Confrontation in Borneo
In
1964 New Zealand began helping Malaysia to fight Indonesia’s attempt to wrest
control of the North Borneo territories in what was known as Confrontation.
This role, which continued until 1966, saw New Zealand soldiers mount covert
cross-border raids into Indonesia.
On
11 August 1966 representatives of Indonesia and Malaysia signed a peace treaty
in Bangkok. Hostilities were officially at an end. 1RNZIR completed its
withdrawal from Borneo that October.
Although
there were no fatalities as a result of enemy action, 12 New Zealanders died or
were accidentally killed in the period of Confrontation between 1964 and 1966.
Greater Malaysia
Confrontation
was a conflict which developed in 1963 between Indonesia and the new state of
Malaysia, which was backed by the British Commonwealth. Its origins lay in the
United Kingdom’s plans to divest itself of its South-east Asian empire. This
was to be achieved by federating the Crown colonies in Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak),
the protected state of Brunei, and the self-governing colony of Singapore with
Malaya, which had been granted independence in 1957 and had declared the end of
the 12-year Emergency in 1960.
Formal
agreement to establish a federation of greater Malaysia by 31 August 1963 was
reached between London and Kuala Lumpur in November 1961. Despite relinquishing
sovereignty, the British were guaranteed the continued use of their Singapore
bases.
Indonesian opposition
These
plans for a greater Malaysia were strongly opposed by neighbouring Indonesia
and its charismatic president, Achmed Sukarno. He complained, with particular
emphasis on the continued British military presence at Singapore, that London’s
grant of independence was not sincere.
Sukarno
reasoned that Malaysia would become a British satellite and perpetuate, rather
than end, European domination of the region. Opposition to Malaysia also
buttressed the president politically by distracting Indonesian public opinion
from the appalling state of the nation’s economy. It came as no surprise,
therefore, when the Indonesian foreign minister, Dr Subandrio, declared on 20
January 1963 that Indonesia would henceforth pursue a policy of Konfrontasi
(Confrontation) against Malaysia.
Guerilla warfare
Sukarno
was limited in his options for opposing Malaysia. Although equipped with modern
Soviet weapons, the Indonesian armed forces were not capable of fighting a war
against the British. Instead, Sukarno decided to encourage and support
subversive movements already existing in Borneo. If a major insurgency could be
fomented, the British might eventually be persuaded to abandon the goal of
greater Malaysia. By the end of 1963, this strategy increasingly involved Indonesian
army regulars, posing as guerrillas, crossing the border from Kalimantan to
attack the security forces in Borneo before quickly returning to Indonesian
territory.
British response: Operation Claret
The
British responded to Confrontation in a two-pronged manner. In order to deter
the Indonesians from mounting an open attack on Malaysia, substantial air and
naval forces were deployed in and around Singapore. The main concern for
British military planners throughout the conflict, however, was containing the
insurgency in Borneo. Here the security forces were in an impossible situation.
They were required to defend a 1600-km-long frontier cloaked in extremely dense
jungle against an enemy who could readily retreat to safety. Increasingly
frustrated, Major-General Sir Walter Walker, director of operations in Borneo,
requested permission to pursue the guerrillas across the border. After
considerable debate, London finally agreed in April 1964.
The
objective of the cross-border operations, code-named Claret, was to wrest the
initiative from the enemy. From May 1964, predominantly SAS troops, operating
in groups of four, regularly patrolled territory immediately across the border.
When a patrol discovered enemy guerrillas moving towards Malaysia, it would
arrange for them to be ambushed as they crossed the border.
Britain requests support
This
combination of deterrence and military operations was remarkably successful in
containing the insurgency to a low-level conflict. Nonetheless, it required a
considerable deployment of Britain’s limited resources and manpower. By early
1965, more than 60,000 British servicemen were deployed in the region, along
with a surface fleet of more than 80 warships, including two aircraft carriers.
From December 1963, the British asked repeatedly that New Zealand and Australia
send combat forces to Borneo.
New Zealand refuses to send troops
Keith
Holyoake’s National government had to weigh up the policy considerations
carefully. On the one hand, there was no question that Malaysia should be
supported. In both official and public eyes, Indonesia had committed clear and
frequent acts of aggression against the new state. On the other hand,
Wellington did not want to become embroiled in a major war with Indonesia. A
bloody conflict might poison New Zealand’s relations with its closest Asian
neighbour for generations. Consequently, the government initially refused to send
troops to Borneo, arguing that the British and Malaysian forces already
stationed there were capable of dealing with the problem.
