To what extent did
British Intelligence have an
impact on ending the
Indonesian-Malaysian
Confrontation of
1963-1966?
by
Ng Wei Yang, Eugene
(K1336703)
in partial fulfilment
of the requirements of
MA in Intelligence
and International Security
Supervisor:
Professor Joe Maiolo
Department of War
Studies
King’s College London
27 August 2014
(14,945 words)
Abstract
The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation was a low-intensity
conflict between Britain, Indonesia, and Malaysia that took place between
1963 and 1966. The roots of the conflict lay in Indonesian opposition to Britain’s plan to
create a united Federation of Malaysia as part its decolonisation efforts. Indonesia
embarked on a policy of ‘Confrontation’ against Malaysia and Britain, employing a range of
economical, political, and military measures aimed at destabilising the newly-formed Federation.
Britain’s response to Confrontation centred around a limited ‘strategy of
attrition’ designed to neutralise Indonesian aggression without escalation and resolve
Confrontation by wearing down Indonesia’s will to continue Confrontation. Hence, through
the course of Confrontation, Britain would respond to Indonesian aggression by adopting a
series of covert countermeasures and gradually intensifying them to cause and exacerbate
internal stresses. Confrontation was eventually ended by developments within
Indonesia following a failed coup attempt in October 1965. An internal power struggle
between President Sukarno, the Communist Party, and General Suharto of the Indonesian Army
led to the rise of General Suharto to political power, the Indonesian Communists
eliminated as a political and social force, and President Sukarno sliding into increasing
ignominy. During this period, the United States provided covert assistance to Indonesian Army.
However, driven by its desire to contain communism rather than to end Confrontation, the United States’
role is argued to be relatively insignificant. A political settlement was
eventually negotiated and Confrontation was formally ended in August 1966. Therefore, Confrontation
eventually ended as a result of developments within Indonesia but it must be seen that
Britain contributed significantly to this outcome by successfully resisting Confrontation. As
such, this dissertation defends the case that although British intelligence could not have
brought an end to Confrontation on its own; without it, Confrontation would not have ended the way
it did.
Table of Contents
Declaration iv
Acknowldgements v
I. Introduction
Literature Review
Scope
Limitations
II. Early Stages of Confrontation, April 1963 - March 1964
Hearts and Minds, Border Scouts and Covert Subversion
Evolution of British Strategy
III. Seizing the Initiative, April 1964 - September 1965
SIGINT & Approval of CLARET
Impact of CLARET Operations
Intelligence, CLARET & the end of Confrontation
IV. Upheaval and the End in Sight, October 1965 - March 1966
Coup and Counter-coup
British Covert Propaganda
Impact on Confrontation
The United States Gets Involved
Impact on Confrontation
V. Suharto and Ending Confrontation, March 1966 - August
1966
Changing the Tide of Opinion
The Final Push
VI. Conclusion
Bibliography
Acknowledgements
This dissertation would not have been possible if not for
the following people and I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude:
Dr David Easter for so graciously offering his time and
effort in providing advice, insights and mentoring throughout this entire process.
Professor Joe Maiolo for being such an accommodating
supervisor and for his mentoring and advice during this period.
My parents whose love and unwavering support has allowed me
to concentrate on writing this dissertation without worry or distraction. Also, other
family and friends who have provided much need encouragement and kept me going.
And most importantly, Thanks be to God. For with man this is
impossible, but with God all things are possible. (Matthew 19:26)
I. Introduction
The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation was a low-intensity
conflict between Britain, Indonesia, and Malaysia that took place between
1963 and 1966. The conflict stemmed from Indonesian opposition to Britain’s
decolonisation efforts in the region.1 As part of its plans to divest itself of a formal empire in
South-east Asia whilst preserving its influence in the region, Britain sought to create a united Federation
of Malaysia2 by merging its colonies in Borneo and the island colony of Singapore with
an already independent Malaya.3 President Sukarno of Indonesia objected to the proposed
creation of Malaysia, denouncing it as a “neo-colonialist project” of Britain and a vestige of
neo-imperialism.4 Indonesia then embarked on a policy of ‘Confrontation’ (or Konfrontasi as
it was known to the Indonesians) against Malaysia and Britain, employing a range of
economical, political, and military measures aimed at destabilising the newly-formed
Federation.5 Britain responded by committing troops and resources to the defence of Malaysia
in a period of regional empire drawback; and despite Singapore’s separation from Malaysia
in 1965, Confrontation eventually ended in 1966 with the survival of Malaysia
firmly secured.
Fought in the dense jungles of Borneo away from public
attention, Confrontation was a conflict that was successfully resolved, to a greater or
lesser extent, by the extensive use of British covert counter-measures against Indonesian
aggression. Central to this success was the impact of clandestine military operations, codenamed
Operation CLARET, and the expedient and effective use of covert propaganda. Orthodox
assessments of Confrontation often emphasise the achievements of British intelligence and
covert action whilst other accounts have brought to attention the significance of other
factors such as the United States as well as rise of Major-General Suharto and the Indonesian
Army, especially in the latter stages of the conflict. As such, this dissertation aims to
enhance our current understanding of how Confrontation ended through an investigation of the
above mentioned factors and will defend the proposition that British intelligence was a
critical factor insofar that it was an insufficient but necessary condition for ending Confrontation.
The efforts of British intelligence were no doubt important
and necessary, but it did not and could not decisively end the conflict. Instead, it
is commonly accepted that the conflict was ended by developm nts within Indonesia
following the watershed events of October 1965. A failed coup attempt sparked off an internal
power struggle that led to the eventual end of Confrontation. The coup attempt was blamed
on the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and a brutal reprisal
from the Indonesian Army removed it as a social and political force within Indonesia.
Political instability ultimately led to the demise of the Sukarno regime and the rise of the Indonesian
Army led by Suharto. Described as a “reverse course” in the conflict that greatly
benefited the West, the events of winter 1965 to 1966 have attracted much debate and
controversy, especially over the extent in which the United States were able to shape these events.
Therefore, 6 the United States must be seen to be a significant actor that contributed to the
end of Confrontation. Similarly, the impact of Suharto’s rise to political power during this
crucial period also warrants attention. An investigation of the political climate within Indonesia
before and after the coup indicates a visible shift in attitudes towards Confrontation and
strongly suggests that Suharto played a decisive role in ending the conflict.
Therefore, this dissertation will qualify its position that
British intelligence was critical to ending of Confrontation by measuring it against the role
of the United States and the rise of Maj. Gen. Suharto. The role of the United States in
ending Confrontation will be shown to have played a minor role because even though its action
may have facilitated the end of Confrontation, it did not act deliberately to end it. The
importance of Suharto’s rise to power cannot be understated because it brought about a shift in
the political climate within Indonesian, directly contributing contributed to the
creation of conditions that led to the end of Confrontation. However, it must be remembered that
Suharto rose to power in a political environment which was, to a greater or lesser extent, the
direct result of British intelligence efforts. As such, this dissertation will build the case that
although the efforts of British intelligence could not have brought about an end to
Confrontation on its own; without it, Confrontation would not have ended the way it did.
Literature Review
The large majority of the literature on Confrontation
engages with the conflict from a British perspective, looking at how Britain dealt with
Confrontation and consequently brought about its resolution. Earlier literature tended to
lionise British achievements and paint an overly favourable assessment of its impact on the
course of Confrontation.7
However, contemporary accounts have increasingly challenged
the validity of these earlier assessments and sought to provide a more balanced assessment
of Britain’s role in ending Confrontation. Several key works have been critical to this
process, most notably David Easter’s Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia
1960-1966 and Nick van der Bijl’s Confrontation: The War with Indonesia 1962-1966 amongst
others. Nick van der Bijl states that while the extent which Operation CLARET directly contributed
to the eventual political process that ended Confrontation remains debatable, an
“efficient and effective acquisition of intelligence” and the exploitation of propaganda allowed
Britain to “conclude Confrontation to her satisfaction” and secure victory.8
In a similar vein,
Easter concluded that while Britain was not able to single-handedly bring about the end of
Confrontation, the achievements of its covert measures ensured that it was able to “control the
terms and conditions of a British withdrawal” from the region.9
While the focus of the
dissertation is on assessing the extent in which British intelligence brought about an end to
Confrontation, it is impossible to avoid some form of assessment on whether Confrontation was a
victory or failure vis-a-vis its strategic aims. To this end, John Subritzky provides an
invaluable insight by arguing that the high cost in achieving the survival of Malaysia coupled with
the failure to maintain its influence in the region, meant that Confrontation was at
best a “pyrrhic victory” for Britain.10
Because of the dominance of British-centric analysis of
Confrontation within the literature, it is important for us to also look at a
secondary body of literature to accurately assess the role played by the United States, and Suharto and
the Indonesian Army. As aforementioned, ambiguity continue to surround the events of
winter of 1965-1966, and in particular the extent of American influence over
developments within Indonesia. Peter Dale Scott argues that the attempted coup was actually an
elaborate “three-phase right-wing [Army] coup” that received extensive covert assistance from
the United States.11
In direct contrast, H.W. Brands has argued that the United States cannot
be held responsible for the coup or developments within Indonesia after the coup, and
while the United States did attempt to facilitate the rise of Suharto via covert
propaganda, its impact was far from certain.12
In Constructive Bloodbath in Indonesia, Nathaniel
Mehr echoes Brands’ assessment of a limited and indirect American influence over events which
preceded the end of Confrontation. The limited availability of translated Indonesian sources,
both primary and secondary, makes it difficult to accurately ascertain the role of
Suharto and the Indonesian Army in ending Confrontation. However, by comparing accounts of the
Indonesian political climate under President Sukarno and Suharto respectively, it is
possible to identify a distinct change in the dynamics within domestic politics and a shift in
attitudes towards Confrontation and thus, build the case that the rise of Suharto was decisive in
ending Confrontation.
An excellent starting point can be found in Franklin Weinstein’s
Indonesia Abandons Confrontation; Weinstein argues that by 1965, the Army was visibly disillusioned by
Sukarno’s konfrontasi policy and the transition of power from President Sukarno to Suharto and
the Army represented a transition from active belligerence to a desire for peaceful
coexistence with its neighbours.
Scope
The central proposition offered largely echoes the
conventional assessment that while the impact of British intelligence was important, it was not
decisive. Although it does not challenge this orthodox position, this dissertation differs
by attempting to qualify its proposition through a qualitative comparison against the
other two aforementioned factors.
Conventional accounts conclude that the impact of British
intelligence was not the deciding factor because it was unable to influence domestic
developments that eventually ended Confrontation. However, it often fails to measure its
assessment against the other factors which contributed to the ending Confrontation in enough
resolution.
Therefore, this dissertation aims to fill this gap by comparing British
intelligence against two other significant factors so as to re-evaluate the validity of our current
understanding of British intelligence’s importance in ending Confrontation. As outlined above, there
exists two distinct sets of literature — the first, explicitly deals with British
achievements vis-a-vis ending Confrontation; the second encompasses a broad range of
literature that while not explicitly focussed on Confrontation, provides fragmentary evidence
that will be used to build credible arguments for the importance of the United States and the
rise of Suharto as critical factors in explaining why Confrontation ended.
Therefore, it is
hoped that through the marriage of the two bodies of literature within the following
discussion, the current understanding of British intelligence’s importance in ending Confrontation
will be enhanced.
The dissertation will proceed within a chronological
framework so as to facilitate the reader’s appreciation of the evolution of Confrontation’s
dynamics. As such, this dissertation begins by looking at the various covert counter measures
taken against Indonesia, building the case that British intelligence contributed significantly to
the extent that it prevented a premature failure for Britain in Confrontation and created
the pre-conditions for a successful resolution of Confrontation according to its own terms.
The
discussion will then focus on the role of the United States and compare it against the role of
British intelligence. Available evidence suggests that the United States were keenly
interested in developments within Indonesia throughout Confrontation and attempted to
influence the course of events. However, the case would be made that it played a relatively
insignificant role in ending Confrontation because its actions were targeted at
containing communism rather than bringing about the end of Confrontation per se.
Next, the
discussion considers the impact of Suharto’s rise to power. It will be shown that Suharto’s
rise to power led to a discernible shift in Indonesian attitudes towards Confrontation. This created
the space within Indonesia’s political climate for constructive negotiation to take
place, leading to the end of Confrontation.
As such, the impact of Suharto’s rise to
power is of paramount importance. In its final chapter, the dissertation will evaluate whether
either the role of the United States or the Indonesian Army and Gen. Suharto diminishes the
importance of British intelligence as a factor in ending Confrontation before offering its
conclusion.
Limitations
The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation was an enigmatic
affair. Not quite a full scale war but more than a simple diplomatic dispute, Confrontation
was a complex conflict whose development was characterised by a dynamic interaction
between the ongoing armed conflict and the political antagonism between the
belligerents.
However, because this dissertation focuses on how Confrontation eventually ended,
it lacks the analytical scope to document the development of the conflict in its entirety.
Thus, it will only describe relevant events and explain its context wherever necessary.13
To fully encapsulate British intelligence’s contribution to
ending Confrontation, intelligence will be understood in its broadest terms to
include all levels of intelligence — tactical, operational and strategic. However, because the
analytical focus is naturally on the tangible impact of British intelligence on ending
Confrontation, the discussion of British intelligence will be confined to the range of covert measures
taken against the Indonesians. This, however, does not discount the importance of
intelligence collection.
Therefore, while intelligence collection will not be discussed as an
independent factor, it will be referred to whenever relevant. In addition, the case is made that
British intelligence had a larger impact in the latter half of Confrontation from August 1964 onwards
and thus, the weight of analysis will focus on the latter years of the conflict from
1964-1966.
II. Early Stages of Confrontation, April 1963 - March 1964
Intelligence was a critical part of Britain’s limited
military response to Indonesian aggression during the early stages of Confrontation.
Constrained by political considerations,14 Britain was keen to avoid overt military retaliation and
hence adopted a largely defensive strategy of attrition designed to neutralise and wear down
its opponent rather than to decisively defeat them in open war.15
These initial efforts
brought success to the extent that Britain was able to successfully defend the territorial
integrity of Malaysia; however, British intelligence, and British efforts in general, did little to
stem the tide of Indonesian aggression and had little or no impact on bringing about a conclusion
to Confrontation during this period. By January 1962, Britain had fully committed to the creation
of the Federation of Malaysia and expended considerable political effort over the
next twenty months to bring its plan to fruition.16
Unexpectedly, the creation of Malaysia
was openly opposed by the Indonesian government. Tensions reached its peak in the
period immediately following the failed Brunei Revolt in December 1962. A gradual escalation
of anti-Malaysia rhetoric from Indonesia culminated in Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Dr.
Subandrio proclaiming in a speech on 20 January 1963 that Indonesia “would have to adopt a
policy of confrontation against Malaya because the Malayans were at present acting as ‘the
henchmen of neo-Imperialism and neo-Colonialism pursuing a policy hostile to
Indonesia.’”.17
Although Subandrio’s declaration did not lead to immediate
hostilities between parties, the initial verbal bellicosity gave way to open
conflict in April 1963. Confrontation took on a military dimension when thirty guerrillas from the
North Borneo National Army (Tentera Nasional Kalimantan, TNKU) attacked a police
station Tebedu, Sarawak on 12 April 1963 which was followed by a series of cross-border
incursions from Indonesian Kalimantan into Malaysian Borneo.
