Campaign Service Medal with ‘Borneo’ Clasp
24th December 1962 – 11th August 1966
Qualifying Period – Thirty days or more, service, not necessarily continuous
in North Borneo
(now Sabah, Sarawak or Brunei).
Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation
The
Indonesian–Malaysian confrontation (also known by its Indonesian/Malay name,
Konfrontasi) was a violent conflict in 1963–66 that stemmed from Indonesia's
opposition to the creation of Malaysia. The creation of Malaysia was the
amalgamation of the Federation of Malaya (now West Malaysia), Singapore and the
crown colony/British protectorates of North Borneo and Sarawak (collectively
known as British Borneo, now East Malaysia) in September 1963.
The
confrontation was an undeclared war with most of the action occurring in the
border area between Indonesia and East Malaysia on the island of Borneo (known
as Kalimantan in Indonesia). The conflict was characterised by restrained and
isolated ground combat, set within tactics of low level brinkmanship. Combat
was usually conducted by company or platoon sized operations on either side of
the border. Indonesia's campaign of infiltrations into Borneo sought to exploit
the ethnic and religious diversity in Sabah and Sarawak compared to that of
Malaya and Singapore, with the intent of unravelling the proposed state of
Malaysia.
The
challenging jungle terrain of Borneo and lack of roads straddling the
Malaysia/Indonesia border forced both Indonesian and Commonwealth forces to
conduct long foot patrols. Both sides relied on light infantry operations and
air transport, although Commonwealth forces enjoyed the advantage of better
helicopter deployment and resupply to forward operating bases. Rivers were also
used as a method of transport and infiltration. Although combat operations were
primarily conducted by ground forces, aerial forces played a vital support role
and naval forces ensured the security of the sea flanks. The British provided
most of the defensive effort, although Malaysian forces steadily increased their
contributions, and there were periodic contributions from Australian and New
Zealander forces within the combined Far East Strategic Reserve stationed then
in West Malaysia and Singapore
.
Initial
Indonesian attacks into East Malaysia relied heavily on local volunteers
trained by the Indonesian Army. With the passage of time infiltration forces
became more organised with the inclusion of a larger component of Indonesian
forces. To deter and disrupt Indonesia's growing campaign of infiltrations, the
British responded in 1964 by launching their own covert operations into Indonesian
Kalimantan under the code name Operation Claret. Coinciding with Sukarno
announcing a 'year of dangerous living' and 1964 race riots in Singapore,
Indonesia launched on 17 August 1964 an expanded campaign of operations into
West Malaysia, albeit without military success. A build-up of Indonesian forces
on the Kalimantan border in December 1964 saw the UK commit significant forces
from the UK based Army Strategic Command and Australia and New Zealand deployed
roulement combat forces from West Malaysia to Borneo in 1965-6. The intensity
of the conflict began to subside following the events of the 30 September
Movement and Suharto's rise to power. A new round of peace negotiations between
Indonesia and Malaysia began in May 1966 and a final peace agreement was signed
on 11 August 1966 with Indonesia formally recognising Malaysia.
Important
precursors to the conflict included Indonesia's policy of confrontation against
Netherlands New Guinea from March–August 1962 and the Brunei Revolt in December
1962.
Background & Political situation
Before
Indonesia's Confrontation of Malaysia, Sukarno had sought to develop an
independent Indonesian foreign policy, focused on the acquisition of
Netherlands New Guinea as a residual issue from the Indonesian National
Revolution, and establishing Indonesia's credentials as a notable international
power operating distinct interests from those of the West and East. Indonesia
had relentlessly pursued its claim to Netherlands New Guinea during the period
1950–1962, despite facing multiple setbacks in the UN General Assembly to have
its claim recognised by the international community. Indonesia was an important
country in developing the Non-Alligned Movement, hosting the Bandung Conference
in 1955.
Following
the Indonesian crisis in 1958, which had included the Permesta rebellion in
eastern Indonesia and the declaration of the PRRI, a rebel revolutionary
government based in Sumatra; Indonesia had emerged as a notable and rising
military power in Southeast Asia.[5] With the influx of Soviet arms aid,
Indonesia was able to advance its diplomatic claims to Netherlands New Guinea more
forcefully. The diplomatic dispute reached its climax in 1962 when Indonesia
launched a substantial campaign of airborne and seaborne infiltrations upon
Netherlands New Guinea. While the infiltration forces were soundly defeated by
Dutch and indigenous forces, Indonesia was able to lend credence to the threat
of an Indonesian invasion of Netherlands New Guinea. The Dutch, facing mounting
diplomatic pressure from the Indonesians and the Americans, who were anxious to
keep Indonesia from becoming Communist aligned, yielded and agreed to a
diplomatic compromise, allowing the Indonesians to gain control of the
territory in exchange for pledging to hold a self determination plebiscite (the
Act of Free Choice) in the territory by 1969. Thus by the close of 1962 Indonesia
had achieved a considerable diplomatic victory, which possibly emboldened its
self perception as a notable regional power. It was in the context of
Indonesia's recent diplomatic victory in the Netherlands New Guinea dispute,
that Indonesia cast its attention to the British proposal for a unified Malaysian
state.
Prior
to the British Government announcing the East of Suez policy in 1968, the
British Government had begun to re-evaluate in the late 1950s its force
commitment in the Far East. As a part of its withdrawal from its Southeast
Asian colonies, the UK moved to combine its colonies in North Borneo with the
Federation of Malaya (which had become independent from Britain in 1957), and
Singapore (which had become self-governing in 1959). In May 1961, the UK and
Malayan governments proposed a larger federation called Malaysia, encompassing
the states of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei, and Singapore. Initially,
Indonesia was mildly supportive of the proposed Malaysia, although the PKI
(Partai Komunis Indonesia — Indonesian Communist Party) was strongly opposed to
it.
