghalang kepada proses integrasi kaum yang lebih baik.

Pendidikan di negara kita yang seakan-akan ikut telunjuk masing-masing dan ini tidak disukai oleh sesetengah individu. Hal ini menyebabkan banyak suara yang inginkan keadilan daripada kerajaan supaya menyamaratakan sistem. Hal ini meyebabkan ramai yang tidak bersependapat dan ada di antara kalangan anak-anak mereka yang tidak bernasib baik mendapat pendidikan kerana masalah pertelingkahan ini.

Kesinambungan daripada peristiwa berdarah tersebut, kaum Cina sudah tidak bersefhaman dengan kaum Melayu di mana pada mula pemerintahan Inggeris, kaum Cina kurang mendapat tempat di hati penjajah. Bermula juga dari zaman pemerintahan Jepun di mana mereka ditindas dengan begitu kejam daripada kaum Melayu. Hal ini menyebabkan sosial di negara pada masa itu terjejas. Setiap kaum tidak bersatu dan hidup berpuak-puak. Ada yang sependapat, dan ada pula yang berlainan.

Kesimpulannya, pada masa itu, 13 Mei sangat memberikan kesan yang buruk dari semua aspek tidak kira kaum tua atau muda, kanak-kanak juga terlibat sama. Oleh itu, pelbagai usaha perlu dilakukan oleh kerajaan dalam merealisasikan hasrat sebenar kesemua kaum yang tinggal di Malaysia.

PENGAJARAN

Pergaduhan kaum antara orang melayu dan orang cina tercetus pada 13 Mei 1969 merupakan kemuncak semangat perkauman yang kuat dan tidak dapat dibendungkan lagi.Tragedi tersebut berlaku sebaik sahaja keputusan pilihanraya tahun 1969 selesai diumunkan. 13 Mei 1969 tidak akan berulang lagi kerana membahayakan keamanan, negara dan perpaduan masyarakat Malaysia. Antara lima (5) pengajaran yang boleh dijadikan iktibar ialah :

1. Kehilangan Nyawa dan Harta Benda

Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 ini sebenarnya tidak menghasilkan sebarang faedah kepada berlakunya perpecahan dan perbalahan antara kaum Melayu dan kaum Cina yang mengakibatkan kerosakan harta benda yang besar malah yang paling malang ialah nyawa yang terkorban, kejadian seperti ini meninggalakan kesan dan pengajaran yang pahit dan getir kepada saudara mara dan kaum keluarga yang terlibat.

2. Perintah Berkurung

Selepas berlakunya peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 , kerajaan terpaksa mengeluarkan Perintah Berkurung yang disebabkan oleh kekacauan dan pecahbelah antara kaum . Ini bertujuan untuk mengawal keselamatan rakyat dan mengembalikan kestabilan negara ketika itu. Ini membawa kesan yang buruk terhadap suasana persekitaran dan pergaulan yang kurang harmoni antara kaum kerana ianya menyekat aktiviti yang bebas untuk mencari punca pendapatan seperti menjalankan perniagaan , susah berinteraksi dan saling berhubungan antara kaum .Selain itu , segala aktiviti harian masyarakat tersekat.

3. Keuntungan Kepada Musuh-Musuh Negara

Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 ini telah menguntungkan kepada musuh-musuh negara yang sentiasa mengambil kesempatan dan peluang untuk memecah-belahkan rakyat dan ingin menakluk Malaysia sebagai taklukan dan jajahan negaranya .Pengalaman yang perlu diteladani daripada peristiwa ini ialah keadaan negara yang menjadi tidak aman , huru-hara dan rakyat yang berbilang kaum berpecah-belah akibat daripada rasa tidak berpuashati dengan isu-isu yang sensitif terutama isu perkauman .Antara contoh-contoh yang boleh dijadikan panduan kepada negara ialah kejatuhan empayar Melayu Melaka di tangan penjajah portugis pada tahun 1511 begitu juga dengan pencerobohan dan penaklukan tanah kepunyaan negara Arab khususnya di Semenanjung Gaza dan Tebing Barat Jordon oleh kuasa Israel , dan penindasan secara kejam terhadap rakyat Palestin setelah berjaya mencerobohi bumi Arab ini .

4. Perpaduan Nasional

Tragedi Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 ini memberi kepada kita pengajaran dan kerajaan telah mengadakan dasar perpaduan antara kaum dan masyarakat sekeliling untuk dijadikan panduan dan pegangan masyarakat yang berbilang kaum bagi menjalankan hidup secara aman dan sentiasa bersifat berbaik sangka antara satu sama lain .Kesedaran penting di kalangan rakyat bahawa sikap hormat-menghormati , bertolak-ansur , bertoleransi dan menjauhi sifat-sifat yang terkeji seperti berdengki , beriri hati dan menanam sifat curiga di antara kaum . Dengan terdapat pelbagai jenis kaum , agama , budaya dan pegangan agama di Malaysia maka Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 ini pasti berulang sekiranya tiada kesedaran tentang isu-isu sensitif yang timbul seperti hak kedudukan istimewa kaum Melayu yang merupakan penduduk asal bagi negara ini . Oleh itu kaum-kaum lain yang tinggal di negara ini perlu menghormati kedudukan istimewa kaum Melayu dan mewujudkan suasana yang harmoni di kalangan masyarakat . Pendek kata tanggungjawab perpaduan adalah tanggungjawab semua pihak.