Although Indonesia maintained
throughout 18 Confrontation that the incursions were carried out only by irregulars from TNKU or
local insurgents volunteers sympathetic to its cause,19 the Indonesian Army (Tentera
Nasional Indonesia, TNI) made little attempt to deny or hide that it was training them. The
inauguration of Malaysia on September 16, 1963 was met with a ferocious Indonesian
response. President Sukarno announced that Indonesia was now on a campaign to “Ganyang
Malaysia” or to ‘Crush Malaysia’. 20 Military confrontation was also subsequently
intensified with larger groups of IBTs crossing the border conducting raids.
Hearts and Minds, Border Scouts and Covert Subversion
Throughout Confrontation, the military conflict
predominantly took place along the border that separated British North Borneo from the
Indonesian province of Kalimantan. Compromising almost 1,000 miles of thick jungle, swamp and
mountains, the physical environment was an insurgent’s paradise.21
Despite the harsh
conflict environment, Britain had the advantage of experience on her side. The Malayan
Emergency had taught Britain valuable lessons that were relevant to the present situation
and British forces were able to bring that to bear with the appointment of General Sir
Walter Walker as the Director of Borneo Operations (DOBOPS). Drawing from his Malayan
Emergency experience, General Walker recognised that winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the
people was crucial to successfully countering an insurgency and thus made it an
immediate priority.22
Providing medical help and helping to improve local agriculture, local
communications and water supplies, amongst other initiatives, British forces in
Borneo were able to quickly gain the support and trust of the indigenous people living along the
border. The significance of winning the confidence of the border peoples was two-fold.
The first was that it prevented them from being subverted to the Indonesian cause; the
second, was that it created an informal information gathering network capable of generating
valuable intelligence.23
General Walker’s approach towards fighting the Indonesian
guerrillas was centred around a strategy to “dominate and own the jungle and the
frontier, week in, week out”.24 However, to do so required accurate and timely intelligence.
This was achieved through the information gathered from the indigenous people but also
through an initiative known as the
Border Scouts. The Border Scouts were a 1,500 strong unit
consisting of indigenous Ibans trained by the Special Air Service (SAS) and Gurkhas into a
border watch of sorts acting as the “eyes and ears” of security forces positioned along the
border.25
Partnering the SAS and Gurkha border patrols, the Border Scouts formed the basis of
a very effective tactical intelligence network which enabled the effective use of
fighting forces. The intelligence produced was of a standard so high that general Walker
commented, “nine times out of ten we knew his [the insurgent’s] every move and we brought him
to battle long before” he could inflict any damage. Therefore, it can be seen that the
establishment 26 of a highly effective intelligence network allowed security forces to deal with
cross-border incursions and prevent a worsening of the military conflict during the early stages of
Confrontation. However, it must be said that British intelligence efforts
were not always met with the same level of success. Fragmentary evidence from available
sources show that Britain also undertook a policy of covertly encouraging and supporting rebel
movements within Indonesia in an attempt to weaken and undermine Indonesia’s
Confrontation campaign but, unfortunately, achieved little success.27 Uneven
development, economic stagnation, and resentment at Javanese domination had created fertile grounds
for subversion within Indonesia, especially in the outer islands of the sprawling
archipelagic state.28
Therefore, aligned with the overall strategy of attrition and avoiding
overt retaliation, covert support for subversive elements within Indonesia proved to be an
attractive policy option for decision makers in London. The idea of covertly supporting internal dissidents was
mooted as early as December 1962 as evidenced in a memo from Philip de Zulueta to
then-Prime Minister Harold Macmillan where he suggested that “the best solution … would
be to encourage a subversive movement inside Indonesian-Borneo”. A similar strand of
thought 29 could be seen in Kuala Lumpur with Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malaysian Prime
Minister, displaying his enthusiasm for supporting subversion, remarking that there
was “potential for an uprising in Sulawesi [Celebes]” as well as Sumatra.30
Although the Tunku
gave no indications whether he was indeed providing material aid to rebels within
Indonesia, it was clear that he believed the future security for Malaysia lay in an eventual
overthrow of Sukarno.31
As such, the possibilities of extending covert support to dissident
elements within Indonesia was given serious consideration throughout 1963 but a decision was not
to be made until 1964. An appreciation of the situation at the start of 1964 indicated
that Indonesians were likely to increase the intensity of Confrontation, creating an
increased need for Britain to respond more positively. Still apprehensive of adopting overt
retaliatory military action against the Indonesians, coupled with increasing pressure from the
Tunku, Britain decided to approve covert support for subversion.32
Although the extent of aid
provided remains unclear, it was clear that Britain’s limited support for dissident elements
in an attempt to exacerbate any internal stresses did not manage to blunt the Indonesians’
Confrontation campaign. Instead, Indonesia continued to gradually intensify their
cross-border incursions and by April 1964, it was clear that the momentum of the conflict was firmly with
the Indonesians.
Evolution of British Strategy
As can be seen, the early stages of Confrontation was
characterised by Indonesian forces launching as many cross-border incursions as
possible. Hall and Andrew states that the Indonesians adopted a strategy aimed at using the absolute
number of incidents to dissipate the activities of British forces and undermine local
confidence in the British and the newly formed Malaysian government. The frequent incursions were
also opportunities to demonstrate the power of the Indonesian guerrillas and
inspire support amongst the indigenous people. Britain responded well to this initial
pressure 33 arising from Indonesian military action.
Combining good intelligence and the
effective use of force, General Sir Walker was able to extract the best out of his limited
forces in a harsh combat environment, ensuring that Britain did not lose the opening rounds of
Confrontation. However, it became increasingly clear that purely defensive
operations would not bring Confrontation to a swift conclusion and more needed to
be done to wrestle the initiative back from the Indonesians.34 Yet, political considerations
continued to restrain Britain to a limited strategy of attrition.
However, by April 1964,
Britain had began to evolve her policy to cope with the intensification of the conflict. On the
surface, Britain’s strategy of attrition continued to appear passive — neither overtly attacking
Indonesia nor willing to engage in negotiations, defending Malaysia till the Indonesians grew
weary. However, it also recognised that for this strategy to be effective, it had to discreetly
increase the pressure on Sukarno and Indonesia.35
As such, Britain began a more aggressive,
albeit secret, side of its attrition strategy. In what would become the pattern of Confrontation
henceforth, it responded to Indonesian aggression by adopting and stepping up its covert
counter-measures such as covert propaganda and clandestine military operations.
III. Seizing the Initiative, April 1964 - September 1965
By the second half of 1964, Confrontation had intensified
significantly. The Indonesians firmly held the initiative and Britain had to
adjust its strategy to prevent a premature military defeat in Confrontation. As a result of
this strategy adjustment, London approved the launch of a series of covert military
operations, codenamed Operation CLARET, designed to deny Sukarno of the initiative, to
impose greater costs on Indonesia and force them onto the back-foot.
The success of CLARET allowed 36 Britain to eventually regain the initiative and prevent Indonesia from gaining success in their cross border guerrilla campaign. Thus, CLARET was significant to resolving Confrontation as it meant that the military side of Confrontation increasingly occupied a background role in the conflict. The extent of British intelligence’s importance can be clearly seen as it features prominently in both the decision-making process over Operation CLARET as well as in the actual conduct of operations. Throughout the first half of 1964, the conflict expanded both geographically as well as in the scale of forces deployed in Borneo.37
In March, British security forces in Borneo encountered and engaged with elements of the 328 Raider Battalion and ‘Black Cobra’ Battalion respectively on two separate occasions. These were regular units from the TNI and it became abundantly clear that the Indonesians were now employing their best infantry, marines and paratroopers as attacking units.38 The scale of forces deployed had also visibly increased; a platoon’s commander’s fight had now effectively evolved into a company’s commander’s war. The TNI were also expanding their military 39 operations beyond the border area with Indonesian saboteurs setting off 13 explosions in Singapore between January to March 1964.40 It was clear that the situation was extremely precarious. Beyond a simple intensification in terms of scale, there was also an increase sophistication in Indonesian operations.
It was assessed that the Indonesian’s operational tactics had changed, incursions were now more carefully planned and aimed at establishing pockets of influence inside Malaysian territory.41 In view of these assessments, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) stated with gravity that if the present Indonesian intensification was left unchecked, Britain would find itself facing a very serious internal security threat within Borneo including a loss of troop morale and a decline in the loyalty of the local population.42
Therefore, in response to an intensification of the conflict by Indonesia, Britain moved to regain the initiative and take the fight to the Indonesians by conducting a series of deniable, cross border military operations,
The success of CLARET allowed 36 Britain to eventually regain the initiative and prevent Indonesia from gaining success in their cross border guerrilla campaign. Thus, CLARET was significant to resolving Confrontation as it meant that the military side of Confrontation increasingly occupied a background role in the conflict. The extent of British intelligence’s importance can be clearly seen as it features prominently in both the decision-making process over Operation CLARET as well as in the actual conduct of operations. Throughout the first half of 1964, the conflict expanded both geographically as well as in the scale of forces deployed in Borneo.37
In March, British security forces in Borneo encountered and engaged with elements of the 328 Raider Battalion and ‘Black Cobra’ Battalion respectively on two separate occasions. These were regular units from the TNI and it became abundantly clear that the Indonesians were now employing their best infantry, marines and paratroopers as attacking units.38 The scale of forces deployed had also visibly increased; a platoon’s commander’s fight had now effectively evolved into a company’s commander’s war. The TNI were also expanding their military 39 operations beyond the border area with Indonesian saboteurs setting off 13 explosions in Singapore between January to March 1964.40 It was clear that the situation was extremely precarious. Beyond a simple intensification in terms of scale, there was also an increase sophistication in Indonesian operations.
It was assessed that the Indonesian’s operational tactics had changed, incursions were now more carefully planned and aimed at establishing pockets of influence inside Malaysian territory.41 In view of these assessments, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) stated with gravity that if the present Indonesian intensification was left unchecked, Britain would find itself facing a very serious internal security threat within Borneo including a loss of troop morale and a decline in the loyalty of the local population.42
Therefore, in response to an intensification of the conflict by Indonesia, Britain moved to regain the initiative and take the fight to the Indonesians by conducting a series of deniable, cross border military operations,
codenamed CLARET.
SIGINT & Approval of CLARET
To date, there still exists some ambiguity over the official
start of Operation CLARET. Official approval for CLARET was difficult due to concerns
of political ramifications and a fear of triggering an aggressive Indonesian backlash;
however, crucial information from signal intelligence (SIGINT) made available during policy
discussions eventually secured the authorisation of CLARET operations. Gregorian Raffi places
the date of authorisation as August 1964 while Easter identifies the approval of cross
border operation to 10,000 yards in January 1965 as the start of CLARET operations.
However, 43 for the purposes of this dissertation, it is suffices to broadly define Operation CLARET to include all cross border operations. As such, this dissertation takes the position that British clandestine military operations began as early as April 1964 and it was gradually stepped up along a graded scale of offensive operations till its final form of targeted incursions of up to 10,000 yards in January 1965. In April 1964, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC) agreed to authorise British forces in Borneo to cross the border in hot pursuit up to a depth of 3,000 yards.44
However, Indonesia were able to sustain a continued build up of both volunteer IBTs and regular TNI forces along the border as well as a steady flow of reinforcements from Java, underscoring its ability to fight a protracted guerrilla war. By June 1964, Commander-in- Chief, Far East (CINCFE), Admiral Begg had requested for a further expansion of the remit given for cross border operations.45 After careful consideration and the failure of negotiations at the Tokyo Summit to produce a political settlement, Admiral Begg was informed on July 1 that approval had been given for credible deniable offensive operations including the laying of ambushes on the Indonesian side of the frontier.46 Further approval was then given to extend operations to 5,000 yards and eventually 10,000 yards as a response to an increased Indonesian threat towards the end of 1964.47
Despite concerns of a potential guerrilla war and a desire to prevent a premature military defeat in Confrontation, there continued to be apprehension amongst decision makers in stepping up covert military action for the fear of international censure if the operations were to become exposed. Whilst the expansion of Confrontation to West Malaysia provided some form of motivation, this apprehension was only fully allayed by information provided from signal intelligence (SIGINT) on the insights of Indonesian political thinking during this period. Indonesian forces conducting seaborne and 48 airborne landings on the coast of Johore, West Malaysia and at Labis in Johore respectively may have alarmed policymakers in London but it was the assurance gained from critical SIGINT intercepts that proved decisive in their decision making.49
Admiral Begg had requested for expansion of the current remit to include planned attacks on specific targets such as known camps, staging areas and supply bases inside Indonesian territory; the COS objected to Admiral Begg’s demands because of concerns over the political difficulty in denying such operations.50 However, Admiral Begg was able to convince the COS otherwise by highlighting a series of intercepted and decrypted Indonesian signals that indicated the need to deny such operations were unlikely to be necessary as Indonesian military commanders rarely reported clashes and when they did, often claimed real and imaginary successes.51
Likewise, a Commonwealth Relation Office (CRO) official put it to Arthur Bottomley, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, that all the available evidence had pointed to local Indonesian commanders concealing the fact that they were being attacked in their own areas and attributing any casualties to ‘successful’ Indonesian operations into British Borneo.52 As such, it can be seen that the Foreign Office and the CRO were similarly persuaded to approve Operation CLARET on the basis of available SIGINT.
However, 43 for the purposes of this dissertation, it is suffices to broadly define Operation CLARET to include all cross border operations. As such, this dissertation takes the position that British clandestine military operations began as early as April 1964 and it was gradually stepped up along a graded scale of offensive operations till its final form of targeted incursions of up to 10,000 yards in January 1965. In April 1964, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC) agreed to authorise British forces in Borneo to cross the border in hot pursuit up to a depth of 3,000 yards.44
However, Indonesia were able to sustain a continued build up of both volunteer IBTs and regular TNI forces along the border as well as a steady flow of reinforcements from Java, underscoring its ability to fight a protracted guerrilla war. By June 1964, Commander-in- Chief, Far East (CINCFE), Admiral Begg had requested for a further expansion of the remit given for cross border operations.45 After careful consideration and the failure of negotiations at the Tokyo Summit to produce a political settlement, Admiral Begg was informed on July 1 that approval had been given for credible deniable offensive operations including the laying of ambushes on the Indonesian side of the frontier.46 Further approval was then given to extend operations to 5,000 yards and eventually 10,000 yards as a response to an increased Indonesian threat towards the end of 1964.47
Despite concerns of a potential guerrilla war and a desire to prevent a premature military defeat in Confrontation, there continued to be apprehension amongst decision makers in stepping up covert military action for the fear of international censure if the operations were to become exposed. Whilst the expansion of Confrontation to West Malaysia provided some form of motivation, this apprehension was only fully allayed by information provided from signal intelligence (SIGINT) on the insights of Indonesian political thinking during this period. Indonesian forces conducting seaborne and 48 airborne landings on the coast of Johore, West Malaysia and at Labis in Johore respectively may have alarmed policymakers in London but it was the assurance gained from critical SIGINT intercepts that proved decisive in their decision making.49
Admiral Begg had requested for expansion of the current remit to include planned attacks on specific targets such as known camps, staging areas and supply bases inside Indonesian territory; the COS objected to Admiral Begg’s demands because of concerns over the political difficulty in denying such operations.50 However, Admiral Begg was able to convince the COS otherwise by highlighting a series of intercepted and decrypted Indonesian signals that indicated the need to deny such operations were unlikely to be necessary as Indonesian military commanders rarely reported clashes and when they did, often claimed real and imaginary successes.51
Likewise, a Commonwealth Relation Office (CRO) official put it to Arthur Bottomley, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, that all the available evidence had pointed to local Indonesian commanders concealing the fact that they were being attacked in their own areas and attributing any casualties to ‘successful’ Indonesian operations into British Borneo.52 As such, it can be seen that the Foreign Office and the CRO were similarly persuaded to approve Operation CLARET on the basis of available SIGINT.