In
Brunei, it was unclear whether the Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III would support
Brunei joining the proposed Malaysian state because of the implied reduction of
his political office, and Brunei's oil revenues ensured Brunei's financial
viability were it to chose independence. Furthermore, a Brunei politician, Dr.
AM Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud, while supporting a unified North Borneo, also opposed
a wider Malaysian federation. In 1961, he had sounded out Indonesia about
possible aid in training Borneo recruits; General Abdul Nasution hinted at
moral support, and Soebandrio, the Indonesian foreign minister and head of
intelligence, hinted at supplying more substantial aid. Azahari was a leftist
who had fought in Indonesia in their war for independence. Following these meetings
Indonesia began training in Kalimantan a small volunteer force, the North
Kalimantan National Army (TNKU).
On 8
December 1962, the TNKU staged an insurrection—the Brunei Revolt. The
insurrection was an abject failure, the poorly trained and equipped forces were
unable to seize key objectives such as capturing the Sultan of Brunei, seize
the Brunei oil fields, or take European hostages. Within hours of the
insurrection being launched, British forces based in Singapore were being
mobilised for a prompt response.
The
failure of the insurrection was clear within 30 hours when Gurkha troops
airlifted from Singapore secured Brunei town and ensured the Sultan's safety.
On 16 December, the British Far East Command claimed that all major rebel
centres had been occupied. Several UK and Gurkha infantry battalions were
deployed to Brunei, with significant elements in Kuching and Tawau because the TNKU
had the support of the Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO) in Sarawak.
Some 4,000 Kelabits from the 5th Division were also mobilised to help prevent
the TNKU's escape to Indonesia. Mopping up operations continued until 18 May
1963, when the last elements of the TNKU, including its commander, were
captured.
The
degree of Indonesian support for the TNKU remains a subject of debate. While
Indonesia at the time
denied direct involvement, it did sympathise with the TNKU's objectives to
destabilise the proposed
Malaysian state. Following the TNKU's military setback in Brunei, on 20 January
1963 Indonesian
Foreign Minister Subandrio announced that Indonesia would pursue a policy of Konfrontasi
with Malaysia, reversing Indonesia's previous policy of compliance with the British proposal.
This was followed by the first recorded infiltration of Indonesian forces on 12
April 1963 when
a police station in Tebedu, Sarawak, was attacked.
People and terrain
In
1961, the island of Borneo was divided into four separate states. Kalimantan,
comprising four Indonesian provinces, was located in the south of the island.
In the north, separated from Kalimantan by a border some 1000 miles long, were
the Sultanate of Brunei (a British protectorate) and two colonies of the United
Kingdom (UK)—British North Borneo (later renamed Sabah) and Sarawak.
The
three UK territories totalled some 1.5 million people, about half of them
Dayaks. Sarawak had a population of about 900,000, while Sabah's was 600,000
and Brunei's was around 80,000. Among Sarawak's non-Dayak population, 31% were
Chinese, and 19% were Malay. Among non-Dayaks in Sabah, 21% were Chinese and 7%
were Malay; Brunei's non-Dayak population was 28% Chinese and 54% Malay. There
was a large Indonesian population in Tawau in southern Sabah and a large and
economically active Chinese one in Sarawak. Despite their population size,
Dayaks were spread through the country in village longhouses and were not
politically organised. Sarawak was divided into five administrative Divisions.
Sabah, whose capital city was Jesselton (Kota Kinabalu) on the north coast, was
divided into several Residencies; those of the Interior and Tawau were on the border.
Apart
from either end, the border generally followed a ridge line throughout its
length, rising to almost 2,500 metres in the Fifth Division. In the First
Division, there were some roads, including a continuous road from Kuching to
Brunei and around to Sandakan on the east coast of Sabah. There were no roads in
the Fourth and Fifth Divisions or the Interior Residency, and in Third
Division, there was only the coast road, which was some 150 miles from the
border. Mapping was generally poor, as British maps of the country showed very
little topographic detail. Indonesian maps were worse; veterans recall “a
single black and white sheet for all of Kalimantan torn from a school text
book” in 1964.
Kalimantan
was divided into four provinces, of which East Kalimantan and West Kalimantan
face the border. The capital of the West is Pontianak on the west coast, about
100 miles (160 km) from the border, and the capital of the East is Samarinda on
the south coast, some 220 miles (350 km) from the border. There were no roads
in the border area other than some in the west, and no road existed linking
West and East Kalimantan.
The
lack, on both sides of the border, of roads and tracks suitable for vehicles
meant that movement was limited to foot tracks mostly unmarked on any map, as
well as water and air movement. There were many large rivers on both sides of
the border, and these were the main means of movement, including hovercraft by
the UK. There were also quite a few small grass airstrips suitable for light aircraft,
as dropping zones for parachuted supplies, and for helicopters.
The
equator lies about 100 miles south of Kuching, and most of northern Borneo
receives over 3000 mm of rain each year. Borneo is naturally covered by
tropical rainforest. This covers the mountainous areas cut by many rivers with
very steep sided hills and hilltop ridges often only a few metres wide. The
high rainfall means large rivers; these provide a main means of transport and
are formidable tactical obstacles. Dense mangrove forest covering vast tidal
flats intersected with numerous creeks is a feature of many coastal areas,
including Brunei and either end of the border. There are cultivated areas in
valleys and around villages. The vicinity of abandoned and current settlements
are areas of dense secondary regrowth.