New Zealand drawn in by Malay Peninsula
attack
Frustrated
by the failure of Confrontation to make any real headway, Sukarno decided in
mid-1964 to extend military operations to the Malay Peninsula. On 1 September,
98 Indonesian paratroopers landed just north of Labis in Johore state. One of
the few available Commonwealth units in the area was 1st Battalion, RNZIR,
which, with Wellington’s permission, was used to hunt down the infiltrators,
most of whom surrendered without a struggle.
Two
months later, on 29 October, the New Zealanders were involved in a similar
operation to capture a small amphibious force which had landed at the mouth of
the Sungei Kesang River in north-west Johore. In addition to these activities,
the RNZAF’s 14 Squadron, consisting of six Canberra bombers, was deployed to
Singapore, where it remained as part of the Commonwealth’s air power deterrent
until the end of Confrontation.
Holyoake agrees to send limited force
Sukarno
responded to these failures by substantially increasing the number of
insurgents crossing the border into Borneo. With Britain’s military resources
now almost at breaking point, the New Zealand government could no longer ignore
the appeals for assistance coming from London. On 1 February 1965 Holyoake
announced that a small Special Air Service detachment, together with 1RNZIR,
would be deployed in Borneo as soon as possible. In addition, New Zealand crews
would man two former Royal Navy minesweepers, renamed HMNZS Hickleton and
Santon, which would join the frigate HMNZS Taranaki in patrolling Malaysian
waters in the Malacca Strait.
During
late February the 1st Ranger Squadron NZSAS, about 40 men under the command of
Major W.J.D. Meldrum, began its tour of duty. They were replaced by a similarly
sized detachment, commanded by Major R.S. Dearing, in October. Both detachments
took part in Claret operations alongside Britain’s 22nd Regiment SAS.
1RNZIR,
commanded by Colonel R.M. Gurr, was not deployed in Borneo until May 1965, when
it relieved a Gurkha battalion in Sarawak. In a series of skirmishes, it
inflicted substantial losses on the enemy without suffering any fatal
casualties. Relieved in October, 1RNZIR returned to its base in Malaya. By the
time it was redeployed to Borneo in May 1966, Confrontation had all but ended.
New
Zealand troops in Borneo were ably supported by No. 41 Squadron RNZAF in
Singapore. The squadron's Bristol B170 Freighters flew regular resupply flights
into Borneo, dropping food and equipment to British and New Zealand ground
forces on jungle operations.
The end of Confrontation
On 1
October 1965, an attempt by a group of army officers to seize power in Jakarta
was ruthlessly crushed by troops loyal to Major-General Suharto. This event
heralded a major transformation in Indonesian politics. Increasingly, Sukarno
became a paper President, with real power exercised by Suharto and the army
establishment.
These
generals, concerned with restoring economic stability and suppressing the
Indonesian Communist Party, decided to abandon Sukarno’s radical agenda, particularly
Confrontation. Military activity in Borneo by Indonesian insurgents subsided
dramatically after the coup. During its second deployment, for example, 1RNZIR
did not engage the enemy at all. On 11 August 1966 representatives of Indonesia
and Malaysia signed a peace treaty in Bangkok, Thailand. Hostilities were
officially at an end. 1RNZIR completed its withdrawal from Borneo in October.
Further
information
This
web feature is adapted from John Subritzky’s entry in The Oxford Companion to
New Zealand Military History (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2000) and
produced by the NZHistory team.
Links
New
Zealand’s involvement in Asian conflicts (www.teara.govt.nz)
Australian
involvement in South-East Asian conflicts (se-asia.commemoration.gov.au)
Books
W.D.
Baker, Dare to Win: The story of the New Zealand SAS, Lothian Publishing
Company, Melbourne, 1987
Ron
Crosby, NZSAS: The first fifty years, Viking, Auckland, 2009
R.
Gurr, Voices of a Border War: A history of 1 Royal New Zealand Infantry
Regiment 1963 to 1965, privately published, Melbourne, 1995
Christopher
Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation: The New Zealand Armed Forces in
Malaya and Borneo 1949-66, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2003
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