Impact of CLARET Operations
General Walker was highly experienced in fighting an
insurgency and had up to this point, fought a relatively successful counter-insurgency
campaign within the Borneo jungles. However, both Admiral Begg and himself understood that under
the current rules Britain could not win but rather only lose slowly; Britain had to
play according to the rules that the enemy had made up for himself if they were to stand a chance
at winning Confrontation militarily.53
Walker emphasised the need to “throw the enemy off balance by disruptive raids” into his forward deployment area so as to deny him the initiative.54 Therefore, CLARET operations were seen as the perfect response to the present military situation in Confrontation. However, although offensive cross border incursions were the true purpose of CLARET operations, it was not designed to be a pre-emptive offensive tool nor was it expected to cause any serious disruption. It remained purely a deterrent measure aimed at causing “psychological rapier-thrusts” to make Indonesians forces think defensively and raise the cost of Confrontation for them.55
The expansion of CLARET to allow offensive operations up to 10,000 yards had an immediate positive impact on the military struggle. British forces were able to strike at the enemy in their once inviolate bases near the border and by 1965, the Indonesians had withdrawn up to 10,000 yards from the border. For example, 56 the 2/10 Gurkha Rifles launched a successful ambush codenamed Operation HIGH HURDLE which forced the IBTs to abandon several of their base areas and fall back to a river some distance away from the border.57
Successful ambushes carried out by other battalions involved in Operation CLARET meant that collectively, British forces were able to create a sanitised area along the border in which Indonesians forces risked being attacked. This helped to deny the enemy the initiative and greatly improved the security of British forces in Borneo.58 British and Commonwealth forces in Borneo suffered 37 casualties between 1963 to 1964 with an estimated 270 IBTs killed; after offensive CLARET operations were launched, Commonwealth forces only suffered 5 casualties with 342 Indonesians killed in the period between January and September 1965.59
Therefore, it was clear that the adoption of a more aggressive military strategy was driving up the costs of Confrontation for the Indonesians in a very direct and tangible way. Perhaps the most telling evidence can be found in the remarks made by General Sukendro in a meeting with Dato Ghazalie Shafie in November 1965 that British operations in North Kalimantan were hurting.60 Yet, despite its apparent effectiveness in arresting the development of Indonesian military aggression, the conduct CLARET was closely tied to the developing political situation. Confrontation was always a political struggle as much as it was a military struggle.61
As such, there was a continuous control of military operations in light of strategic and political implications, and the decision to authorise raids were “made at the highest levels of the British government”.62 CLARET operations became a useful “stick and carrot” in political negotiations and when a political settlement became plausible in May 1966, three months before its eventual end, Operation CLARET was terminated and British forces reverted to its defensive role.
Walker emphasised the need to “throw the enemy off balance by disruptive raids” into his forward deployment area so as to deny him the initiative.54 Therefore, CLARET operations were seen as the perfect response to the present military situation in Confrontation. However, although offensive cross border incursions were the true purpose of CLARET operations, it was not designed to be a pre-emptive offensive tool nor was it expected to cause any serious disruption. It remained purely a deterrent measure aimed at causing “psychological rapier-thrusts” to make Indonesians forces think defensively and raise the cost of Confrontation for them.55
The expansion of CLARET to allow offensive operations up to 10,000 yards had an immediate positive impact on the military struggle. British forces were able to strike at the enemy in their once inviolate bases near the border and by 1965, the Indonesians had withdrawn up to 10,000 yards from the border. For example, 56 the 2/10 Gurkha Rifles launched a successful ambush codenamed Operation HIGH HURDLE which forced the IBTs to abandon several of their base areas and fall back to a river some distance away from the border.57
Successful ambushes carried out by other battalions involved in Operation CLARET meant that collectively, British forces were able to create a sanitised area along the border in which Indonesians forces risked being attacked. This helped to deny the enemy the initiative and greatly improved the security of British forces in Borneo.58 British and Commonwealth forces in Borneo suffered 37 casualties between 1963 to 1964 with an estimated 270 IBTs killed; after offensive CLARET operations were launched, Commonwealth forces only suffered 5 casualties with 342 Indonesians killed in the period between January and September 1965.59
Therefore, it was clear that the adoption of a more aggressive military strategy was driving up the costs of Confrontation for the Indonesians in a very direct and tangible way. Perhaps the most telling evidence can be found in the remarks made by General Sukendro in a meeting with Dato Ghazalie Shafie in November 1965 that British operations in North Kalimantan were hurting.60 Yet, despite its apparent effectiveness in arresting the development of Indonesian military aggression, the conduct CLARET was closely tied to the developing political situation. Confrontation was always a political struggle as much as it was a military struggle.61
As such, there was a continuous control of military operations in light of strategic and political implications, and the decision to authorise raids were “made at the highest levels of the British government”.62 CLARET operations became a useful “stick and carrot” in political negotiations and when a political settlement became plausible in May 1966, three months before its eventual end, Operation CLARET was terminated and British forces reverted to its defensive role.
Intelligence, CLARET & the end of Confrontation
As such, CLARET can be seen to be highly significant in the
ability of Britain to forestall an Indonesian success and the magnitude of its
impact was undoubtedly the result of good intelligence. CLARET operations were aided by excellent
intelligence produced by SIGINT, human intelligence as well as tactical, military
field intelligence.
Locating the enemy was and continues to be the foremost difficulty in guerrilla warfare, and tactical SIGINT solved this challenged significantly during Confrontation.63 The extent of which CLARET operations relied on SIGINT could be clearly seen from comments made in discussions over the publication of General Walker’s biography, Fighting General. It was recorded that the biography had stayed clear of mentioning the sensitive aspect of the operations which was that “they were all based on SIGINT (emphasis added)”.
Furthermore, 64 the extensive information network created by the SAS during the early years of Confrontation also continued to pay intelligence dividends. The Border Scouts became an important intelligence asset to CLARET operations and complimented the extensive reconnaissance missions that were being conducted by 22 SAS.65 CLARET operations were also supported by aerial photo reconnaissance undertaken by the Royal Air Force, producing invaluable photographs and surveys of the border areas which were interpreted and conveyed to frontline troops.66
Britain also benefited from close co-operation with its Commonwealth allies; the Government of Australia approved the deployment of 693 Signal Troop to Labuan, replacing a British Army signal troop in August 1964. The Australians began intercepting Indonesian wireless communications and Gen. Walker gave credit to the Australian signals intelligence efforts, stating that they had been a “significant force multiplier”.67
In addition, intelligence not only supported offensive operations but were also used to support internal security efforts. Corporal David Kitching, a field intelligence officer (FIO) with the 1st Scots Guards, joined HQ Mid-West Brigade in December 1964 and was posted to Lundu, a district that bordered Kalimantan. Arriving in Lundu, Kitching made contact with the local Ibans and unearthed information about a little-known People’s National Commando of Sarawak (Kommando Nasional Rajkat Sarawak, KONAS) which were aimed at subverting Dayaks in Sarawak in support of the Indonesian cause.68 Kitching’s experience was one of many intelligence operations that contributed significantly to guarding against internal subversion; the intelligence generated then supported successful CLARET patrols against various subversive movements within Borneo.
Therefore, in its entirety, Britain possessed an extensive range of information sources and its impressive tactical intelligence enabled the effective execution of CLARET operations and the neutralisation of both external and internal security threats. Furthermore, British intelligence’s co-operation with its allies went beyond the spheres of tactical and operational military intelligence. Throughout Confrontation, Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) achieved outstanding success in intercepting and reading Indonesian ciphers. Because of its ability to read both Indonesian military and diplomatic codes, it was able to give advance warning on Jakarta’s plans and intentions; however, the utility of such information remained limited because peculiarities of the Indonesian political system meant a sense of unpredictability and ambiguity always persisted.
However, GCHQ’s success was in part the result of close 69 collaboration with the Dutch, especially in the area of code-breaking. The Dutch had previously been involved in their own ‘confrontation’ with Sukarno over West New Guinea (West Irian to the Indonesians) and developed considerable intelligence capabilities during that period. Dutch intelligence services were able to intercept diplomatic and military traffic and also ran a successful HUMINT operation codenamed VIRGIL where it recruited several well placed officials.70 British and Dutch intelligence services had forged a strong relationship during the 1950s and this intelligence liaison continued into Confrontation. 71
The Dutch continued to produce valuable intelligence during Confrontation, and it is safe to assume that these results were being shared seamlessly with the British.72 A military defeat in Confrontation would have placed Britain in an adverse position politically, plausibly with her being forced into making concessions or accepting unfavourable terms in a political settlement of the conflict. As such, in a crucial period during Confrontation where the growing Indonesian aggression threatened to consign British forces to a military defeat, Britain was able to avoid losing Confrontation through adopting covert military action supported by an effective intelligence network.
SIGINT played a hugely significant role as it gave British policy-makers the confidence to expand its covert military action which in time, allowed British troops to dominate the border areas in Borneo and effectively neutralise the Indonesian military threat in Confrontation. Strategic intelligence also informed other elements of the overall British strategy in Confrontation. Intelligence allowed British policy-makers to assess the impact of their actions on the Indonesian decision making process.
For example, the Joint Intelligence Committee was able to assess that the provocative passage of HMS Victorious through the Sunda Straits had impressed on the Indonesians Britain’s commitment to Confrontation and determination to retaliate in kind to any further Indonesian aggression.73
Therefore, it can be said that British intelligence undeniably contributed to the ending of Confrontation as it made it impossible for the Indonesians to continue regular incursions into Malaysian Borneo and it also enabled British forces to impose an unacceptably high cost on the Indonesians without provoking a regional crisis. Although CLARET did not directly bring about the end 74 of Confrontation, it gave Britain the ability to resist the Indonesian military challenge and prevent Sukarno from attaining victory. Consequently, when Indonesia experienced a domestic upheaval in October 1965, it was able to exploit the situation and acted decisively to bring Confrontation to an end.
Locating the enemy was and continues to be the foremost difficulty in guerrilla warfare, and tactical SIGINT solved this challenged significantly during Confrontation.63 The extent of which CLARET operations relied on SIGINT could be clearly seen from comments made in discussions over the publication of General Walker’s biography, Fighting General. It was recorded that the biography had stayed clear of mentioning the sensitive aspect of the operations which was that “they were all based on SIGINT (emphasis added)”.
Furthermore, 64 the extensive information network created by the SAS during the early years of Confrontation also continued to pay intelligence dividends. The Border Scouts became an important intelligence asset to CLARET operations and complimented the extensive reconnaissance missions that were being conducted by 22 SAS.65 CLARET operations were also supported by aerial photo reconnaissance undertaken by the Royal Air Force, producing invaluable photographs and surveys of the border areas which were interpreted and conveyed to frontline troops.66
Britain also benefited from close co-operation with its Commonwealth allies; the Government of Australia approved the deployment of 693 Signal Troop to Labuan, replacing a British Army signal troop in August 1964. The Australians began intercepting Indonesian wireless communications and Gen. Walker gave credit to the Australian signals intelligence efforts, stating that they had been a “significant force multiplier”.67
In addition, intelligence not only supported offensive operations but were also used to support internal security efforts. Corporal David Kitching, a field intelligence officer (FIO) with the 1st Scots Guards, joined HQ Mid-West Brigade in December 1964 and was posted to Lundu, a district that bordered Kalimantan. Arriving in Lundu, Kitching made contact with the local Ibans and unearthed information about a little-known People’s National Commando of Sarawak (Kommando Nasional Rajkat Sarawak, KONAS) which were aimed at subverting Dayaks in Sarawak in support of the Indonesian cause.68 Kitching’s experience was one of many intelligence operations that contributed significantly to guarding against internal subversion; the intelligence generated then supported successful CLARET patrols against various subversive movements within Borneo.
Therefore, in its entirety, Britain possessed an extensive range of information sources and its impressive tactical intelligence enabled the effective execution of CLARET operations and the neutralisation of both external and internal security threats. Furthermore, British intelligence’s co-operation with its allies went beyond the spheres of tactical and operational military intelligence. Throughout Confrontation, Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) achieved outstanding success in intercepting and reading Indonesian ciphers. Because of its ability to read both Indonesian military and diplomatic codes, it was able to give advance warning on Jakarta’s plans and intentions; however, the utility of such information remained limited because peculiarities of the Indonesian political system meant a sense of unpredictability and ambiguity always persisted.
However, GCHQ’s success was in part the result of close 69 collaboration with the Dutch, especially in the area of code-breaking. The Dutch had previously been involved in their own ‘confrontation’ with Sukarno over West New Guinea (West Irian to the Indonesians) and developed considerable intelligence capabilities during that period. Dutch intelligence services were able to intercept diplomatic and military traffic and also ran a successful HUMINT operation codenamed VIRGIL where it recruited several well placed officials.70 British and Dutch intelligence services had forged a strong relationship during the 1950s and this intelligence liaison continued into Confrontation. 71
The Dutch continued to produce valuable intelligence during Confrontation, and it is safe to assume that these results were being shared seamlessly with the British.72 A military defeat in Confrontation would have placed Britain in an adverse position politically, plausibly with her being forced into making concessions or accepting unfavourable terms in a political settlement of the conflict. As such, in a crucial period during Confrontation where the growing Indonesian aggression threatened to consign British forces to a military defeat, Britain was able to avoid losing Confrontation through adopting covert military action supported by an effective intelligence network.
SIGINT played a hugely significant role as it gave British policy-makers the confidence to expand its covert military action which in time, allowed British troops to dominate the border areas in Borneo and effectively neutralise the Indonesian military threat in Confrontation. Strategic intelligence also informed other elements of the overall British strategy in Confrontation. Intelligence allowed British policy-makers to assess the impact of their actions on the Indonesian decision making process.
For example, the Joint Intelligence Committee was able to assess that the provocative passage of HMS Victorious through the Sunda Straits had impressed on the Indonesians Britain’s commitment to Confrontation and determination to retaliate in kind to any further Indonesian aggression.73
Therefore, it can be said that British intelligence undeniably contributed to the ending of Confrontation as it made it impossible for the Indonesians to continue regular incursions into Malaysian Borneo and it also enabled British forces to impose an unacceptably high cost on the Indonesians without provoking a regional crisis. Although CLARET did not directly bring about the end 74 of Confrontation, it gave Britain the ability to resist the Indonesian military challenge and prevent Sukarno from attaining victory. Consequently, when Indonesia experienced a domestic upheaval in October 1965, it was able to exploit the situation and acted decisively to bring Confrontation to an end.
IV. Upheaval and the End in Sight, October 1965 - March 1966
In the early morning of October 1st, 1965, a coup attempt
was launched by a group called the ‘Thirtieth September Movement’. However, the coup
was short-lived and it ended as swiftly as it was launched. The failed coup attempt was a
defining moment in Confrontation and over the next five months, Indonesia
underwent a dramatic political upheaval.
The events that unfolded were a watershed in the course of Confrontation and it undoubtedly led to the eventual resolution of Confrontation. Although it is accepted that Confrontation was decisively ended as a result of events in Indonesia, the circumstances in which these events developed allows Britain and the United States to stake a credible claim in having had a vital impact in ending the conflict.