Sarawakian Opposition
The
end of the Second World War had brought an end to the Brooke Dynasty rule in
Sarawak. Believing it to be in the best interest of the people of Sarawak,
Charles Vyner Brooke ceded the state to the British Crown.[10] Sarawak became a
Crown Colony, ruled from the Colonial Office in London, which in turn
dispatched a Governor for Sarawak. The predominantly Malay anti-cession
movement, which rejected the British takeover of Sarawak in 1946 and had
assassinated Duncan Stewart, the first British High Commissioner of Sarawak,
may have been the forerunner of the subsequent anti- Malaysia movement in
Sarawak, headed by Ahmad Zaidi Adruce.
According
to Vernon L. Porritt and Hong-Kah Fong, Left-wing and communist cell groups had
been present among Sarawak's urban Chinese communities since the 1930s and
1940s. Some of the earliest Communist groups in Sabah included the Anti-Fascist
League, which later became the Races Liberation Army, and the Borneo
Anti-Japanese League, which was made up of the North Borneo Anti-Japanese
League and the West Borneo Anti-Japanese League. The latter was led by Wu Chan,
who was deported by the Sarawak colonial government to China in 1952. Other
Communist groups in Sarawak included the Overseas Chinese Youth Association,
which was formed in 1946, and the Liberation League along with its youth wing,
the Advanced Youth Association, which emerged during the 1950s. These
organisations became the nuclei for two Communist guerilla movements: the anti-
Malaysia North Kalimantan People's Army (PARAKU) and the Sarawak People's
Guerrillas (PGRS). These various Communist groups were designated by various
British and other Western sources as the Clandestine Communist Organisation
(CCO) or the Sarawak Communist Organisation (SCO).[11]
The
Sarawak Communist Organisation, was predominantly dominated by ethnic Chinese
but also included Dayak supporters. However, the Sarawak Communist Organisation
had little support from ethnic Malays and the indigenous Sarawak races. At its
height, the SCO had 24,000 members.[12] During the 1940s and 1950s, Maoism had
spread among Chinese vernacular schools in Sarawak. Following the Second World
War, Communist influence also penetrated the labour movement and the
predominantly-Chinese Sarawak United People's Party, the state's first
political party which was founded in June 1959. The Sarawak Insurgency began
after the Brunei Revolt in 1962 and SCO would fight alongside the Bruneian
rebels and Indonesian forces during the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation
(1963–1966).
The
Sarawak Communist Organisation and the Bruneian rebels supported and propagated
the unification of all British Borneo territories to form an independent
leftist North Kalimantan state. This idea was idea originally proposed by A. M.
Azahari, leader of the Parti Rakyat Brunei (Brunei People's Party), who had
forged links with Sukarno's nationalist movement, together with Ahmad Zaidi, in
Java in the 1940s. However, the Brunei People's Party was in favour of joining
Malaysia on the condition it was as the unified three territories of northern
Borneo with their own sultan, and hence was strong enough to resist domination
by Malaya, Singapore, Malay administrators or Chinese merchants.
The
North Kalimantan (or Kalimantan Utara) proposal was seen as a post-decolonisation
alternative by local opposition against the Malaysia plan. Local opposition
throughout the Borneo territories was primarily based on economic, political,
historical and cultural differences between the Borneo states and Malaya, as
well as the refusal to be subjected under peninsular political domination. Both
Azahari and Zaidi went into exile in Indonesia during the confrontation. While
the latter returned to Sarawak and had his political status rehabilitated,
Azahari remained in Indonesia until his death on 3 September 2002.
In
the aftermath of the Brunei Revolt, the remnants of the TNKU reached Indonesia.
Possibly fearing British reprisals (which never eventuated), many Chinese
communists, possibly several thousand, also fled Sarawak. Their compatriots
remaining in Sarawak were known as the CCO by the UK but called the
PGRS—Pasukan Gelilya Rakyat Sarawak (Sarawak People's Guerilla Force) by
Indonesia. Soebandrio met with a group of their potential leaders in Bogor, and
Nasution sent three trainers from Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (RPKAD)
Battalion 2 to Nangabadan near the Sarawak border, where there were about 300
trainees. Some 3 months later two lieutenants were sent there. The PGRS
numbered about 800, based in West Kalimantan at Batu Hitam, with a contingent
of 120 from the Indonesian intelligence agency and a small cadre trained in
China. The PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) was strongly in evidence and led by
an ethnic Arab revolutionary, Sofyan. The PGRS ran some raids into Sarawak but
spent more time developing their supporters in Sarawak. The Indonesian military
did not approve of the leftist nature of the PGRS and generally avoided them.
Beginning of Conflict 1963
Sukarno's
motives for beginning Confrontation are contested. Former Indonesian Foreign
Minister Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung argued years later that Sukarno intentionally
muted Indonesia's opposition to the proposed Malaysian state while Indonesia
was preoccupied with advancing its claim to West New Guinea. Following
Indonesia's diplomatic victory in the West New Guinea dispute, Sukarno may have
been emboldened to extend Indonesia's dominance over its weaker neighbours.
Conversely, Sukarno may have felt compelled by the ongoing pressure of the PKI
and the general instability of Indonesian politics to divert attention towards
a new foreign conflict. Sukarno argued that Malaysia was a British puppet
state, a neo-colonial experiment, and that any expansion of Malaysia would increase
British control over the region, with implications for Indonesia's national
security. Similarly, the Philippines made a claim to eastern North Borneo,
arguing that the Borneo colony had historic links with the Philippines through
the Sulu archipelago.