5. Keadilan Ekonomi

Tragedi 13 Mei juga menunjukkan bahawa matlamat perpaduan masyarakat sukar dicapai jika masyarakat Malaysia dalam kemiskinan ianya menjadi lebih sukar jika majoriti kadar kemiskinan penduduk itu hanya pada satu kaum sahaja.Keadaan ekonomi dan demografi penduduk Malaysia menunjukan bahawa majoroti penduduk Bumiputra tinggal di luar bandar kebanyakan adalah berpendapatan rendah dan miskin. Kemiskinan ini akan menjadi isu didalam masyarakat Malaysia,khususnya masyaraka Bumiputra.Untuk mencapai keharmonian hidup adalah sukar.Oleh itu selepas 13 Mei,satu dasar pragmatik yang diberi nama Dasar Ekonomi Baru (DEB),telah digubal oleh kerajaan. Dasar ini merupakan satu dasar jangka panjang (1970-1990)yang mempunyai dua objektif utama iaitu :

(i) Membasmi kemiskinan tanpa mengira kaum,
(ii) Menyusun semula masyarakat,

Dasar ini tidak bertujuan untuk merampas kekayaan atau hak sesuatu kaum dan memberikan kepada kaum yang lain. Sebaliknya dasar tersebut bertujuan untuk merapatkan jurang perbezaan antara golongan yang miskin dan golongan yang kaya. Objekif yang lain ialah menghapuskan identiti pekerjaan dengan keturunan kaum yang ketara dalam masyarakat Malaysia.

Pembentukan Malaysia yang berteraskan Perpaduan Nasional yang teguh, bersatu padu, maju dan harmoni di mana setiap warga Malaysia harus sama-sama berganding bahu membantu serta menyokong usaha KERAJAAN dalam memupuk perpaduan.

RUMUSAN

Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 merupakan satu rusuhan antara kaum yang tercetus 41 tahun yang lalu. Walaupun kita cuba memadamkan kenangan pahit itu daripda memori namun begitu, pada hakikatnya tregedi itu telah menimbulkan persolan tentang sejauh manakah perpaduan di kalangan rakyat Malaysia yang berbilang kaum itu tahan diuji.

Menyedari perpaduan itu asas kepada pembentukan sebuah negara yang kukuh, pelbagai langkah samaada dalam aspek politik, ekonomi, dan sosial telah dilaksanakan bagi memantapkan perpaduan di kalangan rakyat namun tercetusnya konflik di Kampung Medan beberapa tahun yang lalu seolah-olah menggambarkan bahawa perpaduan yang cuba kita terapkan sejak merdeka masih belum memadai.

Prasangka, perkauman dan etnosentrisme menjadi faktor penghalang ke arah merealisasikan integrasi nasional di negara kita. Di mana faktor-faktor ini mendorong kepada tindakan-tindakan berat sebelah terhadap kumpulan-kumpulan lain. Di dalam konteks Malaysia, ia mungkin satu realiti atau semata-mata disalahtanggap sehingga sesuatu kelompok itu merasakan diri mereka termangsa, disisih serta tidak dipedulikan.

Namun begitu, asas perpaduan kaum di Malaysia masih boleh dianggap baik berbanding dengan negara-negara yang lain. Di mana negara kita berjaya menguruskan cabaran masalah perkauman dengan lebih berkesan. Di mana kita mengambil langkah-langkah seperti perkongsian kuasa di kalangan kelompok etnik yang berbeza. Di samping itu, proses demokrasi dengan peraturan dan kawalan yang berkesan berjaya membendung usaha-usaha ke arah mencetuskan kekacauan dalan negara. Ia seterusnya menggalakkan pertumbuhan ekonomi dan pengagihan semula yang saksama berjaya membawa kemakmuran kepada semua rakyat Malaysia tanpa mengira etnik. Satu lagi kelebihan Malaysia ialah kesediaan kita menerima kepelbagaian budaya dan agama sebagai satu sumber kekuatan dan sentiasa menunjukkan komitmen yang tinggi dalam menyesuaikan sikap sendiri dengan sikap kaum-kaum yang lain.

RUJUKAN

LAMAN WEB :



RUJUKAN PUSAT SUMBER POLITEKNIK SULTAN SALAHUDDIN ABDUL AZIZ SHAH,SHAH ALAM,SELANGOR

PENYELIDIKAN SENDIRI :

sumber : yuyuhaya bin alias (64 tahun)

BUKU RUJUKAN :


Peristiwa 13 Mei: sejarah perhubungan Melayu-Cina /Leon Comber/ International Book Service, 1985

Sumber : welovemh0