Therefore, this chapter will examine the events surrounding the coup in detail and the respective claims in turn.
The events that unfolded were a watershed in the course of Confrontation and it undoubtedly led to the eventual resolution of Confrontation. Although it is accepted that Confrontation was decisively ended as a result of events in Indonesia, the circumstances in which these events developed allows Britain and the United States to stake a credible claim in having had a vital impact in ending the conflict.
Therefore, this chapter will examine the events surrounding the coup in detail and the respective claims in turn.
Coup and Counter-coup
75
In the early hours of 1st October, the ‘Thirtieth September
Movement’ abducted and killed six leading Indonesian Generals, including the then
current Army Chief-of-Staff 76 General Yani, before dumping their bodies in a disused well
at Halim air force base.77 The Movement was led by Lt. Col. Untung, a battalion commander
within the Presidential Guard, and had consisted mainly of left-leaning ‘young
officers’ and elements of the Indonesian Air Force. After taking control of broadcasting
facilities 78 in Jakarta, Untung announced that a military movement had taken place within
the army and it had arrested (not killed) the ‘Council of Generals’.
Announcing the formation of a Revolutionary Council, Untung proclaimed that the Movement had launched a pre-emptive coup against the ‘Council of Generals’ of who, in an alleged collaboration with the United States’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had planned its own coup scheduled for 5th October.79 In its entirety, Untung’s coup d’état was short-lived as Maj. Gen. Suharto, commander of the TNI’s Army Strategic Reserve Command whose role was to deal with internal unrest, quickly assumed control of the Army and mobilised forces loyal to him to swiftly put down the coup.
By 2nd October, the coup was effectively over. Over the next five months, Indonesia experienced a drastic shift in its internal balance of power as it witnessed the destruction of the PKI and Suharto rising to power in what was effectively a military counter-coup. Domestic political tensions had been mounting in the preceding months as Sukarno gravitated towards the PKI, alienating the Army amidst increasing economic and administrative decline.80 The precarious balance of power between the triumvirate of Sukarno, the anti-communist Army and the large communist party could not withstand such a sudden shock aimed at regime change and a violent and protracted power struggle ensued.
Immediately after the coup, the Army moved against the PKI. Suharto and the Army capitalised on the situation to express their dissatisfaction with the PKI’s growing power and acted to destroy the communists. Taking control of the mass media, the Army linked the PKI with the Untung coup and attacked them through a sustained propaganda campaign with claims such as of torturing the six generals before killing them.81 Mobilising popular opinion against the PKI, Suharto was able to effectively remove them as a social and political force within Indonesia. However, the manner in which Suharto eliminated the PKI remains a matter of controversy to date. Instigated by the army to a certain extent, communal conflict broke out.
The ferocious campaign of repression launched subsequently resulted in a large number of PKI members and sympathisers being killed throughout the country.82 There has never been an official statement released by Indonesia on the subject but there have been estimates ranging from 350,000 at the low end to 1.5 million at the high end.83 With the communists removed as a political force, the Army then challenged Sukarno for complete political control. However, unwilling to openly challenge Sukarno because of his status and influence, the struggle for power was muted and fought over minor issues.84
With Sukarno nominally remaining as President, the Army established itself as the dominant political force throughout Indonesia. In March 1966, Sukarno was eventually compelled to transfer executive powers to Suharto, thus marking the end of Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ era and the emergence of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime.85 Despite the Indonesian Army firmly apportioning blame on the PKI, the West was less certain about the PKI’s culpability as initial evidence available to both Britain and the United States were inconclusive regarding the PKI’s involvement and largely suggested that the PKI had played a minor role and was at best, an unwilling party to the coup.86
However, the Army’s response to the Untung coup attempt was highly convenient for the Western powers. Beyond the immediate concerns of Confrontation, Britain and the United States had been concerned about a potential communist take-over in Indonesian and hence, both countries were keen to capitalise on events in Indonesia and exploit the situation to the best of their abilities despite the prevailing uncertainty. Thus, they actively launched propaganda and informational campaigns which aided the Army’s cause, seeking to discredit the PKI by confirming the Army’s rhetoric through bias reporting in the Western media.87
Announcing the formation of a Revolutionary Council, Untung proclaimed that the Movement had launched a pre-emptive coup against the ‘Council of Generals’ of who, in an alleged collaboration with the United States’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had planned its own coup scheduled for 5th October.79 In its entirety, Untung’s coup d’état was short-lived as Maj. Gen. Suharto, commander of the TNI’s Army Strategic Reserve Command whose role was to deal with internal unrest, quickly assumed control of the Army and mobilised forces loyal to him to swiftly put down the coup.
By 2nd October, the coup was effectively over. Over the next five months, Indonesia experienced a drastic shift in its internal balance of power as it witnessed the destruction of the PKI and Suharto rising to power in what was effectively a military counter-coup. Domestic political tensions had been mounting in the preceding months as Sukarno gravitated towards the PKI, alienating the Army amidst increasing economic and administrative decline.80 The precarious balance of power between the triumvirate of Sukarno, the anti-communist Army and the large communist party could not withstand such a sudden shock aimed at regime change and a violent and protracted power struggle ensued.
Immediately after the coup, the Army moved against the PKI. Suharto and the Army capitalised on the situation to express their dissatisfaction with the PKI’s growing power and acted to destroy the communists. Taking control of the mass media, the Army linked the PKI with the Untung coup and attacked them through a sustained propaganda campaign with claims such as of torturing the six generals before killing them.81 Mobilising popular opinion against the PKI, Suharto was able to effectively remove them as a social and political force within Indonesia. However, the manner in which Suharto eliminated the PKI remains a matter of controversy to date. Instigated by the army to a certain extent, communal conflict broke out.
The ferocious campaign of repression launched subsequently resulted in a large number of PKI members and sympathisers being killed throughout the country.82 There has never been an official statement released by Indonesia on the subject but there have been estimates ranging from 350,000 at the low end to 1.5 million at the high end.83 With the communists removed as a political force, the Army then challenged Sukarno for complete political control. However, unwilling to openly challenge Sukarno because of his status and influence, the struggle for power was muted and fought over minor issues.84
With Sukarno nominally remaining as President, the Army established itself as the dominant political force throughout Indonesia. In March 1966, Sukarno was eventually compelled to transfer executive powers to Suharto, thus marking the end of Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ era and the emergence of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime.85 Despite the Indonesian Army firmly apportioning blame on the PKI, the West was less certain about the PKI’s culpability as initial evidence available to both Britain and the United States were inconclusive regarding the PKI’s involvement and largely suggested that the PKI had played a minor role and was at best, an unwilling party to the coup.86
However, the Army’s response to the Untung coup attempt was highly convenient for the Western powers. Beyond the immediate concerns of Confrontation, Britain and the United States had been concerned about a potential communist take-over in Indonesian and hence, both countries were keen to capitalise on events in Indonesia and exploit the situation to the best of their abilities despite the prevailing uncertainty. Thus, they actively launched propaganda and informational campaigns which aided the Army’s cause, seeking to discredit the PKI by confirming the Army’s rhetoric through bias reporting in the Western media.87
British Covert Propaganda
The British strategy had been one of ‘soldiering on’ and
gradually applying pressure to create and exacerbate any internal pressures to bring
Confrontation to an end. Therefore, the Untung coup and its immediate consequences, to a certain
extent, represented the sort of rupture that Britain had desired. While it became clear that
the Army was adopting a hardline against the PKI, it remained difficult to calibrate
British strategy because of the uncertainty that persisted over the intentions of the Army
vis-a-vis Sukarno and Confrontation at large. Andrew Gilchrist, the British
Ambassador 88 to Indonesia, believed that although changes might not end Confrontation “in itself
”, events could possibly lead to a situation in which a political settlement of Confrontation
could be achieved.89
Therefore, Britain moved forward cautiously, waiting to see “how the situation develops and how [it could] best exploit it as it is developing”.90 The cornerstone of this approach was a coordinated covert propaganda campaign designed to ensure, if not the ending of Confrontation then at the very least, that the PKI was eliminated.91 Britain already had an established covert propaganda machinery in place in Southeast Asia and when the opportunity arose, it acted decisively to facilitate Suharto’s rise to power. British propaganda efforts were primarily led by the Foreign Office’s (FO) Information Research Department (IRD). The IRD had been set-up in 1947 to distribute anti-Communist propaganda by carefully selecting factual material and distributing it a variety of recipients including journalists and broadcasters.92
The department took roots in the region early in the 1950s as it defended British interests in Indonesia and the region, establishing an office in Phoenix Park, Singapore.93 Less than a month after the coup, Norman Reddaway, one of the FO’s more senior and experienced information and propaganda specialist arrived in Singapore to take charge of IRD activities. Seen in context with the current British strategy, his appointment was a clear indication of the desire to capitalise on the current situation. Current CINCFE, Sir John Grandy put forward to the FO that Britain’s aim should be “the destruction and putting to flight of the PKI by the Indonesian Army”.94
Wary of adopting any overt measures, Britain continued its pattern of responding to developments within Confrontation with covert measures. Employing its extensive propaganda apparatus, Britain actively encouraged the ongoing power struggles between Suharto and the PKI, as well as between Suharto and Sukarno. It sought to blacken the PKI’s reputation by highlighting its alleged brutality in murdering the six generals, its connection to communist China and Untung’s treachery by virtually kidnapping Sukarno.95 In the months after the coup, IRD published briefs titled, ‘The Dilemmas of China and the PKI’ and ‘The PKI Holds its Fire’ both of which greatly supported Suharto’s interpretation of events surrounding the coup.96
The IRD also distributed stories corroborating those carried by the Army-controlled Indonesian media despite having some knowledge of their lack of authenticity; these included PKI plans to carve towns into districts for systematic slaughter and a story from the Jakarta Daily Mail about genitalia mutilation by female communists.97 Therefore, carefully curated information would be passed on to the media via contacts in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Hong Kong; these news would then travel the world and make it back into Indonesia and influence Indonesian opinion.98
Perhaps, the most telling evidence of the extent of which IRD was able to influence Indonesian public opinion can be found in a letter from Reddaway to Gilchrist where he lists several incidents (read IRD achievements): 99 (b) The story of the messenger plying between Aidit and Subandrio. This was carried by newspapers, agencies and radio. (c) The story of PKI systematic preparations before the coup - the carving up of the town into districts for systematic slaughter. This was carried by agencies. (d) Various sitreps from yourself [referring to Ambassador Gilchrist] which were put almost instantly back into Indonesia via the BBC. You may remember complaining that the versions put back were uncomfortably close to those put out by yourself. …. I wondered whether this was the first time in history that an Ambassador had been able to address the people of his country of work almost at will and virtually instantaneously. …. (h) The first irreverent words about Sukarno were broadcast from K.L. when Don North’s tape … reached K.L. via this office. As can be seen, the extent of propaganda activities undertaken by IRD and British intelligence was extensive and varied. However, beyond the selective replication of information, IRD also began to mount its own “unattributable ploys” designed to achieve its Confrontation aims.100
IRD had relied on a large range of sources for its propaganda material, including other departments within the FO, and British overseas missions; looking at the organisational set-up in Phoenix Park, it is reasonable to expect that the IRD team in Singapore also gained information from MI6 and other intelligence sources within Phoenix Park. For example, SIGINT had revealed secret contacts between 101 Sukarno’s government and the disgraced PKI leader Aidit, this information was subsequently used by IRD to craft a story that was publicised by Reddaway through media outlets in Hong Kong.102
Roland Challis, a journalist in Singapore with close contact with Reddaway, recounts that Reddaway’s IRD team in Singapore was also actively preparing material that would be safe-handed into Jakarta and broadcasted through a programme whose Indonesian title meant ‘Voice from the Well’.103 Given that Reddaway had been offered the use of a small and large radio transmitter, it strongly suggests that Britain may have set up her own black propaganda radio station in Indonesia during Confrontation.104
As well as discrediting the PKI and Sukarno, British propaganda efforts were also explicitly aimed at boosting the Army’s position by portraying them as patriots and not, in any way, ‘Western stooges’.105 Ambassador Gilchrist was recorded as advising the FO that a reference made in a BBC newsreel to Suharto’s foreign minister Adam Malik “being compelled to seek foreign aid from the West” should be dropped for fears of the potential repercussions it would have on Suharto’s nationalist credentials and image.106
British intelligence also ensured the positive opinion of Suharto’s regime in a more surreptitious way by suppressing information it had deemed unfavourable to the Army’s cause. Because of the lack of access by journalists and the media into Indonesia, the IRD came into a convenient position where it enjoyed considerable influence over what information was being made available to the public. Reddaway described it as “marrying up the people with the information [but] no voice with the media which had the voice but no information”.107
However, it did so selectively and with considerable bias. By November 1965, British officials were meeting with members of the Suharto regime and it was clear that the British had some knowledge of the nature and scale of the anti-Communist campaign.108 However, none of the information about the on-going murders of PKI members were passed on to members of the media.109
Therefore, Britain moved forward cautiously, waiting to see “how the situation develops and how [it could] best exploit it as it is developing”.90 The cornerstone of this approach was a coordinated covert propaganda campaign designed to ensure, if not the ending of Confrontation then at the very least, that the PKI was eliminated.91 Britain already had an established covert propaganda machinery in place in Southeast Asia and when the opportunity arose, it acted decisively to facilitate Suharto’s rise to power. British propaganda efforts were primarily led by the Foreign Office’s (FO) Information Research Department (IRD). The IRD had been set-up in 1947 to distribute anti-Communist propaganda by carefully selecting factual material and distributing it a variety of recipients including journalists and broadcasters.92
The department took roots in the region early in the 1950s as it defended British interests in Indonesia and the region, establishing an office in Phoenix Park, Singapore.93 Less than a month after the coup, Norman Reddaway, one of the FO’s more senior and experienced information and propaganda specialist arrived in Singapore to take charge of IRD activities. Seen in context with the current British strategy, his appointment was a clear indication of the desire to capitalise on the current situation. Current CINCFE, Sir John Grandy put forward to the FO that Britain’s aim should be “the destruction and putting to flight of the PKI by the Indonesian Army”.94
Wary of adopting any overt measures, Britain continued its pattern of responding to developments within Confrontation with covert measures. Employing its extensive propaganda apparatus, Britain actively encouraged the ongoing power struggles between Suharto and the PKI, as well as between Suharto and Sukarno. It sought to blacken the PKI’s reputation by highlighting its alleged brutality in murdering the six generals, its connection to communist China and Untung’s treachery by virtually kidnapping Sukarno.95 In the months after the coup, IRD published briefs titled, ‘The Dilemmas of China and the PKI’ and ‘The PKI Holds its Fire’ both of which greatly supported Suharto’s interpretation of events surrounding the coup.96
The IRD also distributed stories corroborating those carried by the Army-controlled Indonesian media despite having some knowledge of their lack of authenticity; these included PKI plans to carve towns into districts for systematic slaughter and a story from the Jakarta Daily Mail about genitalia mutilation by female communists.97 Therefore, carefully curated information would be passed on to the media via contacts in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Hong Kong; these news would then travel the world and make it back into Indonesia and influence Indonesian opinion.98
Perhaps, the most telling evidence of the extent of which IRD was able to influence Indonesian public opinion can be found in a letter from Reddaway to Gilchrist where he lists several incidents (read IRD achievements): 99 (b) The story of the messenger plying between Aidit and Subandrio. This was carried by newspapers, agencies and radio. (c) The story of PKI systematic preparations before the coup - the carving up of the town into districts for systematic slaughter. This was carried by agencies. (d) Various sitreps from yourself [referring to Ambassador Gilchrist] which were put almost instantly back into Indonesia via the BBC. You may remember complaining that the versions put back were uncomfortably close to those put out by yourself. …. I wondered whether this was the first time in history that an Ambassador had been able to address the people of his country of work almost at will and virtually instantaneously. …. (h) The first irreverent words about Sukarno were broadcast from K.L. when Don North’s tape … reached K.L. via this office. As can be seen, the extent of propaganda activities undertaken by IRD and British intelligence was extensive and varied. However, beyond the selective replication of information, IRD also began to mount its own “unattributable ploys” designed to achieve its Confrontation aims.100
IRD had relied on a large range of sources for its propaganda material, including other departments within the FO, and British overseas missions; looking at the organisational set-up in Phoenix Park, it is reasonable to expect that the IRD team in Singapore also gained information from MI6 and other intelligence sources within Phoenix Park. For example, SIGINT had revealed secret contacts between 101 Sukarno’s government and the disgraced PKI leader Aidit, this information was subsequently used by IRD to craft a story that was publicised by Reddaway through media outlets in Hong Kong.102
Roland Challis, a journalist in Singapore with close contact with Reddaway, recounts that Reddaway’s IRD team in Singapore was also actively preparing material that would be safe-handed into Jakarta and broadcasted through a programme whose Indonesian title meant ‘Voice from the Well’.103 Given that Reddaway had been offered the use of a small and large radio transmitter, it strongly suggests that Britain may have set up her own black propaganda radio station in Indonesia during Confrontation.104
As well as discrediting the PKI and Sukarno, British propaganda efforts were also explicitly aimed at boosting the Army’s position by portraying them as patriots and not, in any way, ‘Western stooges’.105 Ambassador Gilchrist was recorded as advising the FO that a reference made in a BBC newsreel to Suharto’s foreign minister Adam Malik “being compelled to seek foreign aid from the West” should be dropped for fears of the potential repercussions it would have on Suharto’s nationalist credentials and image.106
British intelligence also ensured the positive opinion of Suharto’s regime in a more surreptitious way by suppressing information it had deemed unfavourable to the Army’s cause. Because of the lack of access by journalists and the media into Indonesia, the IRD came into a convenient position where it enjoyed considerable influence over what information was being made available to the public. Reddaway described it as “marrying up the people with the information [but] no voice with the media which had the voice but no information”.107
However, it did so selectively and with considerable bias. By November 1965, British officials were meeting with members of the Suharto regime and it was clear that the British had some knowledge of the nature and scale of the anti-Communist campaign.108 However, none of the information about the on-going murders of PKI members were passed on to members of the media.109
Impact on Confrontation
The importance of British propaganda to ending Confrontation
must be seen in context with the constraints Britain faced in ending
Confrontation. Unable to bring its military superiority to bear, the Foreign Office saw
Suharto’s rise to power as the next best possibility of securing an end to Confrontation.110 While
there was initial uncertainty about Suharto’s intentions, the FO could not risk a communist
take-over and hence persisted with its course of action. To a certain extent, British policy
after the coup could be seen to have been explicitly linked with eliminating the communists
rather than ending Confrontation. Mehr describes the aim of British policy during this period
as being the “spread [of] alarm and despondence … [to] aggravate and prolong the present
crisis to encourage anti- communist Indonesians to more vigorous action”. However, the
111 destruction of the PKI is “fundamental in understanding how Confrontation was
eventually terminated”.112
A more detailed discussion about the removal of the PKI’s impact will follow later but it suffices, momentarily, to state that the elimination of the PKI removed a huge obstacle to ending Confrontation and therefore, in this context, British covert propaganda efforts must be seen as a significant part of why Confrontation ended.113 Britain recognised that the Indonesian Army was going to need help in its struggle against Sukarno and the PKI, and proceeded to tacitly support them through covertmeans.114
A covert propaganda campaign was launched to target the PKI, tar Sukarno’s reputation and provide documentary proof for Suharto’s interpretation of events.115 The IRD gave British policy-makers a way to influence public opinion and they exploited it to great effect. The FO was also keen to assure Suharto of its intentions and did so through Gilchrist who was able to pass a message on to the Indonesian military that Britain was not going to step up Confrontation.116 Quite simply, during a crucial period of Confrontation, Britain wanted Suharto and the Indonesian Army to act and did all it could to encourage them.