President
Sukarno had stated in at least four public speeches in 1963–64 that Indonesia
had no territorial ambitions over North Kalimantan, and that Indonesia's
territorial pursuit was completed with the "return" of West Irian in
January 1963. Nevertheless the Indonesian name for the territory "Kalimantan
Utara" had the same form as the names of Indonesia's Kalimantan provinces.
Furthermore, later events in East Timor demonstrated that influential elements
in Indonesia did aspire to other territory when the colonial powers left.
However, while Sukarno made no direct claims to incorporate northern Borneo
into Indonesian Kalimantan, he saw the formation of Malaysia as an obstacle to
the Maphilindo, a non-political, irredentist union spanning Malaya, Philippines
and Indonesia.[16] President of the Philippines Diosdado Macapagal initially
did not oppose the concept and even initiated the Manila Accord, but while the
Philippines did not engage in hostilities, Malaysia severed diplomatic ties
after the former deferred recognising it as the successor state of Malaya.
In
April 1963, the first recorded infiltration and attack occurred in Borneo. An
infiltration force training at Nangabadan was split in two and prepared for its
first operation. On 12 April 1963, one infiltration force attacked and seized
the police station at Tebedu in the 1st Division of Sarawak, about 40 miles from
Kuching and 2 miles from the border with Kalimantan. The other group attacked
the village of Gumbang, South West of Kuching, later in the month. Only about
half returned. Confrontation could be said to have started from a military
perspective with the Tebedu attack.
Manila peace talks, 30 July - 5 August 1963
Prior
to Indonesia's declaration of Confrontation against the proposed Malaysian
state on 20 January 1963, the Cobbold Commission in 1962 had reported on the
viability of a Malaysian state, finding that there was sufficient support in
the Borneo colonies for the creation of a larger Malaysian state. However, due
to firming Indonesian and Philippine opposition to the Malaysia proposal, a new
round of negotiations was proposed to hear the Indonesian and Philippine points
of opposition. To resolve the dispute the would-be member states of Malaysia
met representatives of Indonesia and the Philippines in Manila for several
days, starting on 30 July 1963. Just days prior to the summit, on 27 July 1963
President Sukarno had continued his inflammatory rhetoric, declaring that he
was going to "crush Malaysia" (Indonesian: Ganyang Malaysia). At the
Manilla meeting, the Philippines and Indonesia formally agreed to accept the
formation of Malaysia if a majority in North Borneo and Sarawak voted for it in
a referendum organised by the United Nations. While the fact-finding mission by
the UN was expected to begin on 22 August, Indonesian delaying tactics forced
the mission to start on 26 August. Nevertheless, the UN expected the referendum
report to be published by 14 September 1963.
Prior
to the Manilla meeting the Malayan Government had set 31 August as the date on
which Malaysia would come into existence, (coinciding with Malaya's
independence day celebrations of 31 August) but during the Manilla negotiations
it was persuaded by the Indonesian and Philippine Governments to postpone
Malaysia's inauguration until 15 September 1963 by which time a UN mission was
expected to report on whether the two Borneo colonies supported the Malaysia proposal.
However,
following the conclusion of the Manilla talks, the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku
Abdul Rahman announced that the proposed Malaysian state would come into
existence on 16 September 1963, apparently irrespective of the latest UN
report.
North
Borneo and Sarawak, anticipating a pro-Malaysian UN report, declared their
independence as part of Malaysia on the sixth anniversary of Merdeka Day, 31
August 1963, even before the UN report had been published. On 14 September the
UN report was published, once again providing general endorsement of the
proposed Malaysian state.
Malaysia
was formally established on 16 September 1963. Indonesia immediately reacted by
expelling the Malaysian Ambassador from Jakarta. Two days later, rioters burned
the British embassy in Jakarta. Several hundred rioters ransacked the Singapore
embassy in Jakarta and the homes of Singaporean diplomats. In Malaysia,
Indonesian agents were captured, and crowds attacked the Indonesian embassy in
Kuala Lumpur.
Ongoing Campaign of Infiltrations
Even
as peace talks progressed and stalled, Indonesia maintained its campaign of
infiltrations. On 15 August, a headman reported an incursion in the 3rd
Division and follow up indicated they were about 50 strong. A series of
contacts ensued as 2/6 Gurkhas deployed patrols and ambushes, and after a month,
15 had been killed and 3 captured. The Gurkhas reported that they were well
trained and professionally led, but their ammunition expenditure was high and
their fire discipline broke down. The prisoners reported 300 more invaders
within a week and 600 in a fortnight.
Battle of Long Jawai
The
Battle of Long Jawai was the first major incursion for the centre of the 3rd
Division, directed by an RPKAD Lieutenant Mulyono Soerjowardojo, who had been
sent to Nanga Badan earlier in the year.
1964
The
deliberate attack by Indonesian forces on Malaysian troops did not enhance
Sukarno's "anti imperialist" credentials, although the Indonesian
government tried blaming the KKO as enthusiastic idealists acting independently.
They also produced Azahari, who claimed that Indonesian forces were playing no
part in active operations. Sukarno next launched a peace offensive and, in late
January, declared he was ready for a ceasefire (despite having denied direct
Indonesia involvement). Talks started in Bangkok, but border violations
continued, and the talks soon failed. They resumed midyear in Tokyo and failed
within days but allowed time for a Thai mission to visit Sarawak and witness smart,
well-equipped Indonesian soldiers withdrawing across the border, which they had
crossed a short distance away earlier in the day.