However, it was not alone. Malaysia had also launched its own propaganda campaign and Reddaway and his IRD team contributed to this effort significantly.117 More significantly, the United States were also actively involved in covert propaganda efforts aimed at boosting the Army and diminishing the communists.
A more detailed discussion about the removal of the PKI’s impact will follow later but it suffices, momentarily, to state that the elimination of the PKI removed a huge obstacle to ending Confrontation and therefore, in this context, British covert propaganda efforts must be seen as a significant part of why Confrontation ended.113 Britain recognised that the Indonesian Army was going to need help in its struggle against Sukarno and the PKI, and proceeded to tacitly support them through covertmeans.114
A covert propaganda campaign was launched to target the PKI, tar Sukarno’s reputation and provide documentary proof for Suharto’s interpretation of events.115 The IRD gave British policy-makers a way to influence public opinion and they exploited it to great effect. The FO was also keen to assure Suharto of its intentions and did so through Gilchrist who was able to pass a message on to the Indonesian military that Britain was not going to step up Confrontation.116 Quite simply, during a crucial period of Confrontation, Britain wanted Suharto and the Indonesian Army to act and did all it could to encourage them.
However, it was not alone. Malaysia had also launched its own propaganda campaign and Reddaway and his IRD team contributed to this effort significantly.117 More significantly, the United States were also actively involved in covert propaganda efforts aimed at boosting the Army and diminishing the communists.
The United States Gets Involved
The United States’ position has consistently been one of
disengagement from the Confrontation conflict but this was juxtaposed against a
explicit desire to contain communism in the Far East. Its primary concern was preventing a
communist Indonesia and with a growing disillusion with Sukarno’s intentions and ability to
prevent the rise of the PKI to power, the United States moved to position itself against
Sukarno and began to employ a coordinated covert political action programme to discredit
the PKI and Sukarno. It adopted a “low silhouette policy” in which American influence and
visibility was minimised to maintain the credibility of any pro-Western, anti-communist and
anti-Sukarno factions within Indonesia as well as to minimise the impact of any potential
backlash.118
The United States’ support for moderate elements within
Indonesia had began as early as March 1965 as a programme of political action in
Indonesia aimed at countering the growing power of the PKI was approved and operationalised.
The political action programme included: “covert liaison with and support to existing anti-Communist
groups, particularly among the [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified], black letter operations, media operations, including possibly black radio, and
political action within existing Indonesian organizations and institutions.”119 Its objective was clear — to covertly promote internal
opposition to the PKI through any means available without compromising American interests; and
the Untung coup provided them the clearest opportunity to hurt the PKI.
The United States were such obvious beneficiaries from the coup attempt and ‘reverse course’ for communism in Indonesia that there were suspicions that they were responsible for it. Peter Dale Scott has argued that the October 1st coup was 120 in fact masterminded or induced in part by Suharto himself who then used it as a pretext to eliminate the communists and then Sukarno.121 Thus, the entire course of events was actually a “three-phased right wing coup — one which had been both publicly encouraged and secretly assisted by U.S. spokesmen and officials”.122 Scott claims that the United States had provided Suharto with extensive covert support, in areas such as propaganda and covert military aid to the Army. The United States did indeed have a long standing relationship with the Indonesian Army which reaches back into the 1950s. It could thus be reasonably expected that for a long period, the United States did spend effort on cultivating anti-communist, pro-Western Army officers through the various aid programmes.
In 1962, the United States further provided a Military Training Advisory Group which had an unspoken purpose of maintaining contact with key elements in Indonesia which were interested and capable of resisting a Communist take-over. However, while the claims of covert support are not entirely 123 untrue, Scott’s assertion of U.S. complicity in the coup conspiracy cannot be seriously defended.124 The Untung coup had taken the United States by surprise and great uncertainty existed over how the situation would develop and impact U.S. interests. Acting Secretary of State George Ball had commented that “[it] is not a healthy situation” and that it was “very murky still”.125
The extent of uncertainty which plagued American decision-making was so extensive that it is almost absurd to suggest that they were complicit in masterminding the coup attempt.126 Furthermore, as it would be shown, it was clear that the United States had limited influence over the development of events, further suggesting the lack of involvement. Therefore, to a large extent, the coup attempt and the overthrow of the PKI and Sukarno “had little to do with American machinations”.127 Instead, it had resulted from developments of essentially Indonesian origin. But this does not mean that it did not attempt to capitalise on the situation to achieve its long term strategic aims of diminishing the Communist threat within Indonesia.
The United States were such obvious beneficiaries from the coup attempt and ‘reverse course’ for communism in Indonesia that there were suspicions that they were responsible for it. Peter Dale Scott has argued that the October 1st coup was 120 in fact masterminded or induced in part by Suharto himself who then used it as a pretext to eliminate the communists and then Sukarno.121 Thus, the entire course of events was actually a “three-phased right wing coup — one which had been both publicly encouraged and secretly assisted by U.S. spokesmen and officials”.122 Scott claims that the United States had provided Suharto with extensive covert support, in areas such as propaganda and covert military aid to the Army. The United States did indeed have a long standing relationship with the Indonesian Army which reaches back into the 1950s. It could thus be reasonably expected that for a long period, the United States did spend effort on cultivating anti-communist, pro-Western Army officers through the various aid programmes.
In 1962, the United States further provided a Military Training Advisory Group which had an unspoken purpose of maintaining contact with key elements in Indonesia which were interested and capable of resisting a Communist take-over. However, while the claims of covert support are not entirely 123 untrue, Scott’s assertion of U.S. complicity in the coup conspiracy cannot be seriously defended.124 The Untung coup had taken the United States by surprise and great uncertainty existed over how the situation would develop and impact U.S. interests. Acting Secretary of State George Ball had commented that “[it] is not a healthy situation” and that it was “very murky still”.125
The extent of uncertainty which plagued American decision-making was so extensive that it is almost absurd to suggest that they were complicit in masterminding the coup attempt.126 Furthermore, as it would be shown, it was clear that the United States had limited influence over the development of events, further suggesting the lack of involvement. Therefore, to a large extent, the coup attempt and the overthrow of the PKI and Sukarno “had little to do with American machinations”.127 Instead, it had resulted from developments of essentially Indonesian origin. But this does not mean that it did not attempt to capitalise on the situation to achieve its long term strategic aims of diminishing the Communist threat within Indonesia.
As alluded to in the preceding paragraphs, the United States
adopted a clear strategy of aiding the Indonesian army in the aftermath of the coup.
The coup was seen as the start of the succession struggle and the United States understood
that it was not in their “interest to see the military defeated” because it was one of the few
elements within Indonesia that was both opposed to and numerically superior to the PKI.128
Therefore, a victory for the Indonesian Army had been regarded as the best outcome for
U.S. interests and hence moves were made to bolster the Army’s position. Ambassador to
Indonesia 129 Marshall Green urged the Department of State to “spread the story of PKI's guilt,
treachery and brutality”.130
The Department of State replied stating that they had already begun carrying out “VOA [Voice of America] and information program[s]” linking the PKI to the coup and emphasising the brutality of the Thirtieth September rebels.131 In addition, the United States also actively maintained an open posture towards the Indonesian Army and covertly extended aid directly to them. Communication equipment was provided to the Army in October while measures were also taken to ensure the purchase or deliverance of the small arms, medicine and other items requested by the Indonesians.132 Therefore, in the months after the October 1st coup, the United States saw an opportunity to destroy the PKI by boosting the Indonesian Army’s position and hence executed an operational strategy that was focussed on preventing the Indonesian Army being placed in a vulnerable position that will affect their ability to resist the communists. It provided assistance in a way that would ensure its continued presence and influence in Indonesia while reducing its visible presence, employing both covert propaganda and covert military assistance.133
The Department of State replied stating that they had already begun carrying out “VOA [Voice of America] and information program[s]” linking the PKI to the coup and emphasising the brutality of the Thirtieth September rebels.131 In addition, the United States also actively maintained an open posture towards the Indonesian Army and covertly extended aid directly to them. Communication equipment was provided to the Army in October while measures were also taken to ensure the purchase or deliverance of the small arms, medicine and other items requested by the Indonesians.132 Therefore, in the months after the October 1st coup, the United States saw an opportunity to destroy the PKI by boosting the Indonesian Army’s position and hence executed an operational strategy that was focussed on preventing the Indonesian Army being placed in a vulnerable position that will affect their ability to resist the communists. It provided assistance in a way that would ensure its continued presence and influence in Indonesia while reducing its visible presence, employing both covert propaganda and covert military assistance.133
Impact on Confrontation
Likewise to assessment of the British impact during this
period, the impact of the United States must be seen in context of the limited
influence that external actors had on Indonesian domestic politics. The actions of the United
States were significant in ending Confrontation as it contributed to the rise of Suharto whom
paved the way for the eventual conclusion of Confrontation. In this aspect, the impact of
help rendered by the United States could be regarded as being more critical than that of the
British. Certainly, the United States were able to provide a more direct form of assistance to
Suharto whereas Britain was
constrained by the dynamics of Confrontation.
The difference in the extent of impact that U.S. actions had was highlighted in Mehr’s description: “[U.S. actions made] a telling contribution to Suharto’s rise to power by cultivating strong links with the Suharto-Nasution group over a number of years, and forging a community of interest based on a shared ideological outlook. Through years of assistance to the Indonesian military and its affiliated civilian front groups (most notably the Kap-Gestapu), along with the economic and political de-stabilisation of Indonesia (through aid cuts, and ‘media operations’, respectively) the United States managed to shape developments in such a way as to bring about an outcome that was favourable to her …”134
Therefore, it is unmistakable that the United States had a significant impact on the course of events in 1965-1966. However, whether this is sufficient to make the United States a critical actor in ending Confrontation must be measured against its intentions. The United States may have made a ‘telling contribution’ to Suharto’s rise of power but its actions were not motivated by a desire to end Confrontation but rather a desire to contain communism and prevent a communist take-over in Indonesia. Marshall Green commented in a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs that the United States should not defer to the British position in Malaysia and that it was a matter of “doing what is best in pursuing our own interests in Indo-Malaysia. It so happens that the UK and US interests there and in Southeast Asia generally are the same”.