Expansion of the conflict to the Malaysian
Peninsula, August 1964
Coordinated
to coincide with Sukarno announcing a 'Year of Dangerous Living' during Indonesian
Independence Day celebrations, Indonesian forces began a campaign of airborne
and seaborne infiltrations of the Malaysian Peninsula on 17 August 1964. On 17
August 1964 a seaborne force of about 100, composed of airforce Pasukan Gerat
Tjepat (PGT — Quick Reaction Force) paratroopers, KKO and about a dozen
Malaysian communists, crossed the Malacca Straits by boat. They landed southwest
of Johore. Instead of being greeted as liberators, they were contained by
various Commonwealth forces and most of the infiltrators were killed or
captured within a few days.
On 2
September, three C-130 set off from Jakarta for Peninsula Malaysia, flying low
to avoid detection by radar. The following night, two of the C-130 managed to
reach their objective with their onboard PGT paratroopers, who jumped off and
landed around Labis in Johore (about 100 miles north of Singapore). The
remaining C-130 crashed into the Malacca traits while trying to evade interception
by an RAF Javelin FAW 9 launched from RAF Tengah. Due to a lightning storm, the
drop of 96 paratroopers was widely dispersed. This resulted in them landing
close to 1/10 Gurkhas, who were joined by 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand
Infantry Regiment (1 RNZIR) stationed near Malacca with 28 (Commonwealth)
Brigade. Operations were commanded by 4 Malaysian Brigade, but it took a month
to round up or kill the 96 invaders and a New Zealand officer was killed during
the action.
Indonesia's
expansion of the conflict to the Malaysian Peninsula sparked the Sunda Straits
Crisis, involving the anticipated transit of the Sunda Strait by the British
aircraft carrier Victorious and two destroyer escorts. Commonwealth forces were
readied for airstrikes against Indonesian infiltration staging areas in Sumatra
if further Indonesian infiltrations of the Malaysian Peninsula were attempted.
A tense three week standoff occurred before the crisis was peacefully resolved.
By
the concluding months of 1964 the conflict once again appeared to have reached
stalemate, with Commonwealth forces having placed in check for the moment
Indonesia's campaign of infiltrations into Borneo, and more recently, the
Malaysian Peninsula. However, the fragile equilibrium looked likely to change
once again in December 1964 when Commonwealth intelligence began reporting a build-up
of Indonesian infiltration forces in Kalimantan.
1965
Due
to Indonesia's troop build-up in Kalimantan, Australia and New Zealand agreed
to begin deploying combat forces to Borneo in early 1965.
Expulsion of Singapore from the Malaysian
Federation
During
the height of Konfrontasi, Singapore, much to the embarrassment of British
officials, was expelled from the Malaysian Federation on 9 August 1965 due to
ongoing political deadlock between the warring political parties of the
Malaysian government with its respective power bases in Malaya and Singapore.
Although Indonesia's Konfrontasi tactics of covert infiltrations had no direct
effect on Malaysia's internal stability, the expulsion of Singapore was seized
upon by Indonesia as evidence that the Malaysian state was an artificial
British construct as Indonesia had consistently claimed.
30 September 1965 events and the easing of
conflict
On
the night of 30 September 1965 an attempted coup took place in Jakarta. Six
senior Indonesian military leaders were killed, while General Nasution narrowly
escaped from his would be captors. In the ensuing confusion Sukarno agreed to
allow Suharto to assume emergency command and control of Jakarta and the armed
forces stationed there. Blame for the failed coup was attributed to the
Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI), and in the following weeks and months a campaign of imprisonment
and lynching of PKI members and sympathisers broke out across Jakarta and Indonesia.
With Suharto's grip on power in Jakarta and Indonesia delicately poised, the
scale and intensity of Indonesia's campaign of infiltrations into Borneo began
to ease. The train of events set off by the failed coup led to Suharto's
gradual consolidation of power and marginalisation of Sukarno. At the same
time, the anti-communist purge spread throughout Indonesia. Suharto's steady consolidation
of power after 30 September events allowed him to form a new government and in March
1967 Suharto was able to form a new Cabinet that excluded Sukarno.
1966 Peace Treaty
On
28 May 1966, at a conference in Bangkok, the Malaysian and Indonesian
governments declared the conflict was over. However, it was unclear if Suharto
was in full control of Indonesia (rather than Sukarno), and vigilance in Borneo
could not be relaxed. With Suharto's co-operation a peace treaty was signed on
11 August and ratified two days later.
During
Suharto's rise to power Claret operations continued and, in March 1966, a
Gurkha battalion was involved in some of the fiercest fighting of the campaign
during two raids into Kalimantan.[29] Minor action by Indonesian forces
continued in the border area, including an attempt at counterbattery fire
against a 105 mm gun position in Central Brigade (reports from locals said the
British return fire had turned over the Indonesian gun, thought to be 76 mm).
At
the beginning of 1966, with Indonesia's political hiatus beginning to stabilise
(it had stopped a major RPKAD operation to capture a British prisoner), the
RPKAD linked up with PGRS to establish guerrilla forces in Sabah and Sarawak.
The Sabah effort never crossed the border; however, two groups entered Sarawak
in February and May and obtained support from local sympathisers. The first
group, despite losses in several contacts, lasted until June and exfiltrated on
hearing about the end of Konfrontasi. Survivors of the second, after a contact
with Australian troops, also made it back to Indonesia.[30] However, the final
Indonesian incursion was in May and June. Signs of a substantial force were
found crossing into Central Brigade. This was some 80 strong, mostly
volunteers, led by Lt Sombi (or Sumbi) and a team from 600 Raider Company. They
moved fast towards Brunei with 1/7 Gurkhas pursuing and ambushing them; almost
all were accounted for. In response to this, a final Claret operation was
launched, which was an artillery ambush by 38 Light Battery.