Therefore, 135 to a certain extent, it was perhaps fortuitous that U.S. objectives were complimentary with Britain’s aim of ending Confrontation. The United States had a consistent strategy of maintaining a degree of influence within Indonesia in light of its strategic interests. Throughout the period of Confrontation, the United States had calibrated its action to allow it to have a “foot-in-the-door influence on Sukarno’s policies”.136 Yet, the limits of its influence were clearly recognised. Green points out that the limiting factor on Sukarno’s course of actions were internal factors beyond their capability to influence and the provision of American aid or lack thereof would not have influenced Sukarno.137
Nonetheless, this did not stop American attempts to take responsibility for the change of course in the conflict, the rise of Suharto and the defeat of Communism. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara attributes the change in Indonesia as the result of a consistent and committed U.S. military aid policy. While there is partial truth to McNamara’s claim, it must be seen that the case of the United States successfully influencing the development of Confrontation has been overstated considerably.138
The difference in the extent of impact that U.S. actions had was highlighted in Mehr’s description: “[U.S. actions made] a telling contribution to Suharto’s rise to power by cultivating strong links with the Suharto-Nasution group over a number of years, and forging a community of interest based on a shared ideological outlook. Through years of assistance to the Indonesian military and its affiliated civilian front groups (most notably the Kap-Gestapu), along with the economic and political de-stabilisation of Indonesia (through aid cuts, and ‘media operations’, respectively) the United States managed to shape developments in such a way as to bring about an outcome that was favourable to her …”134
Therefore, it is unmistakable that the United States had a significant impact on the course of events in 1965-1966. However, whether this is sufficient to make the United States a critical actor in ending Confrontation must be measured against its intentions. The United States may have made a ‘telling contribution’ to Suharto’s rise of power but its actions were not motivated by a desire to end Confrontation but rather a desire to contain communism and prevent a communist take-over in Indonesia. Marshall Green commented in a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs that the United States should not defer to the British position in Malaysia and that it was a matter of “doing what is best in pursuing our own interests in Indo-Malaysia. It so happens that the UK and US interests there and in Southeast Asia generally are the same”.
Therefore, 135 to a certain extent, it was perhaps fortuitous that U.S. objectives were complimentary with Britain’s aim of ending Confrontation. The United States had a consistent strategy of maintaining a degree of influence within Indonesia in light of its strategic interests. Throughout the period of Confrontation, the United States had calibrated its action to allow it to have a “foot-in-the-door influence on Sukarno’s policies”.136 Yet, the limits of its influence were clearly recognised. Green points out that the limiting factor on Sukarno’s course of actions were internal factors beyond their capability to influence and the provision of American aid or lack thereof would not have influenced Sukarno.137
Nonetheless, this did not stop American attempts to take responsibility for the change of course in the conflict, the rise of Suharto and the defeat of Communism. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara attributes the change in Indonesia as the result of a consistent and committed U.S. military aid policy. While there is partial truth to McNamara’s claim, it must be seen that the case of the United States successfully influencing the development of Confrontation has been overstated considerably.138
V. Suharto and Ending Confrontation, March 1966 - August
1966
The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation entered its final
stages on from march 1966 after Suharto took over executive authority from Sukarno and
the conflict was formally brought to an end on 11 August 1966 under Suharto’s New
Order government. As previously stressed, the majority of Confrontation literature analyses
the conflict from a British or a largely Western perspective. The dominance of
Western-centric analysis notwithstanding, the orthodox assessment justly points out that the end of
Confrontation results from events within Indonesia which neither the British nor the United States
had effective influence over.
While the literature generally recognises that Confrontation could only have been ended by Indonesian domestic events and not external forces, because of its analytical perspective, it does not explore the domestic Indonesian political dynamics in enough depth. Therefore, this chapter seeks to redress the relative invisibility of internal Indonesian factors in present-day analysis by looking at the rise of Suharto to power, building the case that Confrontation could only have ended as a result of a fundamental shift in the dynamics of Indonesian domestic politics. Confrontation entered its final phase on 11 March 1966 onwards when Sukarno was forced into transferring all executive powers to Suharto. Having blamed the coup on the communists, a brutal campaign of repression was launched against the PKI which led to the murder of hundreds of thousands of communist members and sympathisers and the community party eventually outlawed.
In the middle of March, Suharto 139 established a new cabinet with himself as the new Defence Minister and Adam Malik replacing Subandrio as the Foreign Minister. Although Sukarno remained as the nominal head 140 of state, his grip on political power was steadily being eroded and with the PKI eliminated as a political force, there was little he could do to prevent Suharto from bringing about an end to Confrontation. The Indonesian Army is a unique phenomenon because unlike many modern day militaries, it has never restricted itself to an “exclusive military role”.141 The Indonesian Army sees itself as occupying a dual role in society as being both a military force as well as a social political force. The Army’s perception of itself as a political force arises from its involvement in Indonesia’s revolutionary struggle for independence against the Dutch. Borne out of this history, the Army sees itself as bearing the responsibility of ‘saving’ the country in times of crisis — internal or external.142
Therefore, taken in this context, the Indonesian Army’s decision to act following the Untung coup speaks volume on how it viewed Sukarno’s Confrontation policy. Although the Army’s did not oppose to Sukarno’s decision to challenge the formation of Malaysia in a policy of Konfrontasi, its initial responses were not characterised by abundant enthusiasm.143 Army leaders gave their support to Confrontation because of two main motivations.
First, the Indonesian Army had felt that the atmosphere would facilitate a larger military budget and secondly, taking a vocal, militant stand on an issue of national pride would give them an expanded national role, strengthening its political position.144 However, by 1965, the top Army leadership were visibly disillusioned by the Konfrontasi policy as it gradually recognised the military futility of Confrontation. It was also increasingly frustrated with how the PKI were able to use Confrontation as a means of isolating Indonesia from the world’s major powers. Its increasing uneasiness about where 145 Confrontation was taking Indonesia was vividly expressed in its growing preference for a negotiated settlement. Greatly disturbed by the increasing intensification of Confrontation, the Indonesian Army began initiating “secret contacts with the Malaysian leaders” without Sukarno’s knowledge.146
While the literature generally recognises that Confrontation could only have been ended by Indonesian domestic events and not external forces, because of its analytical perspective, it does not explore the domestic Indonesian political dynamics in enough depth. Therefore, this chapter seeks to redress the relative invisibility of internal Indonesian factors in present-day analysis by looking at the rise of Suharto to power, building the case that Confrontation could only have ended as a result of a fundamental shift in the dynamics of Indonesian domestic politics. Confrontation entered its final phase on 11 March 1966 onwards when Sukarno was forced into transferring all executive powers to Suharto. Having blamed the coup on the communists, a brutal campaign of repression was launched against the PKI which led to the murder of hundreds of thousands of communist members and sympathisers and the community party eventually outlawed.
In the middle of March, Suharto 139 established a new cabinet with himself as the new Defence Minister and Adam Malik replacing Subandrio as the Foreign Minister. Although Sukarno remained as the nominal head 140 of state, his grip on political power was steadily being eroded and with the PKI eliminated as a political force, there was little he could do to prevent Suharto from bringing about an end to Confrontation. The Indonesian Army is a unique phenomenon because unlike many modern day militaries, it has never restricted itself to an “exclusive military role”.141 The Indonesian Army sees itself as occupying a dual role in society as being both a military force as well as a social political force. The Army’s perception of itself as a political force arises from its involvement in Indonesia’s revolutionary struggle for independence against the Dutch. Borne out of this history, the Army sees itself as bearing the responsibility of ‘saving’ the country in times of crisis — internal or external.142
Therefore, taken in this context, the Indonesian Army’s decision to act following the Untung coup speaks volume on how it viewed Sukarno’s Confrontation policy. Although the Army’s did not oppose to Sukarno’s decision to challenge the formation of Malaysia in a policy of Konfrontasi, its initial responses were not characterised by abundant enthusiasm.143 Army leaders gave their support to Confrontation because of two main motivations.
First, the Indonesian Army had felt that the atmosphere would facilitate a larger military budget and secondly, taking a vocal, militant stand on an issue of national pride would give them an expanded national role, strengthening its political position.144 However, by 1965, the top Army leadership were visibly disillusioned by the Konfrontasi policy as it gradually recognised the military futility of Confrontation. It was also increasingly frustrated with how the PKI were able to use Confrontation as a means of isolating Indonesia from the world’s major powers. Its increasing uneasiness about where 145 Confrontation was taking Indonesia was vividly expressed in its growing preference for a negotiated settlement. Greatly disturbed by the increasing intensification of Confrontation, the Indonesian Army began initiating “secret contacts with the Malaysian leaders” without Sukarno’s knowledge.146
Changing the Tide of Opinion
By the time the Untung coup occurred, there was a clear
divergence between Sukarno and Suharto over their respective stance towards the ongoing
conflict. Therefore, the transferral of power from Sukarno to Suharto was also
accompanied by a shift in national attitudes towards Confrontation. Embedded with nationalist
rhetoric such as solidarity in the confrontation against an external power, Sukarno had used
the Konfrontasi policy and the ‘Crush Malaysia’ campaign to create a national issue which
he rallied the Indonesian mass population around. It provided a form of “political
escapism” in which he was able to distract the Indonesian masses from domestic problems, hence allowing
Sukarno to effectively use his external policy for an internal political advantage.147 With
the rise of Suharto, this entrenched meaning of Confrontation as a symbol of national
pride and purpose began to slowly fade away. Therefore, although the outwardly
commitment to Confrontation remained
unchanged initially, one could perceive within Indonesia
“the rise of new pressures which would eventually discredit the existing standards of
fidelity” to Confrontation.148
When Suharto took over the reins of government in March, he brought in a renewed direction in policy objectives. Recognising the futility of Confrontation and the rapidly deteriorating economic condition, Suharto and Adam Malik made restoring order to the economy the top priority.149 However, this shift away from Confrontation could not be achieved overnight. Confrontation’s status as a source of political legitimacy made it difficult to abandon and Suharto needed to establish a new source of legitimacy that was recognised and accepted by the people. A political space in which the Confrontation policy could be legitimately abandoned without repercussions needed to be created. To a certain extent, Suharto was able to create this environment through the elimination of the PKI as a social and political force within Indonesian and the gradual diminishing of Sukarno’s influence and reputation. As aforementioned in the preceding discussion, the internal power balance was precariously balanced between Sukarno and the Army and the PKI.
The Untung coup, regardless of whom it was instigated by, led to an internal power struggle within Indonesia in which the Army was able to emerge as the leading political force. Suharto and the Army moved with such brutality against the communists because they saw the Untung coup as their chance to punish and destroy the forces whom they believed to be “behind the current dangerous tendencies in political life”. To a relatively large extent, Suharto 150 was right — the communists had indeed become a major obstacle to ending Confrontation.
The PKI was a principal beneficiary of the Konfrontasi policy and hence, there was nothing to suggest that they would ever want Confrontation to end.151 Confrontation served both symbolic and instrumental purposes for the PKI. The party’s political rhetoric was symbolically couched in terms of the Confrontation edifice to achieve their actual aim of inculcating a radical mood within Indonesia; whereas in the instrumental sense, the party outlook regarding Confrontation was calculated to strengthen its position in internal politics.152
In the initial stages of the conflict, the PKI assumed a subordinate ideological role vis-a-vis Sukarno; however, as the conflict progressed, there was a subtle change in the relationship and Sukarno began to borrow “more and more extensively from the PKI’s ideological armory [sic]”.153 Although Sukarno had been the prime factor in determining the emergence of a Konfrontasi foreign policy, the influence of the PKI on Sukarno’s decisionmaking was steadily growing and the communists were increasingly able to bring their influence to bear upon events in Confrontation rapidly and decisively.154
Therefore, the elimination of the PKI removed a highly volatile and radicalising element within the Indonesian political climate. The only remaining obstacle was Sukarno himself. Sukarno’s close relations with the communists had caused great consternation within the Indonesian Army. Moreover, it was understood that Sukarno’s increasing advocacy of the PKI was a means of reducing the power of the strongest force — apart from himself — the Indonesian Army. Therefore, with the elimination of the PKI as an 155 effective political force, Sukarno was left competing with the Army for the centre of political power and it was clear that alone, Sukarno was less able to control the Army leadership.156
Hence, through a series of calculated measures, Suharto was able to manoeuvre the Army into a position where it could now decisively shape political developments. However, Suharto was careful not to usher in too extreme a “discontinuity with a foreign policy closely identified” with his predecessor for the fear of jeopardising the success of his gradualist approach thus far.157
When Suharto took over the reins of government in March, he brought in a renewed direction in policy objectives. Recognising the futility of Confrontation and the rapidly deteriorating economic condition, Suharto and Adam Malik made restoring order to the economy the top priority.149 However, this shift away from Confrontation could not be achieved overnight. Confrontation’s status as a source of political legitimacy made it difficult to abandon and Suharto needed to establish a new source of legitimacy that was recognised and accepted by the people. A political space in which the Confrontation policy could be legitimately abandoned without repercussions needed to be created. To a certain extent, Suharto was able to create this environment through the elimination of the PKI as a social and political force within Indonesian and the gradual diminishing of Sukarno’s influence and reputation. As aforementioned in the preceding discussion, the internal power balance was precariously balanced between Sukarno and the Army and the PKI.
The Untung coup, regardless of whom it was instigated by, led to an internal power struggle within Indonesia in which the Army was able to emerge as the leading political force. Suharto and the Army moved with such brutality against the communists because they saw the Untung coup as their chance to punish and destroy the forces whom they believed to be “behind the current dangerous tendencies in political life”. To a relatively large extent, Suharto 150 was right — the communists had indeed become a major obstacle to ending Confrontation.
The PKI was a principal beneficiary of the Konfrontasi policy and hence, there was nothing to suggest that they would ever want Confrontation to end.151 Confrontation served both symbolic and instrumental purposes for the PKI. The party’s political rhetoric was symbolically couched in terms of the Confrontation edifice to achieve their actual aim of inculcating a radical mood within Indonesia; whereas in the instrumental sense, the party outlook regarding Confrontation was calculated to strengthen its position in internal politics.152
In the initial stages of the conflict, the PKI assumed a subordinate ideological role vis-a-vis Sukarno; however, as the conflict progressed, there was a subtle change in the relationship and Sukarno began to borrow “more and more extensively from the PKI’s ideological armory [sic]”.153 Although Sukarno had been the prime factor in determining the emergence of a Konfrontasi foreign policy, the influence of the PKI on Sukarno’s decisionmaking was steadily growing and the communists were increasingly able to bring their influence to bear upon events in Confrontation rapidly and decisively.154
Therefore, the elimination of the PKI removed a highly volatile and radicalising element within the Indonesian political climate. The only remaining obstacle was Sukarno himself. Sukarno’s close relations with the communists had caused great consternation within the Indonesian Army. Moreover, it was understood that Sukarno’s increasing advocacy of the PKI was a means of reducing the power of the strongest force — apart from himself — the Indonesian Army. Therefore, with the elimination of the PKI as an 155 effective political force, Sukarno was left competing with the Army for the centre of political power and it was clear that alone, Sukarno was less able to control the Army leadership.156
Hence, through a series of calculated measures, Suharto was able to manoeuvre the Army into a position where it could now decisively shape political developments. However, Suharto was careful not to usher in too extreme a “discontinuity with a foreign policy closely identified” with his predecessor for the fear of jeopardising the success of his gradualist approach thus far.157
The Final Push
The process in which Confrontation would eventually be ended
was protracted and at times, somewhat confusing. Although Suharto and Adam Malik
were quick to indicate their willingness to find a political settlement to the conflict,
their actions and statements would at times suggest otherwise. Jakarta exhibited an almost
schizophrenic behaviour; Suharto or Adam Malik would often make statements suggesting that
Indonesia is committed to rehabilitating its relations with the international powers
by “returning] to the United Nations” while concurrently displaying a continued
commitment to Confrontation with Malaysia.158 Taking note that Sukarno had been reduced to a
nominal head of state and Suharto held all executive power, the cautious tiptoeing and
avoidance of a direct confrontation with Sukarno by Suharto, Malik and the Army
leaders may be difficult to comprehend for the external observer and certainly reason
enough to have doubts over their true intentions.