End
Origin Killed
Wounded
UK 19 43
Gurkha 44 83
AUS
Army 16 9
NZ
Army 7 7
Rest
29 38
Total
114 181
The
conflict lasted nearly four years; however, following General Suharto's
replacement of Sukarno, Indonesian interest in pursuing the war with Malaysia
declined, and combat eased. Peace negotiations were initiated during May 1966
before a final peace agreement was ratified on 11 August 1966.
Although
the Indonesians had conducted a few amphibious raids and an airborne operation
against Malaya, the war remained limited throughout its duration and remained
largely a land conflict. For either side to have escalated to large scale air
or naval attacks "would have incurred disadvantages greatly outweighing
the marginal military effect that they might have produced". The UK
Secretary of State for Defence at the time, Denis Healey, described the
campaign as "one of the most efficient uses of military forces in the
history of the world". British Commonwealth forces peaked at 17,000 deployed
in Borneo, with another 10,000 more available in Malaya and Singapore. Total
British Commonwealth military casualties were 114 killed and 181 wounded, most
of them Gurkhas. The losses included Gurkha casualties of 43 killed and 83
wounded, other British armed forces were
a further 19 killed and 44 wounded, Australian casualties of 16 killed and 9
wounded (although only 7 were killed in action) and New Zealand casualties of 7
killed and another 7 wounded or injured.[33][34] The remaining casualties were
that of the Malaysian military, police, and Border Scouts. A significant number
of British casualties occurred during helicopter accidents, including a Belvedere
crash that killed several SAS commanders and a Foreign Office official,
possibly a member of MI6. A Wessex collision also killed several men from 2nd
Parachute Battalion, and a Westland Scout crash, on 16 July 1964, near Kluang
airfield, killed the two crewmen from 656 Sqn AAC. Finally, in August 1966,
there remained two British and two Australian soldiers missing and presumed
dead, with the Australians (both from the SASR) probably drowned while crossing
a swollen river.[35] The remains of a Royal Marine were recovered some 20 years
later. Altogether, 36 cilivians were killed, 53 wounded and 4 captured, with
most being local inhabitants.
Indonesian
casualties were estimated at 590 killed, 222 wounded and 771 captured.
Forces Command arrangements
In
early January 1963, the military forces in northern Borneo, having arrived in
December 1962 in response to the Brunei Revolt, were under the command of
Commander British Forces Borneo (COMBRITBOR), Major General Walter Walker, who
was Director of Borneo Operations (DOBOPS) based on Labuan Island and reported
directly to the Commander in Chief Far East Forces Admiral Sir David Luce. Luce
was routinely replaced by Admiral Sir Varyl Begg in early 1963.
Politico-military
authority lay with the Emergency Committees in Sarawak and North Borneo, including
their Governors, who were the Commanders in Chief for their colonies. In
Brunei, there was a State Advisory Council answerable to the Sultan.
After
independence, supreme authority changed to the Malaysian National Defence
Council in Kuala Lumpur with State Executive Committees in Sabah and Sarawak.
Military direction was from the Malaysian National Operations Committee jointly
chaired by the Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff, General Tunku Osman,
and the Inspector General of Police, Sir Claude Fenner. The British Commander
in Chief Far East Forces was a member. DOBOPS regularly attended its meetings.
British
forces in Borneo included Headquarters (HQ) 3 Commando Brigade in Kuching with responsibility
for the western part of Sarawak, 1st–4th Divisions, and HQ 99 Gurkha Infantry
Brigade in Brunei responsible for the East, 5th Division, Brunei and Sabah.
These HQs had deployed from Singapore in late 1962 in response to the Brunei
Revolt. The ground forces were composed of five UK and Gurkha infantry
battalions normally based in Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong and rotated with
others and an armoured car squadron. In the middle of 1963, Brigadier Pat
Glennie, normally the Brigadier General Staff in Singapore, arrived as Deputy
DOBOPS.
The
naval effort, under DOBOPS command, was primarily provided by minesweepers used
to patrol coastal waters and larger
inland waterways. A guardship – a frigate or destroyer- was stationed off Tawau.
The
initial air component based in Borneo consisted of detachments from squadrons
stationed in Malaya and Singapore. These included Twin Pioneer and Single
Pioneer transport aircraft, probably two or three Blackburn Beverley and
Handley Page Hastings transports, and about 12 helicopters of various types.
One of Walker's first "challenges" was curtailing the RAF's
centralised command and control arrangements and insisting that aircraft
tasking for operations in Borneo was by his HQ, not by the RAF Air Command Far
East HQ in Singapore.[36] Other aircraft of many types stationed in Malaya and
Singapore provided sorties as necessary, including routine transport support
into Kuching and Labuan.
The
police deployed a number of paramilitary Police Field Force companies. At this
stage, Indonesian forces were under command of Lieutenant General Zulkipli in
Pontianak, on the coast of West Kalimantan about 200 km (120 mi) from the
border. The Indonesian irregulars, led by Indonesian officers, were thought to
number about 1500, with an unknown number or regular troops and local defence
irregulars. They were deployed the entire length of the border in eight operational
units, mostly facing the 1st and 2nd Divisions. The units had names such as "Thunderbolts",
"Night Ghosts" and "World Sweepers".