Long years of deference and propaganda adulation paid to Sukarno by all sectors of the population including the Army had cemented Sukarno’s commanding father figure image in Indonesia politics; and although Sukarno had no effective power at that moment, he was still in a position of formal authority. Therefore, for Suharto to openly oppose Sukarno was akin to challenging a “latter-day Javanese god-king”.159 Hence, the ‘Janus-quality’ statements made by Suharto and Malik must be understood in the context of an unsettled and volatile political condition.
The final steps in the political settlement of Confrontation began on 29 May 1966 at a ministerial meeting in Bangkok. The importance of Suharto’s rise to power to how Confrontation ended is most vividly observed when we look at the reasons for successful negotiations at the 1966 Bangkok talks vis-a-vis the failed 1964 Tokyo Summit negotiations. Cognisant that Indonesia’s behaviour in the lead up to the Bangkok meeting had not been the
Long years of deference and propaganda adulation paid to Sukarno by all sectors of the population including the Army had cemented Sukarno’s commanding father figure image in Indonesia politics; and although Sukarno had no effective power at that moment, he was still in a position of formal authority. Therefore, for Suharto to openly oppose Sukarno was akin to challenging a “latter-day Javanese god-king”.159 Hence, the ‘Janus-quality’ statements made by Suharto and Malik must be understood in the context of an unsettled and volatile political condition.
The final steps in the political settlement of Confrontation began on 29 May 1966 at a ministerial meeting in Bangkok. The importance of Suharto’s rise to power to how Confrontation ended is most vividly observed when we look at the reasons for successful negotiations at the 1966 Bangkok talks vis-a-vis the failed 1964 Tokyo Summit negotiations. Cognisant that Indonesia’s behaviour in the lead up to the Bangkok meeting had not been the
overtures that Malaysian leaders would have been expecting,
Suharto was keen to privately and discreetly assure his Malaysian counterparts that
despite the lack of outwardly representation, he was serious about pursuing a negotiated
end.160 This was in stark contrast to Sukarno’s attitude towards negotiating an end to Confrontation
in 1964.
Uncompromising and deliberately vague on demands, Sukarno adopted a non-reconciliatory attitude towards negotiations. Michael Leifer commented that when the principals met on 20 June 1964 for the Tokyo Summit, it became evident at once that there was no common ground and both principals left Tokyo without gaining any consensus or making any progress on diffusing the conflict. Although not to the extent of suggesting that Sukarno had 161 become captive to the PKI’s policies, it must be noted that the influence and pressure exerted on Sukarno by the PKI during this period was considerable. Establishing itself as the President’s closest domestic ally, the PKI had moved into a favourable political position to avoid an accommodation with Malaysia being reached.162
Therefore, the 1964 Tokyo Summit became an “uncompromising confrontation rather than an occasion for negotiations”.163 In a stark contrast, the 1966 Bangkok meetings was approached with a genuine willingness to resolve Confrontation. Suharto had indicated that they did not regard the withdrawal of British troops from Singapore as a necessary pre-condition for a peaceful settlement, removing a huge obstacle to successful resolution.164 Furthermore, the removal of the PKI from the political scene had facilitated a more conciliatory approach to be undertaken by Malik at the Bangkok meetings; and success came in the form of the Bangkok Accord which contained “the principles upon which practical steps to restore relations” and resolve Confrontation will be based.165
However, there was still a considerable internal political obstacle in the form of President Sukarno. Malik faced strong criticism upon returning from Bangkok; notably Sukarno refused to endorse the settlement stated that it represented an Indonesian “capitulation”. Recognising a groundswell 166 of opinion against the ‘Bangkok Accord’, Suharto negotiated this obstacle by postponing the ratification of the agreement and furthered negotiations with Malaysia using military intelligence officers. A secret annex suggesting the postponement of official recognition of Malaysia to be postponed until after local elections was added and the Accord was finally ratified on 11 August 1966, signifying the formal end of Confrontation.167
The transition of Indonesia from belligerence to peaceful co-existence with its neighbours took place in a period where there was a significant change to the internal political climate. There had been a discernible shift in the “standard of political virtue” from resisting the nekolim (neokolonialis-imperalis or neo-colonialist-imperialist) to Ampera — the message of the people’s suffering and a willingness to support policies that are designed to improve the living conditions of the people.168 Although Suharto, Adam Malik and the Army leaders had effectively gained political control of Indonesia, they remained reluctant to force a final showdown with Sukarno for fears of in-fighting and civil war.169
Therefore, only when Suharto appreciated that the political climate was favourable and there was a gaining momentum within society to cast off the vestiges of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, did he move decisively to end Confrontation. Therefore, the rise of Suharto and the Indonesian Army is of utmost importance to understanding how Confrontation ended as they were the only actors capable of negotiating Indonesia through the uncertain, fluid political situation which arose in the aftermath of the Untung coup and brought Confrontation to a successful resolution.
Uncompromising and deliberately vague on demands, Sukarno adopted a non-reconciliatory attitude towards negotiations. Michael Leifer commented that when the principals met on 20 June 1964 for the Tokyo Summit, it became evident at once that there was no common ground and both principals left Tokyo without gaining any consensus or making any progress on diffusing the conflict. Although not to the extent of suggesting that Sukarno had 161 become captive to the PKI’s policies, it must be noted that the influence and pressure exerted on Sukarno by the PKI during this period was considerable. Establishing itself as the President’s closest domestic ally, the PKI had moved into a favourable political position to avoid an accommodation with Malaysia being reached.162
Therefore, the 1964 Tokyo Summit became an “uncompromising confrontation rather than an occasion for negotiations”.163 In a stark contrast, the 1966 Bangkok meetings was approached with a genuine willingness to resolve Confrontation. Suharto had indicated that they did not regard the withdrawal of British troops from Singapore as a necessary pre-condition for a peaceful settlement, removing a huge obstacle to successful resolution.164 Furthermore, the removal of the PKI from the political scene had facilitated a more conciliatory approach to be undertaken by Malik at the Bangkok meetings; and success came in the form of the Bangkok Accord which contained “the principles upon which practical steps to restore relations” and resolve Confrontation will be based.165
However, there was still a considerable internal political obstacle in the form of President Sukarno. Malik faced strong criticism upon returning from Bangkok; notably Sukarno refused to endorse the settlement stated that it represented an Indonesian “capitulation”. Recognising a groundswell 166 of opinion against the ‘Bangkok Accord’, Suharto negotiated this obstacle by postponing the ratification of the agreement and furthered negotiations with Malaysia using military intelligence officers. A secret annex suggesting the postponement of official recognition of Malaysia to be postponed until after local elections was added and the Accord was finally ratified on 11 August 1966, signifying the formal end of Confrontation.167
The transition of Indonesia from belligerence to peaceful co-existence with its neighbours took place in a period where there was a significant change to the internal political climate. There had been a discernible shift in the “standard of political virtue” from resisting the nekolim (neokolonialis-imperalis or neo-colonialist-imperialist) to Ampera — the message of the people’s suffering and a willingness to support policies that are designed to improve the living conditions of the people.168 Although Suharto, Adam Malik and the Army leaders had effectively gained political control of Indonesia, they remained reluctant to force a final showdown with Sukarno for fears of in-fighting and civil war.169
Therefore, only when Suharto appreciated that the political climate was favourable and there was a gaining momentum within society to cast off the vestiges of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, did he move decisively to end Confrontation. Therefore, the rise of Suharto and the Indonesian Army is of utmost importance to understanding how Confrontation ended as they were the only actors capable of negotiating Indonesia through the uncertain, fluid political situation which arose in the aftermath of the Untung coup and brought Confrontation to a successful resolution.
VI. Conclusion
The Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation of 1963 to 1966 was a
multi-dimensional, multi-layered conflict whose complexity makes it a
mesmerising topic for research, answering questions far beyond those of purely historical interest. In
one aspect, Confrontation was a low-intensity conflict where Britain fought an effective and
successful counter-insurgency campaign. In February 1967, in front of the House of
Commons, Mr Denis Healey, the British Secretary of State for Defence paid tribute to the
achievements of British forces by stating that the House “will appreciate that in the history
books” the defeat of Confrontation “will be recorded as one of the most efficient uses of military
force in the history of the world”. In many ways, such a tribute was not unjustified.
170
Britain had undertook the defence of Malaysia with a military force that was limited by both practical constraints, in terms of cuts in defence spending and limited manpower, as well as political constraints manifested in its limited ‘strategy of attrition’. Yet in another aspect, the Indonesian- Malaysian Confrontation represented a political contest which had the ability to define the
Britain had undertook the defence of Malaysia with a military force that was limited by both practical constraints, in terms of cuts in defence spending and limited manpower, as well as political constraints manifested in its limited ‘strategy of attrition’. Yet in another aspect, the Indonesian- Malaysian Confrontation represented a political contest which had the ability to define the
destiny of an entire South-east Asia region. Confrontation
was fundamentally a political contest over the legitimacy of a newly created Federation of
Malaysia; however it also took on an ideological character as it became a battleground for
stopping the spread of Communism in the region; and in its final stages, it became a “symbol
used by competitors for power to protect and enhance their own positions” in the internal
power struggle that took place within Indonesia.171
Given the complexity of the conflict, there exists a commensurate challenge in identifying the extent in which British intelligence led to the end of Confrontation. Any assessment of its contribution and significance must be made with recognition of the appropriate contexts and with regards to the appropriate layers of the conflict. The central proposition of this dissertation was that British intelligence was significant in ending Confrontation insofar that although the efforts of British intelligence could not have brought about an end to Confrontation on its own; without it, Confrontation would not have ended the way it did.
Throughout Confrontation, British intelligence informed British decision-making at all levels. At the highest level, critical strategic decisions, such as undertaking CLARET operations, were informed by all-source intelligence. Within the military dimension, tactical and operational intelligence were instrumental in securing success, with General Walker stating that the solution to the Borneo problem had laid in “good intelligence and all kinds of air support”. In a more active capacity, 172 covert measures were the cornerstone of a limited British strategy of attrition designed to neutralise Indonesian aggression without escalation and bring about an end to Confrontation through the exacerbation of internal stresses within Indonesia.
A series of clandestine military operations codenamed Operation CLARET was the first of two significant covert measures undertaken. CLARET operations were undertaken during a crucial period during Confrontation where the growing Indonesian aggression had threatened to overwhelm British forces in Borneo. However, Britain was able to forestall Sukarno from achieving success by adopting covert military action supported by an effective intelligence network. The second measure was a covert propaganda campaign launched against Indonesia, Sukarno and his Konfrontasi policy. Propaganda measures had initially been undertaken to create a favourable international opinion of Britain’s cause in Confrontation.
In 173 the latter half of Confrontation, Britain responded to the domestic upheaval within Indonesia by intensifying its propaganda efforts. Identifying the rise of a moderate Army leadership to power as the best possible scenario vis-a-vis ending Confrontation, Britain utilised its extensive propaganda machinery to discredit the PKI and Sukarno in favour of Suharto and the Army. Britain’s resilience and the efforts of British intelligence finally came to fruition when the Indonesian government led by Suharto ended formally Confrontation on 11 August 1966. Through its discussion, this dissertation has built and defended the case that British intelligence was significant to how Confrontation ended as it contributed to the conflict’s resolution in both an active and a passive capacity. Admittedly at present, there still exists a considerable challenge in assessing the true extent of British intelligence. Raw intelligence material that was produced remain closed to researchers while there continues to be a lack of basic information such as polling data on public attitudes towards the PKI, Sukarno, and Confrontation as well as listener and readership figures for British propaganda outlets.174
Until such information is made available, the extent of British intelligence’s impact on ending Confrontation cannot be ascertained with certainty. However, it is undeniable that intelligence had allowed Britain to sustain its chosen strategy more efficiently and effectively. Therefore, the claim that British intelligence, understood in terms of intelligence product and covert measures, played a significant role in ending Confrontation remains defensible to a large extent. This dissertation sought to further defend its central proposition by measuring it against two factors — the United States and the rise of Suharto and the Army to political power within Indonesia. In its own way, both factors have a defensible claim to having contributed significantly. It was established that in the aftermath of the Untung coup, the United States’s extended valuable covert assistance to Gen. Suharto and Army leaders whom brought about the end of Confrontation. As such, it was clear that the United States made a “telling contribution to Suharto’s rise of power” and thus the end of Confrontation.175
However, its actions were not motivated by the desire to end Confrontation, rather it was motivated by its desire to win the ideological contest between Communism and democracy present within Indonesia. It was perhaps fortuitous that its objectives and British interests were mutually supportive. Hence, to a large extent, the impact of U.S. actions do not diminish the significance of British intelligence in ending Confrontation. Orthodox accounts accept that Confrontation was ended as a result of events within Indonesia that were largely independent of any British and/or American influence. However, how this admission affects our assessment of British intelligence must be seen in relation to the current context of Confrontation. In its final stages, Confrontation underwent a radical evolution in its character; it ceased to be a manifestation of deep concerns about any external threats posed by the creation of Malaysia and became the focal point of an internal power struggle.176
In the complicated struggle waged by Suharto and the Army against Sukarno after the coup, Suharto took calculated steps to successfully negotiate the fluid power alignments in Jakarta and consolidated his position. When it became apparent in the middle of 1966 that Sukarno’s “accelerating slide into ignominy had become irreversible”, Suharto acted decisively to bring Confrontation to an end.
Therefore, 177 Confrontation which was borne out of Sukarno’s machinations was understandably ended by internal Indonesian forces. Therefore, the Indonesian-Malaysia Confrontation eventually ended as a result of developments within Indonesia. However it must be seen that the ability of Britain to successfully resist Confrontation contributed to this outcome; Indonesia’s concomitant economic woes, Sukarno’s uneasy alliance with the PKI and the Army’s growing disillusion with the policy had all been caused or exacerbated by the failure of Confrontation.178
As such, British intelligence and the covert measures adopted were not war-winning weapons that could directly end a conflict like Confrontation but they undeniably contributed to the end of Confrontation by creating and shaping the conditions necessary.
Given the complexity of the conflict, there exists a commensurate challenge in identifying the extent in which British intelligence led to the end of Confrontation. Any assessment of its contribution and significance must be made with recognition of the appropriate contexts and with regards to the appropriate layers of the conflict. The central proposition of this dissertation was that British intelligence was significant in ending Confrontation insofar that although the efforts of British intelligence could not have brought about an end to Confrontation on its own; without it, Confrontation would not have ended the way it did.
Throughout Confrontation, British intelligence informed British decision-making at all levels. At the highest level, critical strategic decisions, such as undertaking CLARET operations, were informed by all-source intelligence. Within the military dimension, tactical and operational intelligence were instrumental in securing success, with General Walker stating that the solution to the Borneo problem had laid in “good intelligence and all kinds of air support”. In a more active capacity, 172 covert measures were the cornerstone of a limited British strategy of attrition designed to neutralise Indonesian aggression without escalation and bring about an end to Confrontation through the exacerbation of internal stresses within Indonesia.
A series of clandestine military operations codenamed Operation CLARET was the first of two significant covert measures undertaken. CLARET operations were undertaken during a crucial period during Confrontation where the growing Indonesian aggression had threatened to overwhelm British forces in Borneo. However, Britain was able to forestall Sukarno from achieving success by adopting covert military action supported by an effective intelligence network. The second measure was a covert propaganda campaign launched against Indonesia, Sukarno and his Konfrontasi policy. Propaganda measures had initially been undertaken to create a favourable international opinion of Britain’s cause in Confrontation.