British Tactics
Soon
after assuming command in Borneo, General Walker issued a directive listing the
ingredients for success, based on his experience in the Malayan Emergency:
•
Unified operations (army, navy and air force operating fully together)
•
Timely and accurate information (the need for continuous reconnaissance and
intelligence
collection)
•
Speed, mobility and flexibility
•
Security of bases
•
Domination of the jungle
• Winning
the hearts and minds of the people (this was added several months later).
Walker
recognised the difficulties of limited forces and a long border and, in early
1963, was reinforced with an SAS squadron from the UK, which rotated with
another mid-year. When the SAS temporarily adopted 3-man instead of 4-man
patrols, they could not closely monitor the border. Increasing the capability
of the infantry to create a surveillance network was also considered important.
Walker
raised the Border Scouts, building on Harrison's force of Kelabits, who had
mobilised to helpintercept the fleeing TNKU forces from the Brunei Revolt. He
also utilised the experience of the Royal Marines as well as knowledge of the
skill and usefulness of the Sarawak Rangers in the Malayan Emergency. This was
approved by the Sarawak government in May as "auxiliary police".
Walker selected Lieutenant Colonel John Cross, a Gurkha officer with immense
jungle experience, for the task. A training centre was established in a remote
area at Mt. Murat in the 5th Division and staffed mainly by SAS. Border Scouts
were attached to infantry battalions and evolved into an intelligence gathering
force by using their local knowledge and extended families.[39] In addition,
the Police Special Branch, which had proved so effective during the Malayan
Emergency in recruiting sources in the communist organisation, was expanded.
British
jungle tactics were developed and honed during the Malayan Emergency against a
clever and elusive enemy. They emphasised travelling lightly, being
undetectable and going for many days without resupplying. Being undetectable
meant being silent (hand signals, no rattling equipment) and 'odour
free'—perfumed toiletries were forbidden (they could be detected a kilometre
away by good jungle fighters), and sometimes eating food cold to prevent
cooking smells.
In
about 1962, at the end of National Service, British infantry battalions had
reorganised into three rifle companies, a support company and an HQ company
with logistic responsibilities. Battalion HQ included an intelligence section.
Each rifle company was composed of 3 platoons of 32 men each, equipped with
light machine guns and self-loading rifles. The support company had a mortar
platoon with 6 medium mortars (3-inch mortar until replaced by 81-mm mortar
around the end of 1965) organised into 3 sections, enabling a section to be
attached to a rifle company if required. Similarly organised was an anti-tank
platoon; there was also an assault pioneer platoon. The machine gun platoon was
abolished, but the impending delivery of the 7.62 mm GPMG, with sustained fire
kits held by each company, was to provide a medium machine gun capability. In
the meantime, the Vickers machine gun remained available. The innovation in the
new organisation was the formation of the battalion reconnaissance platoon,[41]
in many battalions a platoon of "chosen men". In Borneo, mortars were
usually distributed to rifle companies, and some battalions operated the rest
of their support company as another rifle company.
The
basic activity was platoon patrolling; this continued throughout the campaign,
with patrols being deployed by helicopter, roping in and out as necessary.
Movement was usually single file; the leading section rotated but was organised
with two lead scouts, followed by its commander and then the remainder in a
fire support group. Battle drills for "contact front" (or rear), or
"ambush left" (or right) were highly developed. Poor maps meant
navigation was important; however, the local knowledge of the Border Scouts in
Borneo compensated for the poor maps. So tracks were sometimes used unless ambush
was considered possible, or there was the possibility of mines. Crossing
obstacles such as rivers was also handled as a battle drill. At night, a
platoon harboured in a tight position with all-round defence.
A
contact while moving was always possible. However, offensive action usually
took two forms: either an attack on a camp, or an ambush. The tactic for
dealing with a camp was to get a party behind it then charge the front.
However, ambushes were probably the most effective tactic and could be sustained
for many days. They targeted tracks and, particularly in parts of Borneo,
waterways. Track ambushes were close range, 10 to 20 m (11 to 22 yd), with a
killing zone typically 20 to 50 m (22 to 55 yd) long, depending on the expected
strength of the target. The trick was to remain undetected when the target entered
the ambush area and then open fire all together at the right moment.
Fire
support was limited for the first half of the campaign. A commando light
battery with 105 mm Pack Howitzers had deployed to Brunei at the beginning of
1963 but returned to Singapore after a few months when the mopping-up of the
Brunei Revolt ended. Despite the escalation in Indonesian attacks after the
formation of Malaysia, little need was seen for fire support: the limited range
of the guns (10 km (6.2 mi)), the limited availability of helicopters and the
size of the country meant that having artillery in the right place at the right
time was a challenge. However, a battery from one of the two regiments
stationed in Malaysia returned to Borneo in early to mid-1964. These batteries
rotated until the end of the confrontation. In early 1965, a complete UK-based
regiment arrived. The short range and substantial weight of the 3-inch mortars
meant they were of very limited use.
Artillery
had to adopt new tactics. Almost all guns deployed in single gun sections
within a company or platoon base. The sections were commanded by one of the
battery's junior officers, warrant officers or sergeants. Sections had about 10
men and did their own technical fire control. They were moved underslung by
Wessex or Belvedere helicopters as necessary to deal with incursions or support
operations. Forward observers were in short supply, but it seems that they
always accompanied normal infantry Claret operations and occasionally special
forces ones. However, artillery observers rarely accompanied patrols inside
Sabah and Sarawak unless they were in pursuit of a known incursion and guns
were in range. Observation parties were almost always led by an officer but
only two or three men strong.
Communications
were a problem; radios were not used within platoons, only rearwards. Ranges were
invariably beyond the capability of manpack VHF radios (A41 and A42, copies of
AN/PRC 9 and 10), although use of relay or rebroadcast stations helped where
they were tactically possible. Patrol bases could use the World War II vintage
HF No 62 Set (distinguished by having its control panel labelled in English and
Russian). Until the manpack A13 arrived in 1966, the only lightweight HF set was
the Australian A510, which did not provide voice, only Morse code.
Special Forces
One
squadron (up to 64 men in total in its four patrol troops) from the UK-based 22
Special Air Service deployed to Borneo in early 1963 in the aftermath of the
Brunei Revolt to gather information in the border area about Indonesian
infiltration. There was a special forces presence until the end of the
campaign. Faced with a border of 971 miles, they could not be everywhere, and,
at this time, 22 SAS had only three squadrons, although there was also the
Special Boat Service (SBS) that had two sections based in Singapore. Tactical
HQ of 22 SAS deployed to Kuching in 1964 to take control of all special forces.
The special forces shortage was exacerbated by the need for them in South Arabia,
in many ways a far more demanding task in challenging conditions against a
cunning and aggressive opponent.
The
solution was to create new units for Borneo. The first to be employed in Borneo
was the Guards Independent Parachute Company, which already existed as the
pathfinder force of 16th Parachute Brigade. Next, the Gurkha Independent
Parachute Company was raised. Sections of the Special Boat Service were also
used, but it seems mostly for amphibious tasks. Finally, Parachute Regiment battalions
formed patrol companies (C in the 2nd and D in the 3rd). The situation eased in
1965 when the Australian and New Zealand governments agreed that their forces
could be used in Borneo, enabling Australian SAS and New Zealand Ranger
squadrons to rotate through Borneo.
Special
forces activities were probably mostly covert reconnaissance and surveillance
by 4 man patrols. However, some larger scale raiding missions took place,
including amphibious ones by the SBS. Once Claret operations were authorised,
most special forces missions were inside Kalimantan, although they conducted
operations over the border before Claret from about early 1964.
The role of Intelligence in operations and
the events of 30 September
A
useful factor in the containment of the Indonesian forces was the use of
intelligence. The Royal Signals were able to intercept the Indonesian military
communications. The ciphers were decrypted by the Intelligence Corps based at
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) listening stations in Singapore,
one of which was RAF Chia Keng which was linked directly to the RAF Far East
Air Force headquarters at RAF Changi. Intelligence from this may have been used
in planning some aspects of Claret cross-border operations.
British Psychological Operations
The
role of the United Kingdom's Foreign Office and Secret Intelligence Service
(MI6) during the confrontation was brought to light in a series of exposés by
Paul Lashmar and Oliver James in The Independent newspaper beginning in 1997,
and has also been covered in journals on military and intelligence history.
The
revelations included an anonymous Foreign Office source stating that the
decision to unseat President Sukarno was made by Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan and then executed under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. According to
the exposés, the UK had already become alarmed with the announcement of the
"Konfrontasi" policy. It has been claimed that a Central Intelligence
Agency memorandum of 1962 indicated that Macmillan and US President John F.
Kennedy were increasingly alarmed by the possibility of the Confrontation with
Malaysia spreading, and agreed to "liquidate President Sukarno, depending
on the situation and available opportunities". To weaken the regime, the
UK Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD) coordinated
psychological operations (psyops) in concert with the British military, to
spread black propaganda casting the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), Chinese
Indonesians, and Sukarno in a bad light. These efforts were to duplicate the
successes of the British psyop campaign in the Malayan Emergency.
These
efforts were coordinated from the British High Commission in Singapore, where
the BBC, Associated Press, and The New York Times filed their reports on the
Crisis in Indonesia. According to Roland Challis, the BBC correspondent who was
in Singapore at the time, journalists were open to manipulation by IRD due to
Sukarno's stubborn refusal to allow them into the country: "In a curious way,
by keeping correspondents out of the country Sukarno made them the victims of
official channels, because almost the only information you could get was from
the British ambassador in Jakarta."
These
manipulations included the BBC reporting that communists were planning to
slaughter the citizens of Jakarta. The accusation was based on a forgery
planted by Norman Reddaway, a propaganda expert with the IRD. He later bragged
in a letter to the British ambassador in Jakarta, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, that it
"went all over the world and back again", and was "put almost
instantly back into Indonesia via the BBC". Gilchrist himself informed the
Foreign Office on 5 October 1965: "I have never concealed from you my
belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to
effective change."
In
April 2000 Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence at the time of the war,
confirmed that the IRD was active during this time. He officially denied any
role by MI6, and denied "personal knowledge" of the British arming
the right-wing faction of the Army, though he did comment that if there were
such a plan, he "would certainly have supported it".
Although
the British MI6 is strongly implicated in this scheme by the use of the
Information Research Department (seen as an MI6 office), any role by MI6 itself
is officially denied by the UK government, and papers relating to it have yet
to be declassified by the Cabinet Office.
Commonwealth Order of Battle
In
addition to the ground and air force units, between 1963 and 1966 there were up
to 80 ships from the Royal Navy, Royal Australian Navy, Royal Malay Navy and
Royal New Zealand Navy. Most of these were patrol craft, minesweepers, frigates
and destroyers patrolling the coast-line to intercept Indonesian insurgents.
One of the two Commando Carriers, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, was also committed
throughout the period of Confrontation usually in their transport role for
troops, helicopters and army aircraft between Singapore and Borneo.
Source : martinharrisonsmedalresearch