In 173 the latter half of Confrontation, Britain responded to the domestic upheaval within Indonesia by intensifying its propaganda efforts. Identifying the rise of a moderate Army leadership to power as the best possible scenario vis-a-vis ending Confrontation, Britain utilised its extensive propaganda machinery to discredit the PKI and Sukarno in favour of Suharto and the Army. Britain’s resilience and the efforts of British intelligence finally came to fruition when the Indonesian government led by Suharto ended formally Confrontation on 11 August 1966. Through its discussion, this dissertation has built and defended the case that British intelligence was significant to how Confrontation ended as it contributed to the conflict’s resolution in both an active and a passive capacity. Admittedly at present, there still exists a considerable challenge in assessing the true extent of British intelligence. Raw intelligence material that was produced remain closed to researchers while there continues to be a lack of basic information such as polling data on public attitudes towards the PKI, Sukarno, and Confrontation as well as listener and readership figures for British propaganda outlets.174
Until such information is made available, the extent of British intelligence’s impact on ending Confrontation cannot be ascertained with certainty. However, it is undeniable that intelligence had allowed Britain to sustain its chosen strategy more efficiently and effectively. Therefore, the claim that British intelligence, understood in terms of intelligence product and covert measures, played a significant role in ending Confrontation remains defensible to a large extent. This dissertation sought to further defend its central proposition by measuring it against two factors — the United States and the rise of Suharto and the Army to political power within Indonesia. In its own way, both factors have a defensible claim to having contributed significantly. It was established that in the aftermath of the Untung coup, the United States’s extended valuable covert assistance to Gen. Suharto and Army leaders whom brought about the end of Confrontation. As such, it was clear that the United States made a “telling contribution to Suharto’s rise of power” and thus the end of Confrontation.175
However, its actions were not motivated by the desire to end Confrontation, rather it was motivated by its desire to win the ideological contest between Communism and democracy present within Indonesia. It was perhaps fortuitous that its objectives and British interests were mutually supportive. Hence, to a large extent, the impact of U.S. actions do not diminish the significance of British intelligence in ending Confrontation. Orthodox accounts accept that Confrontation was ended as a result of events within Indonesia that were largely independent of any British and/or American influence. However, how this admission affects our assessment of British intelligence must be seen in relation to the current context of Confrontation. In its final stages, Confrontation underwent a radical evolution in its character; it ceased to be a manifestation of deep concerns about any external threats posed by the creation of Malaysia and became the focal point of an internal power struggle.176
In the complicated struggle waged by Suharto and the Army against Sukarno after the coup, Suharto took calculated steps to successfully negotiate the fluid power alignments in Jakarta and consolidated his position. When it became apparent in the middle of 1966 that Sukarno’s “accelerating slide into ignominy had become irreversible”, Suharto acted decisively to bring Confrontation to an end.
Therefore, 177 Confrontation which was borne out of Sukarno’s machinations was understandably ended by internal Indonesian forces. Therefore, the Indonesian-Malaysia Confrontation eventually ended as a result of developments within Indonesia. However it must be seen that the ability of Britain to successfully resist Confrontation contributed to this outcome; Indonesia’s concomitant economic woes, Sukarno’s uneasy alliance with the PKI and the Army’s growing disillusion with the policy had all been caused or exacerbated by the failure of Confrontation.178
As such, British intelligence and the covert measures adopted were not war-winning weapons that could directly end a conflict like Confrontation but they undeniably contributed to the end of Confrontation by creating and shaping the conditions necessary.
Notes
1 Easter, David. (2004), p.1
2 The proposed Federation of Malaysia was to include Malaya,
Singapore and the Borneo territories of North Borneo (modern day Sabah) and
Sarawak, and the British protectorate. the Sultanate of Brunei. Ultimately, Brunei
did sign up to the proposed Federation and remained an independent British
protectorate. See Easter, David. (2004), p.8
3 Subritzky, John. (2000), p.209
4 Mackie, J.A.C. (1974), p.3
5 Gregorian, Raffi. (1991), p.46
6 Easter, David. (2005), p.56
7 Tuck discusses how the early historiography of
Confrontation was dominated by favourable assessments of British achievements,
especially in comparison to the Vietnam War. See Tuck, Christopher (2013a),
pp.2-4
8 van der Bijl, Nick. (2007), pp.245-246
9 Easter, David. (2004), p.199
10 Subritzky, John. (2000), p.209
11 Scott, Peter Dale. (1985), p.240
12 Brands, H.W. (1989), pp.789, 803
13 However, see Mackie, J.A.C. (1974), Konfrontasi: The
Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966 for an in-depth discussion of
Confrontation and its underlying political issues.
14 See Tuck, Christopher (2004), pp.93-94 for political
constraints on Britain
15 Easter, David. (2000), p.199
16 Easter, David. (2004), p.22
17 FO 371/169902, Foreign Office (FO) Telegram 51, 21 Jan
1963
18 van der Bijl, Nick. (2007), p.39
19 Britain referred to these guerrillas collectively as
Indonesian Border Terrorists (IBT). See Raffi, Gregorian (1991), p.49
20 Mackie, J.A.C. (1974), pp.200, 211
21 Mockaitis, Thomas. (1995), p.17
22 Walker, General Sir Walter. (1969), p.11-12
23 Hall, Bob. and Ross, Andrew. (2008), pp.245-246
24 Walker, General Sir Walter. (1969), p.15
25 ibid., p.18; Mockaitis, Thomas. (1995), p.28
26 Walker, General Sir Walter. (1969), p.14
27 Easter, David. (2000), p.195
28 ibid., p.196
29 PREM 11/4346 De Zulueta minute for Macmillan, 27 Dec
1962.
30 Jones, Matthew. (2002), p.129; Easter, David. (2000),
p.196
31 DO 169/240, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 2 May 1963
32 Easter, David. (2000), pp.199-200
33 Hall, Bob. and Ross, Andrew. (2008), p.242
34 Mockaitis, Thomas. (1995), p.32
35 Easter, David. (2004), pp.83, 88
36 Hall, Bob. and Ross, Andrew. (2008), p.251
37 Tuck, Christopher. (2013a), p.122
38 Raffi, Gregorian. (1991), p.51
39 ibid.
40 ibid., p.52
41 CAB 148/1 DOPC 17th Meeting, 8 Apr 1964; DEFE 4/169 COS
36th Meeting, 14 May 1964
42 DEFE 5/150 COS Memo 121/64; COS Memo 124/64
43 Raffi, Gregorian. (1991), p.52; Easter, David. (2004),
p.124
44 CAB 148/1 DOPC 17th Meeting, 8 Apr 1964; DOPC 19th
Meeting, 29 Apr 1964
45 Tuck, Christopher. (2013b), p.607
46 CAB 148/1 DOPC 29th Meeting, 1 July 1964
47 Raffi, Gregorian. (1991), p.55
48 Aldrich, Richard. (2010), p.167
49 Dennis, Peter. and Grey, Jeffrey. (1999), p.329; See also
Appendix C, ibid for a list of Indonesian incursions
into West Malaysia.
50 van der Bijl, Nick. (2007), p.159
51 ibid.
52 FO 371/181526 Note by Prichard on ‘Indonesia’, 12 Jan
1965
53 DEFE 5/150 COS Memo 121/64
54 Dennis, Peter. and Grey, Jeffrey. (1996), p.245
55 Raffi, Gregorian. (1991), pp.53, 56.
56 ibid., p.61.
57 ibid., p.59
58 Dennis, Peter. and Grey, Jeffery. (1996), p.247; van der
Bijl, Nick (2007), p.154
59 Easter, David. (2004), p.136; see Dennis, Peter and Grey,
Jeffrey. (1996), p.247 for a comparison of statistics
when operations were at 3,000 yards and at 10,000 yards. It
underscores how an increase in the offensive nature
of CLARET drove the costs up.
60 FO 371/181457, ‘Record of Meeting between Dato M. Ghazali
and Brig. General Sukendro on 2nd and 3rdNovember 1965 at Bangkok’, 10 Nov.
1965.
61 Easter, David. (2004), p.157
62 Raffi, Gregorian. (1991), p.63
63 Aldrich, Richard (2010), p.165
64 DEFE 24/648 Minute to Secretary of State, May 1973; CGS
to DUS(Army), 24 April 1973
65 Raffi, Gregorian. (1991), p.50
66 Easter, David. (2004), p.72; Air Chief Marshall Sir David
Lee. (1993), pp.27-28
67 Blaxland, John. (2005), p.208
68 van der Bijl, Nick. (2007), pp.190-191
69 Easter, David. (2008), p.698
70 Cees Wiebes. (2001), p.257
71 Wies Platje. (2001), p.300
72 Cees Wiebes. (2001), p.264
73 Easter, David. (2001), p.88; Easter, David. (2004),
pp.100-103
74 Mockaitis, Thomas. (1995), p.37
75 Such is the debate over events surrounding the October 1 coup
attempt that it could easily warrant a full discussion on its own. Naturally,
this paper lacks the scope to describe at length the details of the coup
attempt nor present a full account of Indonesia’s domestic political situation
up. Hence, it will discuss certain aspects of the coup in detail and direct
readers to relevant sources for aspects not discussed.
See Anderson, Benedict. and McVeth, Ruth. (2009) for details
about the raids and members of the Movement; Mortimer, Rex. (2006), pp.413-417
for an outline of the incidents of the coup.
76 This is the equivalent of the British Army’s Chief of
General Staff.
77 van der Bijl, Nick. (2007), p.201; Easter, David. (2004),
p.159
78 Anderson, Benedict and McVeth, Ruth. (2009), p.22
79 Easter, David. (2004), p.159
80 Easter, David. (2005), p.56; Mackie, J.A.C., (1974),
p.309
81 Easter, David. (2005), p.60
82 ibid.
83 Howland, Richard Cabot. (1970), p.21
84 Mackie, J.A.C. (1974), p.313
85 ibid., pp.308-309
86 Easter, David. (2005), pp.59-60
However, it is noted that the CIA produced a 1968 report,
Indonesia 1965: The Coup That Backfired which in essence supports the
Indonesian’s view of communist involvement. The Indonesian view was laid out in
the semi-official Indonesian account, The Coup Attempt of the ‘September 30
Movement’ in Indonesia published by Notosusanto, Nugroho and Ismail Saleh in
1968.
87 Easter, David. (2005), pp.62-64
88 Tuck, Christopher. (2013a), p.138
89 CAB 21/5520 Gilchrist to Stewart, 19 Oct 1965
90 DEFE 13/475 Annex A to COS 176/65 ‘Measures to Counter
Indonesian Confrontation’, 21 Oct 1965
91 Tuck, Christopher. (2013a), p.138
92 Smith, Lyn. (1980), pp.67-69
93 Wilford, Hugh. (1998), p.369
94 quoted in Easter, David. (2004), p.161
95 Easter, David. (2004), p.168
96 Challis, Roland. (2001), p.99
97 Mehr, Nathaniel. (2009), p.107; Easter, David. (2004),
p.162
98 Easter, David. (2004), p.168
99 GILC/13/K (iii) Letter to AG from G.F.N. Reddaway, 1966
100 FO 371/ 181530 Tel 1460 Stanley to Reddaway, 9 Oct 1965
101 Fletcher, Richard. (1982), p.101; Curtis, Mark. (2003),
p.393; Easter, David. (2004), p.168
102 Easter, David. (2008), p.700
103 Challis, Roland. (2001), p.102
104 Easter, David. (2004), p.179
105 FO 371/181457 Minute from Stanley to Peck, 25 Nov 1965
106 FO 371/18753 Tel from Jakarta to London, 22 Mar 1966
107 Interview of Norman Reddaway, IWM Interview Series, 18
Aug 1993
108 Mehr, Nathaniel. (2009), p.99
109 Challis, Roland. (2001), p.101
110 Easter, David. (2004), p.156
111 Mehr, Nathaniel. (2009), p.98
112 Jones, Matthew. (2002), p.269
113 ibid.
114 Curtis, Mark. (2003), p.389
115 Challis, Roland. (2001), p.99
116 Easter, David. (2004), p.170
117 Challis, Roland. (2001), p.99
118 Easter, David. (2005), p.58
119 U.S. Department of State, (2000) Foreign Relations
United States. ‘Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines 1964-1968’, Vol.
XXVI., Doc 110. (hereafter cited as FRUS, appropriate volume, and document number)
120 Eater, David. (2005), p.56
121 Scott, Peter Dale. (1985), p.243
122 ibid., p.240
123 ibid., p.248, see footnote 46
124 See Brands, H.W. (1989) for a full rebuttal of Scott’s
central assertions.
125 FRUS, Vol. XXVI., Doc 143; Doc 144
126 FRUS, Vol. XXVI., Doc 146
127 Brands, H.W. (1989), p.787
128 FRUS, Vol. XXVI., Doc 121
129 FRUS, Vol. XXVI., Doc 160
130 FRUS, Vol. XXVI., Doc 147
131 FRUS, Vol. XXVI., Doc 148
132 FRUS, Vol. XXVI., Doc 155; Doc 168; Doc 172
133 FRUS, Vol. XXVI., Doc 121
134 Mehr, Nathaniel. (2009), p.89
135 FRUS, Vol. XXVI., Doc 90
136 FRUS, Vol. XXVI., Doc 4
137 FRUS, Vol. XXVI., Doc 100
138 Brands, H.W. (1989), p.793
139 Turnbull, C.M. (1993), p.613
140 Leifer, Michael. (1983), p.109
141 Crouch, Harold. (2007), p.24
142 ibid., pp.24-25
143 ibid., p.69
144 Weinstein, Franklin. (1969), p.5; Crouch, Harold.
(2007), p.69
145 Weinstein, Franklin. (1969), pp.6-7
146 ibid., p.8; Crouch, Harold. (2007), p.74
147 Mohd. Noor Mat Yazid, (2013), p.151
148 Weinstein, Franklin. (1969), p.34
149 Crouch, Harold. (2007), p.204
150 Mortimer, Rex. (2006), p.389
151 Weinstein, Franklin. (1969), p.4
152 Mortimer, Rex. (2006), p.204
153 ibid.
154 Bunnell, Frederick. (1966), p.44; Mortimer, Rex. (2006),
p.205
155 Bunnell, Frederick. (1966), p.41
156 Crouch, Harold. (2007), p.135
157 Leifer, Michael. (1983), p.106
158 Australian Associated Press, ‘Indonesia to return to
United Nations’, 5 Apr 1966
159 Howland, Richard Cabot. (1970), p.20; Mackie, J.A.C.
(1974), p.319
160 Leifer, Michael. (1966), p.400
161 Leifer, Michael. (1965), pp.252-253
162 Mackie, J.A.C. (1974), p.225
163 ibid., p.232
164 ibid., p.319
165 Leifer, Michael. (1966), p.401
166 Crouch, Harold. (2007), p.205
167 ibid., pp.205-206; Leifer, Michael. (1983), p.109
168 Weinstein, Franklin. (1969), p.40
169 Crouch, Harold. (2007), p.198
170 Walker, General Sir Walter. (1969), p.20
171 Weinstein, Franklin. (1969), p.29
172 Walker, General Sir Walter. (1969), p.13
173 Mockaitis, Thomas. (1995), p.20
174 Easter, David. (2004), p.195
175 Mehr, Nathaniel. (2009), p.89
176 Weinstein, Franklin. (1969), p.29
177 van der Kroef, Justus M. (1967), pp.499-500
178 Mockaitis, Thomas. (1995), p.37
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Source : Oneman
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